Is Iran Becoming Another 'Forever War'? (w/ John Mearsheimer) |
453,711 views Jul 20, 2026 The Chris Hedges Report
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(0:00) Intro
(3:34) Is Trump going after civilian infrastructure?
(8:39) Trump’s naivete
(10:49) Newfound coercive leverage?
(11:30) New way out will be worse
(14:28) Why the Iranians were foolish to sign the June 17 MoU
(17:30) Why Israel is staying out of this
(19:59) Improvement of Iranian weapons
(22:53) How much damage has Iran done?
(25:48) Americans taking an island in Iran
(32:25) The fantasy of the escalation of force
(38:40) Who is advising Trump?
(44:02) How much time is left
(49:15) Our two options
(51:28) Outro
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Transcript
Intro
US forces launched new air strikes last night against Iran for the eighth straight day following the deaths of two
US service members at an air base in Jordan that came under Iranian attack.
The deaths were the 15th and 16th among US service members in the war with Iran.
The US has also reimposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports to halt its
shipments of crude oil. Iran's supreme leader in response issued a statement
calling Donald Trump's signature on the memorandum of understanding which initiated the now broken ceasefire quote
worthless and invalid end quote and suspended the agreement. The latest
round of strikes is ominous. They include attacks by the US on Iranian
desalination plants which remove salt from seawater and power plants that
provide the electricity to carry out water production. Iran has responded by bombing desalination plants in Kuwait
where US warplanes are based. Nations in the Gulf rely almost exclusively on
desalination plants to provide fresh water. In Kuwait, about 90% of drinking
water comes from desalination along with roughly 86% in Oman and about 70% in
Saudi Arabia. There are hundreds of desalination plants situated along the Persian Gulf. The water supply for
millions of people with is within range of Iranian missiles and drones. Should
the targeting of desolination plants continue, it will trigger a humanitarian crisis. Iran has once again closed for
the most part the straight of Hormuz to shipping. US bases in the UAE, Qatar,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have been attacked. Iran has called on their Houthi allies in Yemen
to close the Babel Mandabub Strait should the US attack Iran Iran's power
infrastructure. This would block all shipments out of the Gulf, including oil from Saudi Arabia. Trump's escalation is
a huge gamble for the United States, whose strategic petroleum reserve has fallen to its lowest level since 1983.
Its stockpiles of missiles and interceptors are also being exhausted. After initially projecting that the war
would cost $29 billion, the Pentagon is now saying it needs $80 billion. Once
indirect costs such as increases in food and fuel prices are added, the cost to
consumers and taxpayers is about $132 billion and rising. Where do we go from
here? Will the steady escalation ignite a regional war? What will the renewed
fighting do to the global economy? And will a negotiated settlement at this point even be possible? Joining me to
discuss the latest round of fighting in the Middle East is Professor John Marshimer. He is the R. Wendell Harrison
Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of
Chicago. Professor Marshimer, who graduated from West Point, was a captain in the US Air Force. He is the author of
numerous books including conventional deterrence, nuclear deterrence, ethics,
and liidel hard and the weight of history. Uh the tragedy of great power politics, the Israel lobby and US
foreign policy and why leaders lie. the truth about lying in international
Is Trump going after civilian infrastructure?
politics. So, John, before we began, you made a point that last night
the United States apparently did not attack infrastructure within Iran. Um,
and you uh suggested that the Iranian attacks on desalination plants and and
oil facilities, we should add, in Kuwait, as well as the two uh uh bases
in Kuwait that are staging areas for US war plananes may have uh uh you know
functioned as a kind of deterrence. I just wondered if you could address that. Yeah, let's just talk about the big
picture here. This tit fortat strategy that has been going on for over a week
now started on July 7th.
And this past week, uh, early in the week, President Trump made it clear
[snorts] that if the, uh, Iranians did not surrender by the end of this week,
uh, that he would then go after civilian infrastructure
uh, in Iran. He'd go after bridges, he'd go after power plants, and so forth and
so on. But what happened was that at the end of this past week, uh he started or
the United States started to go after civilian infrastructure. We went after bridges. Uh we went after uh power
plants and we went after a desalination plant inside of Iran. Now, what the
Iranians did was they instantly retaliated against similar targets in
countries like Kuwait. Furthermore, they ramped up the bombing campaign against
Jordan and they bombed Saudi Arabia for the first time in almost four months.
So, they made it clear that they were going to play tit for tat. Moreover, the
Iranians made it clear that next week if President Trump went after civilian
infrastructure in a big way, they would basically shut down the flow of oil out
of the Persian Gulf and out of the Red Sea and out of the United Arab Emirates,
which has a very important port that's located outside of the straight of
Hormuz. All of this would be shut down. And furthermore, the Iranians would go after
all sorts of power plants, desalination plants across the Middle East. So the
Iranians made it clear that they were playing hard ball. Now, when you look at
these threats in the context of what the Iranians have actually been able to do
over the past few days in terms of hitting various targets in
Jordan and in other places in the Middle East, it's manifestally clear that the
Iranians have the capability to target
all sorts of infrastructure inside of these Middle East states.
and do great destruction. And both the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal have run articles in recent days about how effective the missile strikes
are. So I think what has happened here, Chris, and I'm just saying I think this
is what happened is that last night, which is Saturday, Sunday night, the
American retaliation against Iran did not include civilian
infrastructure in any meaningful way. They did not go after bridges. They did
not go after power plants. They did not go after desalination plants which they
had been doing. We had been moving in that direction but that stopped last night. And the question you have to ask
yourself is number one, why? And number two, is that a harbinger of what we
think will happen in the coming week? Now, my guess is that it stopped last
night because the Gulf States called up President Trump and said, "You
absolutely cannot go after civilian infrastructure inside of Iran because if
the Iranians retaliate, they will destroy our societies. They will ra.
They will wreck our desalination plants." And it looks like, again, just looks like Trump listened. And then that
raises the question, what will Trump do this coming week? Because he has promised that he is going to unleash the
dogs and go after all this civilian infrastructure in Iran, but he now knows
what the consequences of that will be. Well, he's so murial, of course, it's
Trump’s naivete
very dangerous to predict. Uh he could very well bomb civilian infrastructure uh tomorrow night. one senses he's
flailing about. Of course, the entire uh war on Iran
uh was built on a fantasy that didn't come to fruition, fed to him largely by
BB Netanyahu. Uh but it doesn't appear that there's any real strategy
uh other than an escalation of force and I think the naive hope that that will
make the Iranians bend. But you may have another take on that.
Well, I think you're right that he signed theou
on 17 June and as I've emphasized on numerous occasions on numerous platforms
that was a surrender document. Yeah. The Iranians won on every point. Then
after signing the agreement he decided to challenge the Iranians on the whole
question of who controls the straight hormuz. To me, it was very clear from article five of the memorandum of
understanding that Iran controlled the strait in the 60-day negotiating period
and then moving forward uh control of the strait would be settled between Iran
and Aman. That was the deal. Uh there was nothing about the United States controlling the strait. But what
President Trump tried to do was open a US dominated channel in the Gulf that
got around Iranian control of the strait of Hormuz. And the Iranians said
unsurprisingly, this is unacceptable and it violates Article 5. But Trump felt
confident that he could basically throw theou under the bus and he could engage
in a tit fortat military strategy with the Iranians where the United States
would win. In other words, he seemed to believe that we had newfound coercive
Newfound coercive leverage?
leverage over the Iranians after signing the June
17thou. But this is delusional. Nothing has
changed in the dynamics of the conflict as we have seen over the past week or
so. The Iranians have a formidable missile and drone capability and there's
nothing we can do about it. And the idea that we have a newfound advantage over the Iranians now that we didn't have
when we signed the June 17thou uh agreement makes no sense at all.
New way out will be worse
Well, the irony is that there was huge opposition from the hardliners in Iran
uh to uh essentially agree to thisou
uh and uh that's raises the other issue. If there is a way a negotiated way out,
it isn't going to look like theou which was a surrender document. It's going to look a lot worse for the United States.
the because theou was was uh predicated on phases.
Uh at this time around, the Iranians are going to demand that they're they have about a hundred billion in frozen
assets. They're going to want that release. They're going to want a lot of stuff up front.
I agree with that. I mean, there's no question that the moderates won uh with
regard to whether or not Iran should sign the uhou on June 17th. Uh the
hardliners said, "Don't sign it. You can't trust the Americans." But the moderates prevailed and then the
hardliners proved to be correct. So they're now in the driver's seat as best we can tell. And it seems to me, given
that we don't have any military strategy for defeating Iran, that we're going to
at some point have to move to a memorandum of understanding number two.
And it will be the hardliners, not the moderates, who are in the driver's seat. And as I think you correctly point out,
those hardliners uh will push forward uh a tougher deal,
a tougher deal for Trump to swallow. I would imagine that in addition to your
point about them wanting all of those frozen assets up front, uh they will
also demand that the Israelis get out of southern Lebanon. Uh if you look at
article one of the 17 Juneou uh it dealt with Lebanon and it was very
clear from that memorandum of understanding and the mere fact that the Lebanon issue was the number one issue
on that agenda uh that the Iranians really do want uh the Israelis to stop
bombing Hezbollah and to get out of southern Lebanon. And it could be uh one
can't tell for sure, but it could be uh that the Iranians will demand that that
happen before they sign a memorandum of understanding. And this, of course, will put Trump in an extremely difficult
position because, as we both know, the Israelis have no interest in getting out of southern Lebanon. But the problem
that we face here is that the Iranians, I think, probably have more leverage now
than they had before the June 17th agreement. I would note, Chris, that I
said, not publicly, but I said privately to a number of friends who I go back and forth with on this whole issue that I
Why the Iranians were foolish to sign the June 17 MoU
thought the Iranians were foolish to sign the 17 June memorandum of understanding. I've long believed that
the longer the war goes on uh and the more oil that's cut off from the Gulf,
the better off the Iranians are. Uh and just to elaborate on that a bit, and
this will put uh uh some meat on the bone when it comes to talking about what
might happen this coming week. Uh you want to remember that there were about
20 million barrels per day coming out of the Gulf on February 27th. You know when
people talk about 20% of the world's oil came out of the Gulf, that 20% represents about 20 million barrels.
And since the war started, we've
devolved to a situation where 7 million barrels are still coming out of Saudi
Arabia and the UAE combined. So it's only in my opinion about 13
million barrels that have been bottled up in the Gulf. Now where are those 7
million barrels coming out of? Uh, one is that Saudi Arabia is sending probably
somewhere on the order of five million barrels out through the Red Sea, not through the straight of Hormuz.
And I would guess that the UAE is sending out close to 2 million barrels
from Fuji, which is a UAE port on the Gulf of Oman. In other words, it's
outside of the straight of Hormuz. So you have this roughly 7 million barrels
of oil, 7 million out of the original 20 million that are still coming out of the
Persian Gulf. I think the Iranians have a vested interest in shutting down the
flow of oil uh through the Red Sea, that's the Saudi Arabian oil, and
shutting down Fujyra. And there's some evidence they've already shut down Fujyra because this will worsen the oil
situation, the global oil problem that the United States and the rest of the world faces. So if the war goes on and
the Iranians are able to shut down the Red Sea, which they're threatening to do, and also shut down and keep shut
down Fuji, this will work to their advantage. It will give them more coercive leverage.
So all of this is to say, Chris, if Trump does up the ante this coming week and goes after civilian infrastructure
inside of Iran, the Iranians will retaliate by shutting down almost
completely the flow of those 7 million barrels of oil that are now coming out
of Saudi Arabia and probably the UAE as well.
Why Israel is staying out of this
Let's talk about Israel. Israel has not carried out strikes in this latest round and Iran has refrained from attacking
Israel. Uh uh although they did I think the Iranians attacked the port of Akaba
which is of course very close to the Israeli border. Um uh there were Israeli
officials who objected to the fact that uh American refueling planes were
stationed in Israel. Netanyahu had to override them. Um let's talk about the wild card of
Israel. If Israel gets pulled back into this, it does feel like Armageddon at that point.
Well, the Israelis definitely want to stay out. uh they'll let the Americans
uh wage this tit fortat campaign. Uh I would imagine if a major air war started
again, which is extremely unlikely, the Israelis would willingly participate.
But I think the Israelis understand at this point that if they get involved in
the fight now, if they get involved in the tit fortat conflict, then they become a giant magnet for Iranian
missiles. The Israelis are surely watching what just happened in Jordan,
[clears throat] what's happening in Kuwait, what's happening in Bahrain, and what the Iranians are promising to do in
the UAE. Uh, and they fully understand that Iranian missiles invariably get through
the defenses. Maybe a few of those defensive missiles,
those Patriots will knock down an incoming ballistic missile, but most of the ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles and drones that the Iranians fire at those Gulf states get through
and they will get through in Israel as well. We now know that the Israelis were
not very successful uh in shooting down uh Iranian ballistic missiles and drones
during the 40-day air air campaign which ran from February 28th to about April
8th. Uh Israel Israel really got pounded and the Israelis don't want to get
pounded again. So they're perfectly content to sit on the sideline and let
the Americans wage this tit fortat strategy.
Improvement of Iranian weapons
Um the uh the other issue is that the accuracy of the Iranian missiles and
drones has uh increased exponentially
from from the inception of the conflict back to the 40-day conflict. uh largely
because I think they're using uh or it's assumed they're using uh
Chinese and perhaps Russian satellite systems. Yeah, it's it's not just the accuracy,
Chris. It's also the the missiles uh in many cases many of the ballistic
missiles can maneuver as they're coming down uh toward the target and that uh
enables them to dodge or avoid uh the missile defense systems that uh the Gulf
States and Israel have. And I think maybe most important of all, it appears
uh that both the Chinese and the Russians uh are supplying Iran with
excellent intelligence as to where the key targets are. So in other words, it's not just the accuracy. It's not just
that they can, you know, put these missiles in the pickle barrel. It's also the fact that they know which pickle
barrels to hit because either the Russians or the Chinese or both of them
are providing them with excellent intelligence and you know the maneuverability, the accuracy that you
mentioned and the intelligence information. You combine all those things with the fact that they have
ballistic missiles that have powerful warheads and you can see where they can do one heck of a lot of damage. And they
are doing one heck of a lot of damage. And again, we don't want to underestimate that they're promising to
do even more damage. And when you see what they have done up to now and you
think about the promises, you begin to say these are credible promises. And
this is why at the start of the show I was saying to you that I think that this
is why President Trump did not go after civilian infrastructure last night and
why he and I want to underline the word might might not go after civilian
infrastructure um this coming week. Although as you pointed out he is flailing around and I
think your use of the word flailing is exactly the right word. He is flailing around uh and he is in desperate
straits. So nobody knows for sure uh what he might do this week. But it does
seem that if basic deterrence uh strategy or basic deterrence logic
kicks in that he probably won't go up the escalation ladder this week.
How much damage has Iran done?
How much damage has Iran inflicted on US bases in the region with this all
classified? So we were kind of groping. Well, it's quite clear from what
[clears throat] you read in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, and these are newspapers that are deeply
dedicated to the American cause. It's it's not like these are pro-Iranian
newspapers, but it's quite clear what you read from these newspapers that we have suffered an enormous amount of
damage uh on our bases. Um, you know, usually the rhetoric in these newspapers is that
almost all of the bases uh have been either badly damaged or destroyed. And
of course, the Iranians have continued to go after those bases in places like
Kuwait and Bahrain. The fifth naval headquarters uh are at Bahrain and the
Iranians have continued to pound those headquarters and that naval base more generally. They've continued to bomb all
sorts of US targets in Kuwait. Now, very importantly, Chris, just recently we
started bombing Jordan. And the question you want to ask yourself is why are we
now bombing Jordan when we hadn't been bombing Jordan for most of the war?
You mean Iran? Iran is bombing Jordan. Yes. I'm sorry. Sorry. Iran is bombing Jordan. Why is Iran bombing Jordan? And
the answer is that we have moved lots of military assets to Jordan because they
are so vulnerable in places like Kuwait,
Bahrain, the UAE and so forth and so on. So Jordan has become [clears throat] an
important staging area. Well, the Iranians responded by going after US
targets in Jordan, and this is why they ended up killing two American
servicemen. They've also, it appears, wounded many other American servicemen.
Uh they've attacked one base and destroyed a significant number of Blackhawk helicopters.
and they have attacked the main US air base in Jordan as well. And they are
threatening to continue those attacks on Jordan. And what the Iranians are
basically saying, there is no place to hide. Wherever you go, we're coming
after you. And you want to understand that we have a lethal missile, missile,
and drone force. And we will use that force in very effective ways. and they
have demonstrated quite clearly that they have that capability.
Americans taking an island in Iran
A lot of the air attacks have been concentrated in southern Iran. Uh and
there's been speculation that this is because the United States is considering
seizing parts of Iranian territory. Some of the islands perhaps Car Island. Uh, I
don't know how they would do it. I guess they would have to do it by air. I'm not sure how that would work. Certainly, they can't do it by ship. Uh, I think
the boxer is their amphibious and that's what 200 miles away or something. But
how do you know do you see that as a possibility? And how would it play out?
Well, I make a couple points, Chris. First of all, you have to ask yourself, how many combat troops? And here we're
talking mainly about uh infantry and marines. US Army infantry and marines,
combat troops, people that you can use for an amphibious operation. Uh how many troops of that sort do we
have in the Gulf? Now you'll see in the media people say there are 50,000 American troops in the region. That's
true, but those 50,000 troops are not all combat troops. And in my opinion,
almost well, most of them are not combat troops. My guess is that there are at
the most 8,000 Marines and Army troops from the 82nd Airborne in the region.
About 8,000 combat troops at most. What are you going to do with 8,000
troops? That's a tiny number of troops. If you're seriously talking about
invading a country like Iran that has 93 million people, a formidable military,
represents a huge piece of real estate. I mean, this is a big territory that it
covers, has forbidding terrain. What are you going to do with 8,000
troops? Not only do you have to invade with those 8,000 troops, you have to sustain them and then you have to
reinforce them. This is just not in the cards. And if you listen to President
Trump talk, he says that it's not going to be American ground troops that do the
invading. It's other troops from the region that are going to do the
invading, the the ground operation. So, I scratch my head and say, "Well, who is
that? Are they going to send in the IDF?" No. I mean, they're bogged down in
southern Lebanon and the Israelis uh are too smart to invade Iran. That's not
going to happen. So, who's going to do it? And it looks like if anybody, it's
going to be the Kurds coming out of Iraq who invade Iran. But the Kurds are not
going to do that unless they're crazy. And if they do invade, it's not going to
have any meaningful consequence. The Kurds are our ground force option. This
is not serious. 8,000 troops in the region are a ground force option. I
don't think so. Furthermore, if President Trump were foolish enough to
try and seize an island or to land somewhere on the coastline of Iran,
[clears throat] many American soldiers would die. Uh this would be a highly uh
dangerous operation. The Iranians would go to great lengths to retaliate and drive those American forces off the
beaches. Uh, and the question you have to ask yourself is what does the costbenefit analysis look like for
President Trump? There'd be zero benefit, right? What is he going to gain
by invading an island or, you know, establishing a beach head on the Iranian
coast? What are the gains from that? I don't see any. And the cost, the cost is
that many Americans will die in what almost everybody will see as a feudal
military operation. uh and he'll pay an even greater political price for that. Uh so why
would he do that? Uh so I I don't see any ground force option. You know,
Chris, just to elevate for a second here, we started with a strategic bombing campaign that lasted 40 days. It
failed. uh we were running out of munitions and despite all the talk about all the damage we were doing to Iran's
missile and drone capability, that proved not to be true. So we quit after 40 days. Then we went to the blockade.
That lasted just a little over two months. And then we quit when we signed the memorandum of understanding because
the blockade didn't work. Then Trump welched on the deal on the June 17th
memorandum of understanding and we started engaging in this tit fortat war
which we're now involved in. Uh and uh that's not working as we've just talked
about that's not working. The one thing we haven't done uh oh by the way we have
actually reinstituted our blockade. We're back to the maritime blockade as well, which didn't work last time, but
on July 14th, President Trump uh reinstituted the naval blockade. Uh so
we have that at play now with the tit for tat, but it looks like the tit for
tat's not working out very well as we talked. So people are now talking about
using land power. We've used air power. We've used naval power. That didn't work. Let's use land power. This is not
a serious option. If it was a serious option, we would have tried it a long time ago. We didn't try it a long time
ago because it doesn't stand any chance of working. The point is, Chris, we have
no military option here. This is why Trump signed the June 17thou
because we had no option. The Iranians were winning the war. And then the
question you have to ask yourself is, have the dynamics changed since then? Is there evidence that the United States
has turned the tide and that we now have found a theory of victory? The answer is
clearly no. Unless you and I are missing something and they have some secret strategy in mind that they haven't told
us about. And I don't think that's the case. Isn't there always a temptation go back
The fantasy of the escalation of force
to LBJ in the Vietnam War uh when it was clear and it was clear fairly early on
in the Vietnam War uh that the United States was in serious trouble then you
get the heavy bombing campaign of North this this uh fantasy that the escalation
of force is going to solve your problem uh has been characteristic of these uh
imperial adventures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and as I said earlier in
Vietnam, although it's not tethered to reality. A couple points on Vietnam. Uh first of
all, there's no question that the Johnson administration starting in March of 65, March of 65 is when the bombing
campaign began uh big time. Uh this is
um rolling thunder. And then shortly thereafter we put combat troops. This is
on March 8th 65. We put combat troops for the first time into Vietnam.
And we escalated and escalated up until March 31st of 1968. you remember very
well that that's when LBJ who u was uh the president said that he
was not going to run for another term. He was clearly a defeated man. Uh we had
failed. Now it's very important to understand that all along the way from
March 65 up until ' 68 uh the key decision makers including Johnson
himself did not have a [snorts] lot of faith in the military option that we
were pursuing. They were desperate but they were well aware that there were
tremendous limits to what we could do against the North Vietnamese and the Vietkong with military force. They were
not wildly as optimistic. Nevertheless, they escalated.
And I think that you see a similar situation here. I think after the
initial bombing campaign failed after about two weeks, we understood that we
were in a very difficult position. I believe that we will eventually discover
that the key policy makers inside the administration understood pretty early
in this war that we did not have a good military option. Nevertheless, we've
escalated and this is exactly what happened in Vietnam. There's no question
that the leaders understood that we did not have a good military option, but
they escalated. And as you remember, we ended up with about 530,000
combat troops in Vietnam. Just think about that. 530,000
combat troops in Vietnam by March of 68 when Johnson decided that uh the war was
a lost cause. Um and he stopped the bombing campaign. Of course, Nixon and
Kissinger then came in and they thought that maybe they could find a way to win
the war. Uh Nixon said that he had this secret plan to get out of the war, but
not really. Uh what he really wanted to do was see if he could greatly reduce
the American military commitment and we could still win the war. But of course, that didn't happen. Um, and we were
forced to quit just like that was in 72, of course, we quit. And what happened
with Johnson is he quit in ' 68. And if you look at Trump and what happened, he
quit once on June 17th. And I think what's going to happen here is he's going to be forced to quit again. Not
altogether unlike what happened in Vietnam. Again, Johnson wanted to quit
March 68 and Nixon was eventually forced to quit at the end of 72. We just had no
military strategy for winning against Vietnam. We had no military strategy for
winning in Afghanistan. We had no military strategy for winning in Iraq.
Uh, and we have no military strategy for winning here. But your point is that
once you get into these things, very hard to get out. No question. And you
look for ways to escalate and it's kind of like a wing and a prayer. You know,
maybe something will happen that we don't foresee. And if we just double down, maybe, you know, we'll be lucky.
And I think there's just a lot of that going on. I think that's what President Trump was thinking after June 17th. He
figured that memorandum of understanding I signed, it's a surrender document. I
really don't like it. I'm sure the Israelis and uh the Israel lobby and
neoconservatives and the hawks in the United States were telling him he made a mistake signing that June 17thou. And he
probably said, "Ah, let's try something else. Maybe if I go back to, you know,
putting pressure on the Iranians, I can get them to cut a deal." And uh here we
are. But again, there is no deal to be had just as there was no deal to be had
in Vietnam. If you took five of the smartest strategists in the United
States, uh and you could ramp back in a time machine to March of 1965, and you
told those five strategists, it's your responsibility to come up with a brilliant strategy to win the Vietnam
War. the end result would be the same. And if they were really brilliant strategists, they would have told LBJ
not to go in. And if he had nevertheless gone in, they would have told him to immediately get out because there was no
way to win the Vietnam War. We had no theory of victory. And again, I think
that most of the policy makers at the time understood that.
Who is advising Trump?
Well, who's advising Trump? That's the question. uh you know he doesn't have a magnamera
uh whatever you think of McNamera he was competent although of course led us into
disaster in Vietnam uh but that's the question uh he's surrounded by sycopants
and people like Steven Miller I don't know if Miller is involved in this but of course he has no military training uh
you know and that that's that and Trump seems to be able just to decide
unilaterally. I mean, Congress did pass a resolution with Republican support
saying any more strikes on Iran had to be cleared through Congress that of course Trump is just blightly ignored.
Well, it's very hard to say uh you know who exactly is whispering in his ear. Uh
and it's also hard to say whether he listens to anybody. Uh it seems from the
outside that the key force for restraint, the person, you know, who was
sort of acting like McNamera. And just to be clear, McNamera figured out quite quickly uh that we had no winning
strategy in Vietnam. Uh he did not act this way when he spoke publicly. He was
full of uh confidence when he talked publicly about the war. But it's quite
clear now that behind closed doors, he understood uh that we just did not have a winning strategy. And I think if
there's anybody in the administration who fits that bill, it's JD Vance. Uh
it's quite clear that Vance was hardly enthusiastic about this war to begin
with. uh he had real doubts and it appears that he advised against it and
he has been the point man for dealing with the Iranians. I mean he is the
person who met with the Iranians uh with regard to getting the uh 17
Juneou in place. So, it looks like Vance
is the person who is telling Trump that uh it makes sense to cut a deal here. Uh
and as we all know, Vance has basically said publicly that he thinks that the
Israelis and their supporters in the United States have been going to great lengths to sabotage the 17 Juneou and
any future negotiations. uh that might put an end to this
conflict. Uh so Vance looks like one person who's pushing in the right
direction. I I don't know what to make of WhitF and Kushner. Uh I wouldn't be
surprised if Witoff was telling him pretty much the same thing that u uh
that Vance is. I would guess that Rubio is saying exactly the opposite. Uh you
want to remember Chris that what Rubio and Vance say on this issue uh has
significant implications for their chances of being the Republican presidential candidate in 2028.
I'm sure Vance understands that by being appointed the point man in dealing with
the Iranians and working to negotiate a deal with the Iranians,
uh, Vance is not going to endear himself to the Israel lobby and to the hawks in
the United States and they will go to great lengths to make sure that Rubio, not Vance, is the Republican candidate
in 2028. Uh viewers should remember that when President Trump was thinking about
appointing a vice president for his 2024 run, the two choices were Rubio and
Vance. And Vance barely won because there was a huge amount of pressure from
uh people like Rupert Murdoch to make uh Rubio the vice presidential candidate,
but Vance won out in the end. And these two individuals will surely be in a
head-to-head competition for the 2028 nomination of the Republican party for
the presidency. And uh I think how the two of them act on this whole subject of
dealing with Iran and working out a memorandum of understanding really matters for that purpose. Uh, I don't
think it's any surprise that you don't see Rubio, Marco Rubio, deeply involved
in dealing with the Iranians. He surely understands
uh who's buttering his bread and he's trying to stay as far away as he can
from getting involved in those negotiations. And of course, uh, from his point of view, it's advantageous
that it's Vance who is involved. But I do think Vance understands that we
cannot win this war, that we have to cut a deal. Uh, and that from his point of
view, but I think more importantly from Trump's point of view, I think Vance believes that from [clears throat] Trump's point of view, the best thing
that could happen here is just to cut a deal and put an end to this, accept the fact that we've lost and walk away. Uh,
How much time is left
I mean, how much how much time do we have left before the global economy craters? It's already pretty stressed
out the shortages of cooking oil in India, fertilizer,
uh, helium for microchips. I had read before the memorandum of
understanding that some economists were saying by July that if if there if there
wasn't an opening of the strait that we could head for a global depression. And
as I mentioned in the introduction, the strategic reserves have uh been heavily
depleted and not just in the United States, countries like Japan as well. How much more time do we have?
Let me tell you how I read um the oil situation.
Uh I think what's happened is that with a set of workarounds
uh we have been pretty successful at minimizing the damage that has been done
so far. Uh and there are three major workarounds that I see. First, as I told
you before, of the 20 million barrels that used to come out of the Gulf, 7
million are actually still cutting off coming out. So, when people say that the flow of oil out of the Gulf has been
completely cut off. Those 20 million barrels have been completely cut off. That's not true. 7 million are coming
out uh through Yanboo and Fujyra. That's Yanbu in Saudi Arabia and Fujyra in the
UAE. And furthermore, as you know, the canal has been I mean the straight has
been opened up at different points and um and and some ships have come out when
that straight was opened up, including Iranian ships. So the 20 million barrels have not
completely disappeared. That's one point you want to keep in mind. The second point is, and this is quite remarkable,
the Chinese have greatly reduce their demand for oil uh by about 5 million
barrels a day. Uh it's it's amazing how they've done that.
And how they've done it, we're not sure. uh but the fact is that the Chinese
demand for oil has gone down 5 million barrels. So when we talk about those 20
million barrels coming out, there's 5 million, right? 5 million that
are not needed because the Chinese have produced their demand and there's 7 million that are coming out from the UAE
and Saudi Arabia. And then getting back to what you were mentioning, there's all that oil that's been released from the
strategic reserve and that adds up to another maybe three
million barrels a day as best I can tell. So when you add all these things
together, you can see that um we have been able to weather
the crisis in the Gulf reasonably well up to now. Now, what scares people is
that the strategic petroleum reserve is running down and we're running out of
oil that's available in that strategic reserve to float into world oil markets.
Furthermore, there is the danger as I was talking about before that Fujira and
Yanboo uh will be completely shut down and then there'll be no oil or hardly
any oil coming out of the Gulf. And then there's the Chinese
demand for oil, which is the wild card. What if the Chinese all of a sudden decide that they need more oil and uh
the demand for oil from China begins to go back where it was on February 27th.
If those three things happen, then you're in deep trouble. But it's hard at
this point to say exactly how this plays itself out. I mean, for example, if
President Trump continues the tit fortat campaign this coming week and he doesn't
go after Iranian infrastructure in the process, he doesn't go after Iranian bridges and
power capabilities or power stations. Uh then maybe the Iranians will not shut
down the Red Sea and maybe oil will start to come out of Fujyra or will
continue to come out of Fyra. I'm not sure whether Fuja is completely shut down at this point and that really
matters for the overall question of oil supply. Um and then what the Chinese do
is just very hard to say. Uh so all of this is to say we're in a sense flying blind here.
Our two options
I mean really it sounds like there are two roads that we can take. One, if the
United States does continue to attack infrastructure,
we are headed for a humanitarian disaster in the Gulf. If it doesn't,
then it leaves open the possibility of some kind of a negotiated
settlement that is even more advantageous to Iran than the memorandum
of understanding. Are those the two kind of uh scenarios that that face us?
Yeah, I think that's right. Uh I mean I I don't again I don't see uh a land
invasion as feasible or as turning the tide. Uh I don't think we have any
meaningful uh theory of victory at this point in time. And I think what's happening here
is that we have this tit fortat strategy or tit fortat campaign taking place uh
between the United States and uh Iran and the question is how does it play itself out and I think we'll know a lot
a week from now. Uh it it all remains to be seen what the United States does. And
I think that if President Trump uh does
this coming week as he promised he would, which is to go after Iranian
power plants and bridges and maybe even oil facilities in a serious way, then
the consequences for uh [snorts] the Gulf States will be disastrous.
uh and uh I wouldn't be surprised if the Iranians even uh attack targets in
Israel and I think it will have a seriously negative effect on the flow of
oil into global oil markets because I think almost certainly uh Fujyra and
Yanbu will be shut down. Great. Well, thanks John. Uh, and I want
Outro
to thank Diego and Max who produced the show. You can find me at chris hedges.substack.com.
[music]
====
세진님, 요청하신 존 엠어샤이머(John Mearsheimer) 교수의 대담 내용에 대한 요약 및 평론입니다.
===
< 요약 및 평론: 미-이란 갈등의 격화와 무제한 전쟁의 함정 >
< 1. 대담 개요 및 핵심 요약 >
크리스 헤지스 리포트(The Chris Hedges Report)에서 진행된 시카고 대학교 존 엠어샤이머 교수와의 대담은 미국과 이란 간의 최근 군사적 충돌이 새로운 '영원한 전쟁(Forever War)'으로 변모하고 있는지, 그리고 미국의 중동 전략이 지닌 근본적 한계가 무엇인지를 정밀하게 파헤친다. 엠어샤이머 교수는 <재래식 억지력>, <핵 억지력>, <강대국 정치의 비극>, <이스라엘 로비와 미국 외교 정책>, <지도자들은 왜 거짓말을 하는가> 등의 저서로 잘 알려진 대표적인 현실주의 국제정치학자다.
대담의 주요 내용은 다음과 같이 요약할 수 있다.
첫째, 민간 인프라 공격과 이란의 억지력 입증이다. 미국은 이란 내 발전소와 담수화 시설 등 민간 인프라를 타격하며 압박을 가했으나, 이란은 즉각 쿠웨이트, 요르단, 사우디아라비아 등 미군 기지 및 걸프국가의 담수화 시설을 역으로 타격하는 '보복(Tit-for-Tat)' 전략으로 대응하였다. 걸프국가 용수의 70~90%를 담당하는 담수화 시설이 파괴될 위기에 처하자, 걸프국가들의 강력한 항의로 미군의 민간 인프라 공격은 일시 중단되었다. 이는 이란의 정밀 미사일 및 드론 역량이 실질적인 상호 억지력을 발휘하고 있음을 보여준다.
둘째, 미국의 승리 이론(Theory of Victory) 부재다. 40일간의 공습 캠페인과 해상 봉쇄가 모두 실패로 끝난 상황에서 지상군 투입 역시 현실적 대안이 되지 못한다. 현재 중동 지역 내 미군 전투 병력은 약 8,000명 수준에 불과하여 9,300만 인구와 험준한 지형을 가진 이란을 상대로 지상전을 수행하는 것은 불가능하다.
셋째, 6월 17일 양해각서(MoU)의 파기와 향후 협상의 악화다. 이란의 승리로 평가받던 6월 17일 양해각서를 트럼프 행정부가 호르무즈 해협 통제권을 명목으로 파기했으나, 군사적 수단이 고갈된 상황에서 향후 추진될 '제2차 양해각서'는 이란 내 강경파의 주도 아래 미국에 훨씬 불리한 조건(동결 자금 즉각 해제, 레바논 남부 내 이스라엘 철수 등)으로 체결될 가능성이 높다.
넷째, 베트남 전쟁과의 구조적 유사성이다. 엠어샤이머는 린든 B. 존슨 행정부가 승리 전략이 없음에도 불구하고 에스컬레이션(단계적 확대)만을 되풀이하다가 결국 퇴진했던 베트남 전쟁의 비극이 현재 트럼프 행정부에서도 그대로 재현되고 있다고 지적한다.
< 2. 평론: 구조적 한계와 현실주의적 통찰 >
이번 대담에서 엠어샤이머 교수가 제시한 분석은 현실주의 국제정치학의 정수를 보여줌 동시에, 미국 외교 정책이 빠진 심각한 교착 상태를 명확히 진단하고 있다.
우선, 이란의 '비대칭적 억지력'에 대한 평가가 매우 탁월하다. 미국과 이스라엘은 전통적으로 압도적인 공군력과 군사 기술을 통해 상대국을 굴복시킬 수 있다는 신화에 의존해 왔다. 그러나 이란은 중국과 러시아로부터 제공받는 위성 정찰 정보, 기동형 탄도미사일, 저비용 자폭 드론의 결합을 통해 걸프 지역 내 핵심 인프라(담수화 시설, 석유 수출 항구)를 인질로 잡는 데 성공하였다. 이는 군사적 전면전이 아니더라도 취약한 경제 및 사회 인프라를 타격함으로써 강대국의 군사적 행동을 억제할 수 있음을 증명한 사례다.
또한, 미국 내부의 정치적 미신에 대한 비판은 시사하는 바가 크다. 트럼프 행정부는 군사적 강요(Coercion)가 이란을 굴복시킬 수 있다는 '에스컬레이션의 환상'에 사로잡혀 있다. 엠어샤이머가 짚어내듯, 어떠한 전략적 목적도 달성하지 못한 채 자국 군대의 사상자만 늘리고 글로벌 에너지 시장을 위협하는 현재의 군사 행동은 외교적 전략의 부재를 군사력 재가동으로 메우려는 무모한 시도에 불과하다. 미국 내 차기 대권 구도(JD 밴스와 마르코 루비오 간의 입장 차이) 및 이스라엘 로비의 영향력 등 국내 정치적 이해관계가 국가의 거시적 전략을 오염시키고 있다는 지적 역시 매우 날카롭다.
결론적으로, 이 대담은 강대국이 명확한 종전 전략이나 현실적인 승리 이론 없이 군사적 개입을 확대할 때 어떻게 무한한 소모전의 늪에 빠지게 되는지를 적나라하게 보여준다. 미국이 현실을 직시하고 실리적인 외교적 타협으로 회군하지 않는 한, 이번 충돌은 제2의 베트남전이자 세계 경제 전체를 흔드는 거대한 재앙으로 귀결될 것임을 본 대담은 명확히 경고하고 있다.
====
<이란은 또 하나의 ‘영원한 전쟁’이 되는가?>
— 크리스 헤지스·존 미어샤이머 대담 요약 평론
이 대담은 미국이 이란과 벌이는 전쟁이 이라크·아프가니스탄·베트남처럼 승리의 전망 없이 장기화되는 또 하나의 ‘영원한 전쟁’이 될 가능성을 검토한다. 진행자 크리스 헤지스는 전쟁이 이미 이란 본토의 발전소·교량·담수화 시설 같은 민간 기반시설 공격으로 확대되고 있으며, 이란도 쿠웨이트·요르단·바레인·사우디아라비아·아랍에미리트의 미국 기지와 에너지 시설을 공격하고 있다고 전제한다. 존 미어샤이머는 미국이 군사적 우위를 갖고 있다는 통념과 달리, 이란의 보복 능력이 미국의 선택을 크게 제한하고 있다고 주장한다.
1. 민간 기반시설 공격과 상호 억제
미어샤이머가 가장 먼저 강조하는 것은 이란의 억제력이다. 미국이 이란의 전력시설·교량·담수화 시설을 공격하자 이란은 걸프 국가들의 유사 시설을 보복 공격했다. 걸프 국가들은 식수의 상당 부분을 담수화에 의존하기 때문에, 시설 파괴는 군사적 손실을 넘어 수백만 명의 생존을 위협하는 인도주의적 재난으로 이어질 수 있다.
미어샤이머는 미국이 어느 날 이란의 민간 기반시설 공격을 중단한 이유를 걸프 국가들의 압력에서 찾는다. 사우디아라비아·쿠웨이트·아랍에미리트 등이 “이란을 계속 공격하면 우리 사회의 생명선이 파괴된다”고 트럼프 행정부에 경고했을 가능성이 크다는 것이다. 미국은 이란보다 훨씬 강력한 군대를 보유하지만, 중동 전역에 흩어진 미군기지와 동맹국의 취약한 사회 기반시설 때문에 자유롭게 확전할 수 없다.
이것은 전쟁의 역설을 보여준다. 압도적인 군사력을 가진 국가가 반드시 압도적인 정치적 선택권을 갖는 것은 아니다. 미국의 전투기와 미사일은 이란을 공격할 수 있지만, 이란 역시 걸프의 석유 수송로·발전소·정유시설·항만·담수화 시설을 공격할 수 있다. 이 경우 미국의 우위는 승리의 수단이 아니라 상호 파괴를 확대하는 수단이 된다.
2. 미국의 ‘강압 우위’라는 환상
대담에서 미어샤이머는 트럼프가 6월 17일 이란과 체결한 양해각서를 파기하고 다시 군사 압박에 나선 것을 전략적 오판으로 규정한다. 트럼프는 양해각서 체결 이후 미국이 새로운 강압적 지렛대를 확보했다고 판단했지만, 실제 전장의 세력관계는 달라지지 않았다는 것이다.
이란은 상당한 규모의 미사일·드론 전력을 유지하고 있으며, 정확도와 기동성도 개선했다. 미어샤이머는 중국과 러시아가 위성정보와 정보지원을 제공하고 있을 가능성도 제기한다. 그 결과 이란은 미국과 동맹국의 군사기지를 정확히 공격하고, 일부 미사일은 방공망을 뚫을 수 있게 되었다. 그는 미국 언론의 보도를 근거로 쿠웨이트·바레인·요르단의 미군시설이 큰 피해를 입었을 가능성이 있다고 말한다.
그러므로 “조금 더 폭격하면 이란이 굴복할 것”이라는 생각은 근거가 없다. 미국은 이미 전략폭격, 해상봉쇄, 제한전, 경제압박을 시도했으나 결정적 성과를 거두지 못했다. 그럼에도 정책결정자들은 실패를 인정하기보다 더 강한 압박이 효과를 낼 것이라고 기대한다. 미어샤이머는 이를 ‘확전 우위의 환상’이라고 본다.
3. 전쟁이 길어질수록 커지는 이란의 지렛대
이란의 가장 강력한 무기는 석유 수송로다. 전쟁 전 페르시아만에서는 하루 약 2천만 배럴의 석유가 수송되었지만, 대담 시점에는 약 700만 배럴만이 사우디아라비아의 얀부와 아랍에미리트의 푸자이라를 통해 우회 수송되고 있다고 설명한다. 이란이 호르무즈해협뿐 아니라 홍해·바브엘만데브해협과 푸자이라 항로까지 차단하면 세계 석유시장은 심각한 충격을 받게 된다.
미어샤이머는 역설적으로 전쟁이 길어질수록 이란의 협상력이 커질 수 있다고 주장한다. 세계 경제와 미국 동맹국들이 석유 부족을 견디기 어려운 반면, 이란은 이미 봉쇄와 제재에 익숙하기 때문이다. 미국이 이란의 민간 기반시설을 더 공격할수록 이란은 걸프 산유국의 석유 수출을 봉쇄하여 전쟁 비용을 미국과 세계에 전가할 수 있다.
이런 상황에서는 새로운 협상이 성립하더라도 이전보다 미국에 불리한 조건이 될 가능성이 높다. 이란 내 온건파는 미국과의 합의를 지지했으나, 미국이 합의를 파기함으로써 강경파의 주장이 정당화되었다. 이란은 동결자산의 선제 해제, 이스라엘의 남부 레바논 철수, 이란의 호르무즈해협 통제권 인정 등 더 강한 요구를 제시할 수 있다.
4. 지상전은 가능한가
미국이 공군력과 해상봉쇄에 실패한다면 지상군을 투입할 수 있는가. 미어샤이머의 답은 단호하게 부정적이다. 중동에 주둔한 미군이 약 5만 명이라 해도 실제 전투병력은 8천 명 정도에 불과하며, 인구 9천만 명이 넘고 국토가 광대하며 산악지형이 많은 이란을 침공하기에는 턱없이 부족하다.
이란의 섬이나 해안 일부를 점령하는 방안도 전략적 의미가 없다. 병력을 상륙시키는 순간 이란 미사일과 드론의 집중공격을 받게 되며, 점령지 유지와 보급도 어렵다. 이스라엘이나 쿠르드 세력을 대신 투입한다는 구상 역시 현실성이 희박하다. 따라서 미국은 공중전·해상전·지상전 가운데 어느 수단으로도 이란을 굴복시킬 명확한 ‘승리 이론’을 갖고 있지 않다.
5. 베트남전쟁과의 비교
대담의 중심적 역사 비유는 베트남전쟁이다. 미어샤이머는 존슨 행정부가 군사적 승리가 어렵다는 사실을 알면서도 폭격과 병력 증파를 계속했다고 지적한다. 1965년 미군을 본격 투입한 뒤 병력은 1968년 53만 명까지 늘었지만, 승리 전략은 끝내 만들어지지 않았다.
그는 트럼프 행정부도 비슷한 경로를 걷고 있다고 본다. 처음에는 폭격으로 이란의 미사일 능력을 파괴하려 했고, 실패하자 봉쇄를 시도했으며, 합의를 체결했다가 다시 파기하고 상호 보복전에 들어갔다. 각각의 정책이 실패할 때마다 전쟁을 끝내는 대신 새로운 수단을 시도한다. 이는 전략이 아니라 “조금만 더 하면 운이 따를 것”이라는 도박에 가깝다.
베트남·이라크·아프가니스탄에서도 미국은 전쟁의 정치적 목표와 군사적 수단을 연결하지 못했다. 이란 전쟁 역시 정권교체, 핵 능력 제거, 미사일 전력 파괴, 지역 영향력 축소 가운데 무엇이 최종 목표인지 불분명하다. 목표가 모호하면 승리의 기준도 없고, 전쟁은 끝날 수 없다.
6. 트럼프 행정부 내부
미어샤이머는 트럼프 주변에 군사전략을 통합적으로 검토할 유능한 조언자가 보이지 않는다고 평가한다. 그는 J. D. 밴스를 상대적으로 협상에 적극적인 인물로 보며, 밴스가 이란과의 양해각서 체결을 추진하고 전쟁의 한계를 이해하는 듯하다고 말한다. 반대로 마코 루비오는 이스라엘과 미국 내 강경파의 입장에 가까운 인물로 묘사된다.
이 분석은 이란전쟁이 단지 국제전략의 문제가 아니라 미국 국내정치, 공화당의 차기 대선 경쟁, 이스라엘 로비와 네오콘의 영향력이 얽힌 문제임을 보여준다. 정책결정은 순수한 군사적 합리성에 따라 이뤄지지 않으며, 체면·선거·파벌 경쟁이 전쟁 지속에 영향을 준다.
7. 평론
이 대담의 가장 큰 장점은 군사력과 승리 가능성을 구별한다는 점이다. 미국은 이란보다 강하지만, 그 힘을 정치적 승리로 전환할 방법이 없다. 미어샤이머는 전쟁을 무기·병력의 비교가 아니라 비용을 누가 더 오래 견딜 수 있는가, 상대에게 어떤 손실을 강요할 수 있는가의 문제로 분석한다. 특히 걸프의 석유 수송로와 담수화 시설을 전쟁의 핵심 변수로 본 것은 설득력이 있다.
또한 미국이 합의를 파기함으로써 이란 강경파를 강화하고, 다음 협상을 더 어렵게 만들었다는 지적도 중요하다. 외교를 약함으로 보고 군사적 압박을 협상의 보조수단으로 사용하는 정책은, 상대의 불신과 저항 의지만 키울 수 있다.
그러나 한계도 분명하다. 미어샤이머는 미국의 실패와 이란의 저항 능력을 강조하는 과정에서
- 이란의 취약성을 상대적으로 축소한다. 이란의 경제적 고통, 민간인 피해, 내부 정치갈등, 장기전이 이란 사회에 미치는 부담은 충분히 다뤄지지 않는다.
- 러시아와 중국의 정보지원, 미국 기지의 피해 규모 등도 확정된 사실이라기보다 정황적 추론에 의존하는 부분이 있다.
무엇보다 헤지스와 미어샤이머의 관점은 전쟁을 국가 간 세력경쟁으로 해석하는 현실주의적 틀에 집중한다. 이란 시민, 걸프 국가 주민, 이스라엘과 레바논 민간인의 삶은 주로 전략적 지렛대나 피해 가능성으로 등장한다. 전쟁의 도덕적·법적 책임과 민간인 보호 문제를 더 깊이 다루었다면 논의가 한층 풍부해졌을 것이다.
그럼에도 이 대담의 결론은 무겁다. 미국이 이란의 기반시설 공격을 확대하면 걸프 전체가 파괴되고 세계 경제가 흔들릴 수 있다. 반대로 확전을 중단하면 미국은 이전보다 불리한 조건으로 협상해야 한다. 군사적 승리의 길은 보이지 않고, 체면 때문에 전쟁을 계속할 유혹만 남아 있다.
따라서 이란전쟁이 ‘영원한 전쟁’이 되는 것을 막는 유일한 방법은 더 강한 무기를 사용하는 것이 아니라, 승리할 수 없다는 사실을 인정하고 정치적 타협으로 돌아가는 것이다. 이 대담이 던지는 핵심 경고는 단순하다. <끝낼 전략이 없는 전쟁은 시작해서는 안 되며, 이미 시작했다면 확전보다 패배를 인정하는 용기가 더 필요하다.>
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[이란전쟁이 ‘영원한 전쟁’이 되는 것을 막는 유일한 방법은 더 강한 무기를 사용하는 것이 아니라, 승리할 수 없다는 사실을 인정하고 정치적 타협으로 돌아가는 것이다. ]
(여당이건 야당이건) 미국의 정치인들이 이 정도의 판단을 하지 못하는 것일까요?
왜 그럴까요?
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세진님, 던져주신 질문은 미국 외교 정책이 가진 가장 치명적이면서도 반복적인 비극의 핵심을 짚고 계십니다.
"승리할 수 없음을 인정하고 타협하는 것"이 지극히 합리적인 이성의 판단임에도 불구하고, 여야를 막론하고 미국 정치인들이 이를 선택하지 못하는 데에는 몇 가지 뿌리 깊은 구조적 이유가 존재합니다.
1. 정치적 자살 행위: <패배 인정>에 대한 공포
미국 정치 지형에서 상대국과의 타협, 특히 비대칭 전력을 가진 상대에게 양보하는 것은 정치적으로 <유화책(Appeasement)>이자 <약함(Weakness)>으로 규정됩니다.
선거공학적 리스크: 여당이든 야당이든 "미국의 패배를 인정했다"거나 "적국에 굴복했다"는 프레임이 씌워지는 순간, 다음 선거에서 정치적 생명이 끝납니다.
베트남과 아프가니스탄의 기억: 베트남 철수나 최근 아프가니스탄 철수 때도 정치인들이 가장 두려워했던 것은 철수 이후의 혼란이 가져올 정치적 책임이었습니다. 따라서 "내 임기 동안만은 패배를 선언하지 않는다"며 문제를 다음 정권으로 미루는 폭탄 돌리기가 반복됩니다.
2. 군사력 만능주의와 <승리의 환상>
미국 정치권과 정책 입안자들 다수는 "미국이 가진 압도적인 군사력과 기술이면 결국 상대를 굴복시킬 수 있다"는 강력한 신화에 사로잡혀 있습니다.
대담에서 엠어샤이머 교수도 지적했듯, 공습이 실패하면 해상 봉쇄를 하고, 그것이 실패하면 민간 인프라를 타격하거나 지상군 카드를 만작이는 식의 <단계적 격상(Escalation)의 환상>에 빠집니다.
"조금만 더 강력하게 타격하면 상대가 무릎을 꿇을 것"이라는 미련 때문에, 현실적인 종전 전략이 없음에도 계속해서 군사 행동을 확대하게 됩니다.
3. 워싱턴 외교·안보 기득권(The Blob)과 로비 집단
미국의 외교 정책을 주도하는 워싱턴의 싱크탱크, 군수산업체, 주류 언론 등 이른바 <블롭(The Blob)>이라 불리는 기득권층 구조가 유연한 타협을 방해합니다.
이익집단의 영향력: 이스라엘 로비(AIPAC 등)나 군수산업체 등 강경 노선을 요구하는 집단들의 영향력이 매우 막강합니다. 대담에서도 언급되었듯, 차기 대권을 노리는 정치인들(예: 마르코 루비오 등)은 이들 강경파와 로비 집단의 눈치를 보느라 타협적인 목소리를 낼 수 없습니다.
유연한 전략가의 부재: 현실을 정확히 파악하고 타협을 주도하려는 정치인(예: 대담에서 언급된 JD 밴스 등)조차 정치적 입지가 좁아지거나 '반애국적'이라는 비난을 받기 십상입니다.
4. 제국적 명분과 <초강대국 패러다임>
미국은 스스로를 글로벌 질서의 수호자이자 '예외적인 국가(Exceptional Nation)'로 인식합니다.
초강대국이 중동의 미시적인 지형과 비대칭 미사일 역량을 갖춘 지역 강국과의 싸움에서 "우리가 졌다"고 인정하는 것은, 미국이 주도해 온 세계 질서와 패권의 균열을 전 세계에 알리는 꼴이 됩니다.
이 때문에 체면과 명분을 유지하기 위해서라도 실익 없는 싸움을 끝내지 못하고 계속 끌려가게 되는 것입니다.
결국 미국의 정치인들이 이를 몰라서라기보다는, 알면서도 인정하는 순간 치러야 할 정치적·구조적 비용이 너무 크기 때문에 눈앞의 현실을 외면하고 "한 번만 더 때려보면 되지 않을까"라는 위험한 도박을 계속하는 것에 가깝습니다. 대담에서 지적된 베트남 전쟁의 비극이 수십 년이 지난 지금도 똑같이 되풀이되는 이유가 바로 여기에 있습니다.
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