Sunday, August 23, 2026

Friendly Fire: How Israel became its own worst enemy : Ayalon, Ami, David, Anthony, Ross, Dennis: Amazon.com.au: Books

Friendly Fire: How Israel became its own worst enemy : Ayalon, Ami, David, Anthony, Ross, Dennis: Amazon.com.au: Books




Friendly Fire: How Israel became its own worst enemy
by Ami Ayalon (Author), Anthony David (Author), & 1 more Format: Paperback
4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars (97)
Part of: Eyewitness Memoirs (5 books)

A highly decorated Israeli military officer, leader, and former director of the internal security service, Shin Bet, sees the light on what his country must do to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

In this deeply personal journey of discovery, Ami Ayalon seeks input and perspective from Palestinians and Israelis whose experiences differ from his own. As head of the Shin Bet security agency, he gained empathy for 'the enemy' and learned that when Israel carries out anti-terrorist operations in a political context of hopelessness, the Palestinian public will support violence, because they have nothing to lose.

Researching and writing Friendly Fire, he came to understand that his patriotic life had blinded him to the self-defeating nature of policies that have undermined Israel's civil society while heaping humiliation upon its Palestinian neighbours. 'If Israel becomes an Orwellian dystopia,' Ayalon writes, 'it won't be thanks to a handful of theologians dragging us into the dark past. The secular majority will lead us there motivated by fear and propelled by silence.'

Ayalon is a realist, not an idealist, and many who consider themselves Zionists will regard as radical his conclusions about what Israel must do to achieve relative peace and security and to sustain itself as a Jewish homeland and a liberal democracy.


'How can a staunch Zionist who was raised on one of Israel's earliest settlements and trained as a kill-or-be-killed elite commando spearhead a campaign for peace with his enemies? The answer, in Ami Ayalon's captivating narrative, is an eye-opener for Palestinians and Israelis alike.'
-Sari Nusseibeh, author of Once Upon a Country: a Palestinian life, former president of the Al-Quds University, and former Palestinian National Authority representative in Jerusalem

' Ayalon's aims and accomplishments are ... undeniably impressive ... Hope finds a prominent presence in what so many think is a hopeless, endless conflict.'
-Kirkus Reviews

'Ami Ayalon discusses how he came to see a two-state solution with the Palestinians as the best way to ensure Israel's security, not just through analysing numbers and statistics, but through a humanistic approach. He discusses ... how his humanist paradigm not only allowed him to see how the Palestinians' grievances and aspirations are intertwined with Israel's security, but also how he still acknowledges and sympathises with the narratives of those in Israel whom he may disagree with.'
-Jonah Naghi, The Times of Israel



Book Description
A highly decorated Israeli military officer, leader, and former director of the internal security service, Shin Bet, sees the light on what his country must do to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

About the Author
Ami Ayalon (Author)
Admiral (Ret.) Ami Ayalon is the former commander of the Israeli navy, director of the Shin Bet security agency, cabinet minister, Knesset member, and recipient of the Medal of Valour, Israel's highest military decoration. He organised and was featured in the Academy Award-nominated documentaryThe Gatekeepers.

Anthony David (Author)
Anthony David, a historian and biographer, teaches creative writing at the University of New England's campus in Tangier, Morocco.

Product details
Publisher ‏ : ‎ Scribe Publications
Publication date ‏ : ‎ 1 December 2020
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Print length ‏ : ‎ 320 pages





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From Australia

KennelKing
5.0 out of 5 stars excellent read
Reviewed in Australia on 4 November 2023
Format: PaperbackVerified Purchase
A timely purchase, and provides a robust background as to why the Zionists are making things worse, not better, in Palestine
Helpful
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From other countries

Miriam Leiner Zachs
5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent!
Reviewed in Canada on 29 November 2024
Verified Purchase
An eye opener written by a remarkable man of great intelligence and sensitivity, who worked on the first line and exposed his life through almost every stage of the Israeli struggle for its existence.
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Barry
5.0 out of 5 stars Essential reading
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 7 April 2026
Verified Purchase
Extraordinary book. A must read.
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Anonimo
5.0 out of 5 stars A must read
Reviewed in Italy on 13 February 2021
Verified Purchase
Ami Ayalon is brutally honest. To the outsider of the conflict it is at times disturbing. But it is precisely through this honesty and great courage that he paves the way for a different future. It is indeed a powerful narrative that must be heard and shared widely.
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Dan
5.0 out of 5 stars OK
Reviewed in the United States on 12 March 2026
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
OK
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SMB.
5.0 out of 5 stars A valuable fresh look at the military and political issues in the Middle east.
Reviewed in the United States on 22 November 2020
Verified Purchase
Lots of insight and information regarding Israel's conflict with her neighbors. Details about several missed opportunities. Told by a military veteran who has been close at hand for 45 years.
Written in English by a non-native English speaker. There are some glitches in style and usage.
Could not put it down till I was done.
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nuremberger
5.0 out of 5 stars Best non-fiction book I've read for a while
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 5 July 2023
Verified Purchase
I'll admit my understanding of the Israeli/Palestinian issue was patchy: newspaper articles, online reports and the views of a couple of passive witnesses from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. Finally it seems that I have found a book that offers a critical and informative assessment of the conflict. The author and those whose words he quotes weren't mere observers in the decades of strife but actively engaged in it. Opposing sides of a hereto unresolved impasse but in remarkable agreement about how to arrive at their shared destination .
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Shirley Herman
5.0 out of 5 stars friendly fire
Reviewed in Canada on 8 March 2024
Verified Purchase
An eye opening book especially in light of current situation!! A must read for everyone no matter where you sit on the conflict!
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Gabriel Stein
4.0 out of 5 stars Troubling and challenging
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 21 March 2022
Format: KindleVerified Purchase
This is a troubling and challenging book. To some extent, it may seem to have been overtaken by events, but I think it’s fundamental questions remain to be answered. Unfortunately, while relevant, it is not very well written, but that perhaps makes it even more important to delve into it. Whether you agree or not with the author, you should certainly read the book if you care for and about Israel – and Palestine.
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Mike Solomon, Chicago
5.0 out of 5 stars Prescient book
Reviewed in the United States on 9 January 2024
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
A engrossing memoir that reads like fiction.
Sadly prescient about current events
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Amazon Customer
5.0 out of 5 stars Insightful
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 27 February 2025
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
Reverting read and from someone who had been at the sharp end of a complicated conflict who ultimately suggests diplomacy need to work..
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R. Furberg
5.0 out of 5 stars Eye opening
Reviewed in the United States on 1 May 2021
Verified Purchase
Like probably many Israelis and Jews I have been believing the narrative that we have no partner in peace, but this book has been eye opening and changed my perspective
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Ronnie Aroety
5.0 out of 5 stars Awesome book, great author
Reviewed in the United States on 4 February 2023
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
Awesome book, great author
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<아군 사격: 이스라엘은 어떻게 스스로의 가장 큰 적이 되었는가> 요약 및 평론

<1. 저자 배경 및 저술 의도> 아미 아얄론(Ami Ayalon)은 이스라엘 최정예 해군 특수부대 사령관과 해군 참모총장을 거쳐, 대테러 및 방첩을 총괄하는 국내 정보기관 신베트(Shin Bet)의 수장을 역임한 최고위 안보 관료다. 앤서니 데이비드와 공저한 <아군 사격: 이스라엘은 어떻게 스스로의 가장 큰 적이 되었는가>는 평생을 군과 첩보 현장에서 보낸 베테랑 내부자가 던지는 뼈아픈 참회록이자 긴급한 경고장이다. 저자는 수십 년간 축적된 군사 작전과 첩보전의 최전선 경험을 바탕으로, 군사적 점령과 힘의 우위에만 매몰된 현 이스라엘의 정책이 국가의 도덕성과 민주주의를 내부에서부터 갉아먹으며 스스로를 파멸로 몰아넣고 있다고 역설한다.

<2. 핵심 요약: 전술적 승리와 전략적 파멸> 이 책의 중심 서사는 눈부신 전술적 성공이 어떻게 총체적인 전략적 패배로 귀결되었는지를 집요하게 추적하는 데 있다.

  • <전술적 승리와 전략적 공백>: 신베트는 고도화된 감시망과 표적 암살을 통해 수많은 테러 기도를 무력화하며 전술적 차원에서 탁월한 성과를 거두었다. 그러나 아얄론은 정치적 비전과 해법이 결여된 군사 작전은 결코 항구적 평화를 가져올 수 없음을 인정한다. 적을 제거할수록 팔레스타인 사회의 절망과 분노는 더욱 깊어졌고, 저항의 악순환만 영속화되었다.

  • <점령의 일상화와 도덕적 타락>: 팔레스타인 영토에 대한 군사 점령을 유지하는 과정에서 자행되는 검문, 가택 수색, 불법 감금 등은 점령당하는 팔레스타인인뿐 아니라 점령을 집행하는 이스라엘 사회 전체의 양심을 마비시켰다. 건국 초기 내세웠던 유대적이면서도 민주적인 국가라는 이상은 점차 식민지적 지배를 정당화하는 군국주의적 사고방식으로 대체되었다.

  • <아군 사격(Friendly Fire)의 본질>: 아군 사격은 전투 중 오인으로 자신의 편을 타격하는 비극을 뜻한다. 아얄론은 현재 이스라엘을 가장 심각하게 위협하는 존재는 외부의 하마스나 이란이 아니라, 점령 영속화를 꾀하며 극단적 민족주의와 종교적 근본주의를 퍼뜨리는 내부 우익 세력과 정착촌 확장주의자들이라고 단언한다. 이들이 주도하는 맹목적 안보 지상주의가 이스라엘의 헌정 질서와 민주주의적 정체성을 저격하고 있다는 분석이다.

<3. 주요 논점: 두 국가 해법과 안보 개념의 재정의> 아얄론이 제시하는 유일한 출구는 팔레스타인과의 상호 인정을 전제로 한 <두 국가 해법(Two-State Solution)>이다. 그는 진정한 안보란 적을 물리적으로 완전히 굴복시키는 무력에서 나오는 것이 아니라, 상대방에게도 빼앗길 수 없는 삶의 터전과 희망이 존재할 때 형성된다고 본다. 팔레스타인인들의 존엄과 권리를 보장하지 않는 한 이스라엘의 안보 역시 영원히 신기루에 불과하다.

또한 그는 점령지 병합 시도가 초래할 실존적 위기를 지적한다. 서안지구를 병합할 경우 이스라엘은 팔레스타인인들에게 완전한 시민권을 부여해 유대인다수 국가로서의 성격을 잃거나, 시민권을 박탈한 채 영구적인 아파르트헤이트(인종분리) 국가로 전락하는 양자택일의 덫에 걸리게 된다.

<4. 비판적 평론: 내부 고발의 성과와 시온주의적 한계> 이 책은 국가 폭력 장치의 정점에 섰던 인물이 직접 제도적 위선과 과오를 솔직하게 고백했다는 점에서 강력한 기록적 가치와 설득력을 지닌다. 테러와의 전쟁이 낳은 도덕적 맹점을 안보 수장의 입을 통해 적나라하게 드러냄으로써, 무력 지상주의가 초래하는 국가적 자멸을 명확히 증명했다.

그러나 본 저작은 몇 가지 구조적 한계를 안고 있다.

첫째, 자유주의적 시온주의(Liberal Zionism)의 시각에 갇혀 있다. 저자는 1967년 6일 전쟁 이전의 이스라엘을 도덕적으로 건전했던 시기로 회고하는 경향을 보인다. 그러나 팔레스타인 측의 관점에서 보면 1948년 건국 당시 벌어진 대규모 추방(나크바) 역시 폭력적 배제의 역사였음을 충분히 포섭하지 못한다.

둘째, 급격히 우경화된 정치 현실과의 괴리다. 아얄론이 제시하는 온건한 평화 정착 모델은 현재 서안지구에 뿌리내린 50만 명 이상의 정착촌 주민들과 종교적 시온주의 정당들이 권력을 장악한 현실 앞에서 다소 순진한 이상론으로 비칠 위험이 있다.

<5. 시사점> <아군 사격>은 승리에 도취된 군사 패권이 어떻게 스스로의 영혼을 파괴하고 존립 기반을 무너뜨리는지 증언하는 탁월한 정치적 참회록이다. 군사력과 정보 기술의 우위만으로는 결코 국가의 지속 가능성을 담보할 수 없으며, 도덕적 정당성과 타자에 대한 인정이 배제된 안보는 자멸을 재촉할 뿐이라는 교훈을 남긴다. 분쟁의 악순환을 끊어내기 위해 내부의 구조적 결함부터 직시해야 한다는 메시지는 이스라엘뿐만 아니라 분단과 안보 위기를 겪는 모든 국가에 깊은 성찰을 요구한다.

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『Friendly Fire: How Israel Became Its Own Worst Enemy and the Hope for Its Future』

『아군 사격: 이스라엘은 어떻게 자기 자신의 최악의 적이 되었는가, 그리고 미래의 희망』

아미 아얄론(Ami Ayalon), 앤서니 데이비드(Anthony David), 2020
— 1,000단어 요약·평론

아미 아얄론은 이스라엘 비판자로 출발한 사람이 아니다. 오히려 그 반대다. 해군 특수부대 <Shayetet 13>의 전투원, 해군 사령관, 이스라엘 최고 무공훈장 수훈자, 그리고 1995~2000년 국내정보기관 신베트(Shin Bet) 국장을 지낸 그는 이스라엘 안보 엘리트의 정점에 있었던 사람이다. 따라서 『Friendly Fire』의 중요성은 <이스라엘을 외부에서 고발하는 책>이 아니라 <이스라엘을 평생 지켜온 사람이 자신이 지켜온 안보 패러다임 자체를 재검토하는 책>이라는 데 있다. 2020년 National Jewish Book Award 최종후보에도 올랐다.

1. 전사에서 신베트 국장으로

책의 전반부는 상당 부분 자서전이다. 홀로코스트를 피해 팔레스타인에 온 부모, 갈릴리 호숫가 키부츠 마간에서의 성장, 강렬한 시온주의 교육, 해군 특수부대 지원, 1967년 전쟁 이후의 군 생활 등이 이어진다. 젊은 아얄론에게 세계는 비교적 단순했다. 이스라엘은 생존해야 하고, 적은 이스라엘을 파괴하려 하며, 군인의 임무는 적보다 강해지는 것이다.

그는 실제로 뛰어난 전사였다. 그러나 이 시기의 회고에서 이미 훗날의 자기비판이 시작된다. 자신이 애국심과 국가방위라는 언어 속에서 <팔레스타인 사람을 거의 보지 못했다>는 것이다. 팔레스타인은 사람이라기보다 위협, 정보, 표적의 범주에 들어가 있었다.

전환은 1995년 이츠하크 라빈 암살 이후 신베트 국장에 취임하면서 일어난다. 아이러니하게도 팔레스타인을 가장 철저히 감시해야 하는 정보기관의 책임자가 되자 비로소 그는 팔레스타인 사회를 이해해야 했다. 테러조직을 파괴하려면 누가 테러리스트인지만 알아서는 안 된다. <왜 사람들이 테러조직을 지지하는가>를 알아야 했기 때문이다.

여기서 그의 유명한 구별이 나온다.

<테러리스트를 죽이는 것과 테러를 막는 것은 같은 일이 아니다.>

이 한 문장이 사실상 책 전체를 압축한다. 신베트의 임무는 적을 많이 죽이는 것이 아니라 이스라엘 국민이 죽지 않도록 만드는 것이다. 지도자 한 사람을 제거했는데 그 결과 그 조직에 새로운 지원자 수백 명이 생긴다면 전술적으로 성공했더라도 전략적으로 실패한 것이다. Jewish Book Council이 소개하는 책의 한 대목에서도 그는 후임 신베트 국장에게 바로 이 점을 강조한다.

2. <우리가 전투에서는 이기고 전쟁에서는 지고 있다>

아얄론이 얻은 가장 중요한 교훈은 폭력에는 정치적 맥락이 있다는 것이다. 점령, 검문소, 토지 상실, 정착촌 확대, 국가 없는 상태, 일상의 굴욕과 미래에 대한 절망이 계속되는 상황에서 테러조직의 지도자만 제거한다고 문제가 사라지지 않는다.

오히려 이스라엘의 압도적인 군사력이 팔레스타인 전체를 응징하는 방식으로 행사될수록 하마스가 정치적으로 강해질 수 있다는 것이 그의 경험적 결론이었다. Guardian 서평은 이를 <모든 전투에서 승리하면서 전쟁에서는 패배하는> 역설로 요약한다.

이 점에서 『Friendly Fire』라는 제목은 절묘하다. 본래 friendly fire란 아군이 실수로 아군을 공격하는 <아군 오인사격>이다. 그러나 아얄론에게 이스라엘의 진짜 friendly fire는 군사적 실수가 아니다.

<이스라엘을 안전하게 만들기 위해 실시한 정책이 장기적으로 이스라엘을 더 위험하게 만드는 현상>이다.

정착촌을 늘리면 단기적으로 영토를 지배할 수 있다. 팔레스타인 저항세력을 죽이면 당장의 공격능력을 감소시킬 수 있다. 장벽과 검문소를 늘리면 통제력이 높아진다. 그러나 동시에 팔레스타인 국가의 가능성을 파괴하고 증오와 절망을 확대한다면 다음 세대의 적을 스스로 만들어낸다.

그러므로 <이스라엘의 최악의 적은 때로 이스라엘 자신이다>라는 것이 제목의 의미다.

3. 라빈 암살이 보여준 또 하나의 적

아얄론의 사고를 바꾼 또 하나의 사건은 라빈 암살이다. 이스라엘 총리를 죽인 것은 팔레스타인 테러리스트가 아니라 유대인 극단주의자 이갈 아미르였다.

따라서 국가안보를 <아랍으로부터 유대인을 지키는 문제>로만 볼 수 없었다. 서안의 일부 극단적 정착민과 종교민족주의 세력 역시 민주국가 이스라엘을 내부에서 위협할 수 있다.

하지만 아얄론은 책임을 극우 정착민에게만 떠넘기지 않는다. 오히려 책에서 가장 날카로운 진술 가운데 하나는 이것이다. 이스라엘이 오웰적 디스토피아가 된다면 그것은 소수의 종교적 광신자 때문만이 아니라 <두려움에 사로잡혀 침묵한 세속적 다수> 때문일 것이라는 주장이다.

이 대목에서 이 책은 안보론을 넘어 민주주의론이 된다.

점령은 팔레스타인에게만 해로운 것이 아니다. 다른 민족을 장기간 통제하기 위해 정보기관, 군대, 감시, 검열, 차별적 법률을 계속 확대하다 보면 <점령하는 사회 자체도 변한다>는 것이다.

4. 적을 사람으로 보기 시작하다

책을 쓰면서 아얄론은 팔레스타인 철학자 사리 누세이베(Sari Nusseibeh), 여론조사 전문가 칼릴 시카키, 야세르 아라파트 등과 대화하고, 동시에 이스라엘 정착민과 지식인들을 찾아간다. 중요한 것은 그가 팔레스타인 주장에 모두 동의하게 되었다는 것이 아니다.

그보다 더 근본적인 변화가 일어난다.

<적에게도 자기 역사가 있다는 것을 인정하게 된 것이다.>

1948년이 유대인에게는 독립과 귀환이라면 팔레스타인에게는 나크바와 추방의 기억이다. 어느 한쪽의 기억을 없애서 평화를 만들 수 없다. 상대방의 서사를 받아들이라는 것이 아니라 <그들에게 그 서사가 실제라는 사실을 인정해야 한다>는 것이다.

그래서 아얄론의 핵심어가 empathy, 즉 공감이다. 그러나 이것은 단순한 도덕적 동정이 아니다. 그의 공감은 매우 현실주의적이다.

<상대방이 무엇을 두려워하고 무엇을 원하고 왜 싸우는지를 이해하지 못하는 정보기관은 안보에서도 실패한다.>

바로 이 지점이 이 책을 흔한 평화운동 서적과 다르게 만든다.

5. 사리 누세이베와 <People's Voice>

퇴임 후 아얄론은 팔레스타인 철학자 사리 누세이베와 함께 <People's Voice> 운동을 시작한다.

두 사람의 합의안은 놀랄 만큼 구체적이었다. 1967년 경계를 기본으로 한 두 국가, 1대1 영토교환, 예루살렘을 양국의 수도로 하는 방안, 팔레스타인 국가에서 이스라엘 정착촌 철수, 비무장 팔레스타인 국가 등을 제시했다. 난민 문제에서는 팔레스타인 난민의 귀환을 새 팔레스타인 국가로 한정하고 보상을 병행하는 타협안을 내놓았다.

따라서 아얄론은 반시온주의자가 아니다. 오히려 <이스라엘이 유대국가인 동시에 민주국가로 살아남기를 원하는 시온주의자>다.

그의 논리는 간단하다.

요르단강에서 지중해까지 이스라엘이 계속 지배하면서 팔레스타인 국가를 허용하지 않는다면 결국 두 선택 가운데 하나를 해야 한다. 팔레스타인에게 동등한 정치권리를 부여하면 유대인 국가라는 성격이 흔들리고, 권리를 부여하지 않으면 민주주의를 포기해야 한다.

그러므로 그에게 팔레스타인 독립국가는 팔레스타인에게 베푸는 자선이 아니다.

<이스라엘 자신을 구하기 위한 조건>이다.

6. 이 책의 가장 큰 장점

『Friendly Fire』의 가장 강력한 점은 저자가 평화주의자가 아니라는 사실이다.

그는 군사력의 필요성을 부정하지 않는다. 테러조직이 존재하며 이스라엘 시민을 보호해야 한다는 것도 인정한다. 문제는 <군사력으로 무엇을 할 수 있고 무엇을 할 수 없는가>다.

군사력은 공격자를 죽일 수 있다. 그러나 정치적 정당성을 만들지는 못한다. 정보기관은 테러를 억제할 수 있지만 민족의 독립 요구를 제거할 수 없다.

따라서 이 책의 메시지는

<force냐 peace냐>가 아니라

<군사력이 정치전략을 대신할 수 있는가?>

라는 질문이다.

아얄론의 대답은 단호하게 <아니다>이다.

7. 그러나 한계도 분명하다

나는 이 책의 가장 큰 한계가 바로 그 장점의 이면에 있다고 본다.

아얄론은 끝까지 <이스라엘 안보의 관점>에서 팔레스타인 문제를 바라본다. 팔레스타인의 자유와 국가권이 그 자체로 정당하기 때문이라기보다, 그것을 인정하지 않으면 이스라엘이 안전하지 못하고 민주국가로 살아남지 못한다는 논리가 강하다.

따라서 팔레스타인 독자가 읽는다면 이렇게 질문할 수 있다.

<왜 우리의 자유가 이스라엘의 안보에 유익하다는 사실을 증명해야만 인정되는가?>

또한 그의 자서전적 구조는 이스라엘인의 <도덕적 각성>을 이야기의 중심에 놓는다. 팔레스타인은 상당 부분 이스라엘인이 깨달음을 얻도록 해주는 타자의 위치에 남는다. 점령이라는 구조적 권력 비대칭, 1948년 난민 문제, 정착촌의 국제법적 문제는 팔레스타인 연구자들의 책만큼 근본적으로 파고들지 않는다.

People's Voice가 팔레스타인 난민의 이스라엘 귀환권을 사실상 포기시키는 것도 팔레스타인 입장에서는 매우 큰 양보다.

그러므로 이 책을 팔레스타인 문제의 <완전한 역사>로 읽어서는 안 된다.

8. 2023년 10월 7일 이후 읽으면 더욱 무거워진 책

이 책은 2020년에 출판되었다. 그런데 2023년 10월 7일과 그 뒤의 가자 전쟁을 거친 뒤 읽으면 예언적인 느낌마저 든다.

흥미롭게도 아얄론 자신도 입장을 바꾸지 않았다. 2025년 Carnegie 인터뷰에서 그는 10월 7일 직후 이스라엘이 하마스에 맞서 전쟁을 시작할 권리가 있었다고 보면서도, 군사목표를 달성한 뒤에도 <정치적 목표 없이 계속되는 전쟁>은 이스라엘의 안보와 정체성을 해친다고 비판했다. 2025년 Foreign Affairs에서도 이스라엘의 장기적 안전은 팔레스타인의 권리와 열망을 인정하고 가자와 서안을 포함하는 팔레스타인 국가를 만드는 데 달려 있다는 기존 주장을 계속했다.

그래서 『Friendly Fire』는 10월 7일로 논박되었다기보다 오히려 더 어려운 질문을 남긴다.

<압도적인 군사력과 정보능력을 가진 국가가 왜 근본적인 안전을 확보하지 못했는가?>

아얄론이라면 이렇게 대답할 것이다.

<적을 계속 죽였지만 적이 생겨나는 정치적 현실은 바꾸지 않았기 때문이다.>

종합 평가

『Friendly Fire』는 이스라엘-팔레스타인 문제를 이해하기 위해 읽을 가치가 매우 큰 책이다. 특히 중요한 이유는 저자가 이스라엘의 도덕적 우월성을 외부에서 공격하는 사람이 아니라 <이스라엘 안보체제의 내부 깊숙한 곳까지 들어갔다 나온 사람>이기 때문이다.

나는 이 책의 핵심을 세 문장으로 압축할 수 있다고 본다.

<테러리스트를 죽이는 것과 테러를 막는 것은 다르다.>

<팔레스타인을 굴복시키는 것과 이스라엘을 안전하게 만드는 것은 다르다.>

<군사적 승리와 정치적 승리는 다르다.>

그리고 여기에 가장 중요한 네 번째 문장을 덧붙일 수 있다.

<상대방에게 희망을 주는 것은 자선이 아니라 자기 자신의 안전을 위한 전략이다.>

바로 이 때문에 아얄론은 흥미롭다. 그는 <평화가 선하기 때문에 평화를 주장하는 사람>이라기보다, 수십 년 동안 무력을 사용해 본 끝에 <무력만으로는 안보를 만들 수 없다는 결론에 도달한 안보 현실주의자>다.

그런 점에서 나는 이 책을 『The Gatekeepers』의 연장선에서 읽는 것이 특히 좋다고 본다. 신베트 전직 수장들이 하나같이 비슷한 지점에 도달한다는 사실은 상당히 의미심장하다. 이스라엘-팔레스타인 문제의 역설은 <이스라엘의 안보를 가장 잘 아는 사람들 가운데 일부가 오히려 점령의 지속이 이스라엘을 더 위험하게 만든다고 주장한다>는 데 있다.

『Friendly Fire』의 가장 깊은 메시지는 결국 이것이다.

<이스라엘이 팔레스타인을 지배함으로써 팔레스타인만 파괴하는 것이 아니다. 그 과정에서 자신이 지키려고 했던 이스라엘—유대적이면서 민주적이고 인간적인 사회—도 함께 파괴할 수 있다.>

이 점에서 제목 <Friendly Fire>는 단순한 비유가 아니다. 이 책 전체가 <한 국가가 안보라는 이름으로 자기 자신에게 총을 쏘는 과정>에 대한 내부자의 증언이다.

그리고 2023년 10월 7일 이후를 경험한 지금 다시 읽는다면, 이 책은 2020년 당시보다 오히려 더 중요해졌다고 평가한다.

===

Ami Ayalon on Israel vs Palestine - Jung & Naiv: Episode 839 - YouTube

Former Head of Shin Bet: Ami Ayalon on Israel vs Palestine - Jung & Naiv: Episode 839 - YouTube

Former Head of Shin Bet: Ami Ayalon on Israel vs Palestine - Jung & Naiv: Episode 839
Jung & Naiv
143,300 views  Jul 22, 2026  English episodes
==
Our guest is Ami Ayalon. He is a former commander of the Israeli Navy, former director of the Shin Bet (Israel's domestic intelligence service), and a former Labor Party member of the Knesset. Born in 1945, Ayalon became one of Israel’s most prominent security figures and later one of the most outspoken voices from within the Israeli security establishment arguing for a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After leaving the Shin Bet, he co-initiated a joint Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal with Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh and has continued to speak publicly about occupation, security, democracy and the future of Israel.

In this episode, Ami talks about his years in the military and intelligence services, the logic and moral cost of war, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, the war in Gaza, and why he believes Israel has failed to recognize its own victory. He discusses the failures of Israeli leadership, the need to understand one’s enemy, and why he argues that Israel’s long-term security depends on Palestinian freedom and a political horizon for both peoples.

Please support our independent journalism:
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or via PayPal ► http://www.paypal.me/JungNaiv

#Israel #Palestine #MiddleEast 

00:00 Teaser
01:44 Who is Ami Ayalon?
03:18 Rabin’s assassination and the path to Shin Bet
05:22 Navy vs. Shin Bet: black-and-white thinking and grey zones
08:47 Why Ayalon thinks politics is built wrong
12:20 Responsibility instead of blame
15:16 Kibbutz, family and duty after 1967
20:03 Naval Commando, war experience and lost friends
23:00 “The longest war in modern history”
25:18 Why Ayalon says Israel won the war in 2002
28:52 Zionism, settlements and security
33:30 The Holocaust, biblical places and the difficulty of partition
36:50 Israeli mistrust and the belief in military power
39:58 Gaza, Lebanon and the refusal to end wars
44:39 Is Gaza a genocide? Ayalon’s answer
50:06 Netanyahu, power and “Hamas as an asset”
55:27 Palestinian citizens of Israel and lost trust in democracy
60:00 The courts, protest and civil disobedience
65:34 Shin Bet loyalty: democracy or the prime minister?
69:45 Understanding the enemy: interrogation, fear and humanity
71:13 Israeli security only with Palestinian hope
75:10 Iran, Sun Tzu and failing to understand the enemy
80:01 Ayalon’s message to German politicians
85:00 Europe’s role and the Arab Peace Initiative
How this was made


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<융 & 나이프(Jung & Naiv) 에피소드 839: 전 신베트 수장 아미 아얄론 인터뷰> 요약 및 평론

<1. 핵심 인터뷰 내용 요약>

<군인에서 정보기관 수장으로: 흑백 논리에서 회색 지대로> 아미 아얄론은 해군 특수부대 사령관 및 해군 참모총장을 거쳐 1995년 이츠하크 라빈 총리 암살 이후 국내 정보기관 신베트(Shin Bet)의 수장을 맡았다. 군대는 적을 군사적 표적으로 규정하고 <어떻게 죽일 것인가>만을 고민하는 흑백의 세계지만, 신베트는 적의 동기와 인간적 배경을 분석하며 <왜 싸우는가>를 묻는 회색 지대였다. 그는 신베트 수장으로 재임하며 두 가지 본질적인 교훈을 얻었다고 밝힌다.

  • <첫째, 적 또한 인간이라는 사실이다>: 적의 이름, 가족, 자녀가 다니는 학교를 파악하면서 비로소 상대의 이데올로기와 인간적 실체를 직시하게 되었다.

  • <둘째, 팔레스타인인에게 희망이 있을 때만 이스라엘의 안보가 보장된다는 점이다>: 잃을 것이 없는 사람은 억제할 수 없으며, 인간은 자유와 존엄을 빼앗겼을 때 극단적 선택을 감행한다. 그는 <내가 팔레스타인인이었다면 나 역시 점령에 맞서 자유를 위해 싸웠을 것>이라며, 상대방의 처지를 인정하지 않는 군 지휘관은 결코 전쟁에서 이길 수 없다고 단언한다.

<이스라엘은 이미 2002년에 승리했다> 아얄론은 이스라엘이 140년 넘게 이어진 실존적 전쟁에서 이미 2002년 베이루트 아랍 정상회의를 통해 전략적 승리를 거두었다고 역설한다. 과거 1967년 하르툼 회담의 <3불(No) 원칙(불인정·협상불가·평화불가)>이 2002년 아랍 평화 구상을 통해 <3가(Yes) 원칙(인정·협상·평화)>으로 전환되었기 때문이다. 그러나 역대 이스라엘 정부는 동쪽 국경 확장과 팔레스타인 국가 수립 저지에 집착하여 이 승리를 공식적으로 인정하기를 거부해 왔다.

<가자 전쟁과 네타냐후 정권의 정치적 계산> 2023년 10월 7일 하마스의 민간인 학살에 대한 대응으로 시작된 가자 전쟁은 초기 12개월 동안은 정당성을 가졌으나, 군사적 수단이 한계에 도달한 이후에도 전쟁을 지속하는 것은 부당하다고 비판한다.

  • <전쟁 범죄와 정치적 종속>: 가자지구에서의 작전은 법적 의미의 제노사이드는 아닐지라도 수치스러운 전쟁 범죄에 해당한다.

  • <하마스를 자산으로 취급한 전략적 파탄>: 네타냐후 정권은 팔레스타인 자치정부(PA)와의 협상을 회피하고 분할 통치를 유지하기 위해 수년간 하마스를 자산으로 활용해 왔다. 현 정권은 정치적 생존과 권력 유지를 위해 외부의 적과 영구 전쟁을 필요로 하고 있다.

<민주주의의 붕괴와 국제사회의 역할> 서안지구의 실질적 아파르트헤이트 현실과 헌법 부재 속에서 사법부를 무력화하려는 우익 연정의 시도는 이스라엘 민주주의를 내부에서 파괴하고 있다. 신베트의 충성 대상은 총리 개인이 아니라 국가의 민주주의 체제여야 한다. 또한 독일과 유럽을 비롯한 국제사회는 이스라엘에 무조건적인 지지를 보내는 대신, 아랍 평화 구상에 기반한 2국가 해법 협상으로 이스라엘을 견인해야 한다고 촉구한다.

<2. 비판적 평론>

<안보 현실주의와 도덕적 성찰의 결합>

본 인터뷰는 평생 군사·첩보의 정점에 섰던 베테랑 안보 관료가 안보 지상주의의 허구를 내부에서 해체한다는 점에서 강한 설득력을 갖는다. 군사력으로 적을 억제할 수 있다는 맹신을 비판하고, <타자의 절망 위에 세운 안보는 지속될 수 없다>는 명제를 전략적·군사적 관점에서 입증해 낸다.

<한계와 이상주의적 낙관>

  • <구조적 시온주의의 맹점>: 아얄론은 2002년 아랍 평화 구상 이전의 전쟁을 정당한 것으로 규정하고 1967년 이전의 시온주의를 낭만화하는 경향이 있다. 1948년 나크바(대재앙) 등 팔레스타인 원주민이 겪은 구조적 폭력의 역사성을 온전히 담아내지 못하는 한계를 보인다.

  • <국제 외교에 대한 과도한 기대>: 1977년 안와르 사다트 이집트 대통령의 예루살렘 방문과 같은 극적 제스처가 현 국면에서도 작동할 수 있다고 보지만, 현재 이스라엘 내부의 극우화와 서안지구 정착촌 확장이라는 구조적 장애물을 극복하기에는 다소 이상론적인 처방에 머문다.

그럼에도 불구하고 적을 악마화하지 않고 인간으로 이해하는 역지사지의 태도와 내부 권력의 자기 파괴성을 직시하라는 그의 메시지는 분쟁 해결을 위한 중요한 이정표를 제공한다.

==

아미 아얄론, 「Former Head of Shin Bet: Ami Ayalon on Israel vs Palestine」

Jung & Naiv, Episode 839, 2026년 7월 22일 — 요약·평론

이 인터뷰는 앞서 살펴본 아미 아얄론(Ami Ayalon)의 『Friendly Fire』를 <2023년 10월 7일 이후의 현실 속에서 다시 쓴 후속편>처럼 읽을 수 있다. 2020년 책에서 그는 이미 “이스라엘의 군사적 우위가 정치적 해결을 대신할 수 없다”고 주장했는데, 2026년 인터뷰에서는 훨씬 더 단호해졌다. 가자전쟁, 네타냐후 정부, 서안 점령, 이스라엘 민주주의의 위기를 하나의 문제로 묶으면서, <이스라엘이 팔레스타인에게 희망을 주지 않는 한 이스라엘 자신도 안전할 수 없다>고 말한다.

1. 군인에서 정보기관장으로: “흑백”에서 “회색”으로

아얄론은 1945년 요르단 계곡에서 태어났다. 부모는 유럽에서 영국 위임통치령 팔레스타인으로 이주한 시온주의 세대였다. 그는 키부츠에서 성장했고, 1960년대부터 이스라엘 해군에 들어가 약 35년 동안 복무하여 해군 사령관까지 올랐다.

그 자신의 회고에서 중요한 것은 군대가 자신에게 가르쳐 준 세계관이다.

군대에서는 현실이 단순하다.

<우리 편은 선하고 적은 악하다. 문제는 “왜 싸우는가”가 아니라 “어떻게 죽일 것인가”이다.>

그러나 1995년 이츠하크 라빈 총리가 유대인 극우주의자 이갈 아미르에게 암살된 뒤 신베트 국장을 맡으면서 세계가 달라졌다. 신베트에서는 시민 가운데 누가 적인지 판단해야 하므로 모든 것이 “회색”이었다. 더욱 중요한 것은 적을 제거하려면 적에 관해 알아야 한다는 사실이었다.

후반부에서 그는 이것을 훨씬 노골적으로 표현한다.

<군대에서는 적을 죽이기 위해 그 사람의 이름도 가족도 알 필요가 없다. 신베트에서는 그 사람을 이해하지 않고서는 정보를 얻을 수도, 요원으로 포섭할 수도 없다.>

이 과정에서 그가 얻었다는 첫 번째 교훈은 매우 단순하면서도 중요하다.

<“My enemies are human beings.” — 나의 적들도 인간이다.>

이는 도덕적 감상이 아니라 정보기관장의 실무적 깨달음이다. 적을 비인간화하면 오히려 적의 행동을 예측할 수 없게 된다는 것이다.

2. “비난”에서 “책임”으로

인터뷰를 관통하는 가장 중요한 개념 가운데 하나는 <blame과 responsibility의 차이>다.

아얄론은 이스라엘 사회가 문제가 생길 때마다

“팔레스타인 때문”
“국제사회 때문”
“우리에게 동의하지 않는 사람들 때문”

이라고 말한다고 비판한다.

그가 요구하는 질문은 다른 것이다.

<“그들이 왜 우리를 그렇게 보는가?”>
<“우리는 그 상황을 만드는 데 무엇을 했는가?”>

그에게 책임을 인정한다는 것은 하마스나 팔레스타인의 책임을 면제하는 것이 아니다. 자신이 통제할 수 있는 것은 자신의 행동뿐이므로, 책임 있는 정치라면 먼저 <내가 무엇을 바꿀 수 있는가>를 질문해야 한다는 것이다.

이 점에서 그의 안보론은 상당히 독특하다. 일반적인 안보담론은 외부의 위협을 강조하지만 아얄론은 <자기 성찰 능력 자체가 국가안보 능력>이라고 본다.

3. “우리는 2002년에 전쟁에서 이겼다”

인터뷰에서 가장 도발적인 주장은 이것이다.

<“이스라엘은 2002년에 이미 전쟁에서 승리했다.”>

그가 말하는 승리는 팔레스타인을 군사적으로 패배시켰다는 뜻이 아니다.

1967년 수단 하르툼 아랍정상회의의 유명한 “3 No” — 이스라엘과 평화 없음, 협상 없음, 인정 없음 — 와 대조하여, 그는 2002년 <아랍평화구상(Arab Peace Initiative)>을 결정적 전환으로 본다.

아랍연맹 국가들이 이스라엘을 인정하고 평화를 맺을 준비가 되어 있다고 선언했으므로, 시온주의의 최초 목표였던

<유대국가의 존재와 국제적 인정>

은 사실상 달성되었다는 것이다.

그런데 이스라엘은 그 승리를 인정하지 않았다고 아얄론은 주장한다.

그 결과 전쟁의 목적이 변했다.

이제는 “이스라엘의 생존”이 아니라

<동쪽 국경을 확장하고 팔레스타인이 독립국가를 갖는 것을 막는 전쟁>

이 되어버렸다는 매우 강한 진단을 내놓는다.

이것은 『Friendly Fire』보다 한층 급진적인 표현이다.

4. 시온주의의 꿈 속에서는 “팔레스타인이 보이지 않았다”

아얄론의 자기비판 가운데 가장 인상적인 부분은 어린 시절의 시온주의를 회고하는 대목이다.

그에게 유대국가는 꿈이었다. 홀로코스트에서 가족을 잃은 부모 세대에게 국가 건설은 생존 그 자체였다.

그래서 그는 말한다.

<“We didn't see Palestinians.”>

팔레스타인 사람들이 실제로 존재하지 않았다는 뜻이 아니다.

<시온주의적 역사서사 안에서 보이지 않았다는 의미>다.

그의 전환에 중요한 인물이 팔레스타인 철학자 사리 누세이베(Sari Nusseibeh)이다.

누세이베의 집안은 수백 년 동안 예루살렘 성묘교회 열쇠를 맡아온 오래된 예루살렘 가문이었다. 홀로코스트 때문에 자신의 유럽 가족사가 거의 사라진 아얄론에게, 수백 년을 예루살렘에서 살아온 팔레스타인 가문의 역사는 큰 충격이었다.

여기서 그의 깨달음이 나온다.

<“이 땅은 우리의 땅이지만, 우리만의 땅은 아니다.”>

이것이 오늘날 아얄론의 두 국가론을 지탱하는 역사관이다.

5. 이스라엘 안보문화의 핵심은 “불신”

아얄론은 이스라엘의 군사주의를 단순히 공격성으로 설명하지 않는다.

그 배후에는 유대인의 역사적 기억이 있다.

포그롬, 홀로코스트, 독립전쟁, 반복되는 중동전쟁을 통해 형성된 메시지는 하나였다.

<결정적인 순간에는 아무도 우리를 구해주지 않는다.>

세속적 유대인은 “우리 자신밖에 없다”고 말하고, 종교적 유대인은 “하느님밖에 없다”고 말하지만 정치적 결과는 비슷하다.

<타인을 신뢰하지 말라. 힘만이 생존을 보장한다.>

아얄론은 이 경험 자체를 부정하지 않는다. 자신도 그것을 체화한 세대다.

그러나 문제는 과거에 합리적이었던 생존전략을 영구적인 국가전략으로 만들었다는 것이다.

그래서 전쟁이 끝날 수 없게 된다.

그는 이것을 매우 날카롭게 표현한다.

<이스라엘은 전쟁이 끝난다는 생각 자체를 믿지 않는다.>

6. 10월 7일과 가자: “정당한 전쟁이었지만 이제는 전쟁범죄다”

가자전쟁에 관한 답변은 이 인터뷰에서 가장 논쟁적이면서 중요한 부분이다.

아얄론은 2023년 10월 7일 하마스 공격 이후 이스라엘이 전쟁을 시작한 것은 정당했다고 본다. 민간인을 의도적으로 살해·납치한 공격에 대응할 권리가 있었으며, 하마스가 민간지역과 터널을 이용한 것도 강조한다.

그러나 그는 전쟁 전체를 정당화하지 않는다.

그의 시간구분은 분명하다.

초기의 전쟁은 정당했다. 그러나 2024년 말쯤 이스라엘 군 지도부가

<군사력으로 더 이상 달성할 목표가 없다>

고 정부에 보고한 뒤에도 전쟁을 계속한 것은 다른 문제라고 본다.

그는 현재 가자에서 벌어진 일을 “genocide”라고 부르는 데는 반대한다. 그 이유는 팔레스타인 민족 자체를 제거하려는 명시적인 <집단학살 의도>가 입증되지 않았다고 보기 때문이다.

그러나 곧이어 매우 강한 말을 한다.

<“I'm ashamed of what we did in Gaza. It's a war crime.”>

즉 그의 판단은

<집단학살은 아니지만 전쟁범죄이며, 나는 부끄럽다>

이다.

이 구분은 법적으로도 정치적으로도 논쟁의 대상이 될 수 있지만, 중요한 것은 전직 신베트 국장이 가자의 파괴를 단순한 “불가피한 전쟁 피해”로 옹호하지 않는다는 사실이다.

7. 네타냐후와 “하마스는 자산이다”

더 심각한 비판은 네타냐후 정부를 향한다.

아얄론은 네타냐후 정부의 핵심 전략을 이렇게 설명한다.

<“Hamas is an asset.”>

하마스가 가자를 통치하고 팔레스타인 자치정부가 서안을 통치하도록 놔두면 팔레스타인 정치가 분열된다.

그러면 이스라엘 정부는 세계를 향해

<“협상할 상대가 없다”>

고 주장할 수 있다.

아얄론은 이를 전형적인

<divide and control — 분할 통치>

전략으로 본다.

그의 판단으로는 이 정책이 결국 10월 7일이라는 재앙에 기여했다.

더 나아가 그는 전쟁 지속 자체가 네타냐후와 연립정부의 정치적 생존에 도움이 된다고 주장한다. 전쟁이 끝나고 정치적 합의가 이루어지면 현 정부가 무너질 가능성이 크기 때문에 전쟁을 지속할 정치적 유인이 생긴다는 것이다.

8. 팔레스타인에게 “희망”이 있어야 이스라엘이 안전하다

인터뷰 전체를 한 문장으로 압축한다면 아마 이것일 것이다.

<“We Israelis shall have security only if and when Palestinians will have hope.”>

팔레스타인에게 희망이 있어야 이스라엘도 안전할 수 있다는 주장이다.

왜인가?

아얄론은 이를 군사언어로 설명한다.

아무것도 잃을 것이 없는 사람은 억제할 수 없다.

가족도 미래도 국가도 자유도 잃었다고 느끼는 사람에게 “죽일 수 있다”는 위협은 효과가 없다.

그래서 그는 자살폭탄 공격을 이슬람의 특성으로 설명하는 것도 거부한다.

<자살공격은 종교적 본성이 아니라 절망한 인간이 보일 수 있는 행동이다.>

이 부분은 그의 안보철학에서 가장 중요한 전환이다.

전통적 억지(deterrence)는 상대가 잃을 것이 있다는 것을 전제로 한다.

그러므로

<팔레스타인에게 희망을 주는 것은 인도주의가 아니라 이스라엘 안보의 전제조건>

이 된다.

9. “내가 팔레스타인 사람이라면 점령에 맞서 싸울 것이다”

후반부에서 인터뷰어가 “팔레스타인인이 되어 점령받는 입장을 생각해본 적이 있느냐”고 묻자 아얄론은 주저하지 않는다.

<“If I were a Palestinian, I would fight against the Israeli occupation.”>

그리고 반복한다.

자기가 팔레스타인 사람이었다면 점령에 맞서 자유를 얻기 위해 싸웠을 것이라고 한다.

동시에 하마스의 이념은 받아들이지 않는다고 명확히 한다.

이 두 문장을 함께 읽어야 한다.

<팔레스타인의 저항권을 이해하는 것과 하마스의 폭력을 정당화하는 것은 동일하지 않다.>

아얄론은 오히려 적을 이해하지 못하면 전쟁에서 이길 수 없다는 손자의 말을 인용한다.

그가 이란 문제에서도 미국과 이스라엘의 정책을 비판하는 이유가 같다. 이란과 시아파 역사, 카르발라의 기억을 이해하지 않고 “충분히 폭격하면 항복할 것”이라고 생각하는 것은 적을 모르는 전략이라는 것이다.

10. 이스라엘 민주주의 자체가 위험하다

이 인터뷰는 『Friendly Fire』보다 민주주의 문제를 훨씬 강하게 다룬다.

아얄론은 서안지구에 대해서는 명시적으로

<apartheid>

라는 말을 사용한다.

이스라엘 본토 전체를 아직 아파르트헤이트 국가라고 부르지는 않지만, 서안에서는 유대인 정착민과 팔레스타인에게 서로 다른 법체계가 적용되므로 아파르트헤이트 현실이라고 말한다.

또 정부의 사법부 약화와 권력 집중을 비판하면서 이스라엘 민주주의가 자유민주주의에서 멀어지고 있다고 경고한다.

특히 전직 신베트 국장으로서 흥미로운 원칙을 제시한다.

<신베트 국장의 충성 대상은 총리가 아니라 이스라엘 민주주의와 법이다.>

그는 이를

<“The kingdom comes before the king.”>

이라고 표현한다.

국왕보다 왕국이 먼저라는 뜻이다.

필요하다면 시민 불복종과 거리시위, 심지어 명백히 불법적인 명령에 대한 복종 거부까지 민주주의를 지키기 위한 의무가 될 수 있다고 주장한다.


평론

이 인터뷰의 가장 큰 가치는 <누가 말하고 있는가>에 있다.

팔레스타인 활동가가 “점령이 이스라엘을 위험하게 만든다”고 말하는 것은 놀랍지 않다.

그러나 해군 특수부대 전투원, 해군 사령관, 신베트 국장을 지낸 사람이

<“내가 팔레스타인이라면 점령에 맞서 싸웠을 것이다”>

라고 말하는 것은 전혀 다른 무게를 갖는다.

『Friendly Fire』에서 이미 발견했던 그의 핵심 사고는 이 인터뷰에서 더욱 분명해졌다.

<안보와 지배는 같은 것이 아니다.>

이스라엘은 더 많은 영토를 통제하고 더 많은 적을 죽이며 더 높은 군사기술을 확보하면서도 오히려 덜 안전해질 수 있다.

이것이 아얄론의 가장 중요한 공헌이다.

그에게 평화는 이상주의의 반대말이 아니다.

<평화는 현실주의적 안보정책이다.>

그러나 이 인터뷰에는 한계도 있다.

첫째, 가자 집단학살 문제에서 그의 정의는 지나치게 좁을 수 있다. 그는 집단 전체를 제거하려는 의도가 명백해야 genocide라고 판단하는데, 국제법상의 집단학살 의도는 반드시 정부가 공개적으로 “민족을 없애겠다”고 선언해야만 성립하는 것은 아니다. 행동 양식과 정책에서도 추론될 수 있다. 따라서 그의 “war crime but not genocide”라는 결론은 그의 입장이지 논쟁이 끝난 법적 판단은 아니다.

둘째, 그는 여전히 전형적인 <이스라엘 안보 현실주의자>다. 팔레스타인의 자유가 인간으로서 당연한 권리이기 때문에 필요하다는 논리보다

<팔레스타인에게 자유를 주지 않으면 이스라엘이 안전하지 않다>

는 논리가 강하다.

이는 『Friendly Fire』에서부터 계속되는 한계다.

셋째, “우리는 2002년에 이미 전쟁에서 승리했다”는 말은 매우 통찰력 있으면서도 지나치게 단순하다. 아랍평화구상은 엄청난 역사적 전환이지만 팔레스타인 난민, 예루살렘, 정착촌, 국경, 주권 문제까지 해결된 것은 아니었다. 그것을 “전쟁의 승리”로 표현하는 것은 정치적 메시지로서는 강력하지만 역사적 분석으로서는 압축이 지나치다.

그럼에도 이 인터뷰에서 가장 높이 평가해야 할 것은 <자기 집단을 비판하는 능력>이다.

아얄론은 하마스의 10월 7일 학살을 명확하게 비난하면서 동시에 가자에서 이스라엘이 저지른 전쟁범죄를 인정한다.

팔레스타인의 저항을 이해하면서도 하마스의 이념을 거부한다.

시온주의자로 남으면서도 “이 땅은 우리만의 것이 아니다”라고 말한다.

이스라엘의 안보를 걱정하면서도 서안의 현실을 apartheid라고 부른다.

이러한 <두 가지 사실을 동시에 붙들려는 태도>가 이 인터뷰의 가장 큰 지적 힘이다.

마지막 장면도 인상적이다. 인터뷰는 그의 집 주변에 있는 수백 년 된 올리브나무 이야기로 끝난다. 자신은 그 나무를 심지 않았지만 지금도 열매를 맺고 있으며, 자신이 평화를 살아서 보지 못할 수도 있다고 말한다.

그리고 이렇게 결론짓는다.

<우리는 나무를 심지 못하더라도 아이디어를 심어야 한다. 우리 아이들과 손자들을 위해서.>

82세를 바라보는 전직 정보기관장의 이 말은 그의 정치철학을 압축한다.

<승리란 적을 굴복시키는 것이 아니라 다음 세대가 더 이상 같은 전쟁을 하지 않도록 만드는 것이다.>

그런 의미에서 이 2026년 인터뷰는 『Friendly Fire』보다 더 강하고 더 비관적이면서도, 동시에 더 희망적인 아얄론을 보여준다. 『Friendly Fire』가 <이스라엘이 어떻게 자기 자신의 적이 되었는가>를 설명했다면, 이번 인터뷰는 한 걸음 더 나아가 이렇게 묻는다.

<이스라엘은 아직 자기 자신으로부터 스스로를 구할 수 있는가?>

아얄론의 대답은 조건부로 <그렇다>이다. 그러나 조건은 분명하다.

<팔레스타인을 적이기 전에 인간으로 보고, 팔레스타인의 국가와 희망을 이스라엘 자신의 안보조건으로 인정해야 한다.> 

===
Transcript
===
0:00
Your people expect from you to kill the enemies. So the enemies, whether you like it or not, are becoming military targets.
0:12
I'm not proud of it. I killed many people in many ways.
0:17
I knew nothing about them, personally. I didn't know their names. I didn't know their families, their wives, their children, with whom they pray in the mosque.
0:27
You didn't need it. A military commander always asks is how, how to kill.
0:33
And we have been fighting so many years, and what happened to us is
0:39
horrible. Because if you ask me, and this is the way I understand our war,
0:44
we won the war. And we refuse to recognize our victory.
0:50
And I'll say it again, although many people believe that I'm a traitor,
0:57
if I were a Palestinian I would fight against the Israeli occupation
1:05
I will never accept the Hamas ideas but against the
1:12
occupation in order to achieve my freedom and I will add that every
1:19
statement, Israeli statement and every military commander who
1:26
will give you a different answer. He is either stupid
1:34
or he just does not know his enemy and he will never win this war.
Who is Ami Ayalon?
1:44
All right, new episode of Jung & Naiv. I have a new guest. Who are you? Well, it's a very interesting question. I'm asking myself every day. Who am I?
1:54
My name is Ami Ayalon. I was born in the Jordan Valley, which is on the other side of Israel. And as a child,
2:03
the Syrians were up above. And we used to spend many days in shelters. But it was okay because we knew
2:16
exactly what for. To build the state of Israel.
2:23
You were born in 45? Yeah, I was born in 45 and my parents came from Europe during the British Mandate as illegal immigrant. My father, my mother, a
2:33
child to study in Jerusalem. And when I was 18 years old,
2:40
I joined the military, in my case, Naval Commando. The idea was to do it
2:46
for three, four years, but I found myself leaving the Navy after a
2:53
military career of about 35 years as a commander of the Israeli Navy.
2:58
I fought too many wars, too many battles, too many operations. Too many? Too many. I lost too many friends. and the idea was to join you know
3:10
the the business community but it was immediately
Rabin’s assassination and the path to Shin Bet
3:18
about one month after the assassination of our prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres who was a prime minister then asked me to replace the
3:30
director of the Israeli Shin Bet who retired as a result of the assassination. And I couldn't refuse. Why? Why? Because,
3:39
I don't know, I think that since the war of attrition,
3:45
I find myself in the shoes of my father, who could,
3:51
he never could separate from his personal life
4:00
and his collective or the way he saw, you know, the future and the security of the State of Israel. I remember that when he was very old, he came in
4:09
38, and when he was 90 years old, before he died, I used to ask him every
4:14
day by phone, how do you feel? And his house is built on
4:20
the shore of the lake, Lake of Galilee. and on the other side of the lake
4:26
he just sees the Hermon Mountain but what he cares about is the level of
4:32
the sea the level of the lake and he said well because this was it was the
4:39
only source of sweet water for Israel so he
4:46
said well how do I feel? I said not very well and I knew that it's not
4:53
him it's the level of the lake and he couldn't separate between the level
4:59
of the lake and the state of the nation I don't know anyhow so I couldn't
5:05
refuse because I felt that it's my responsibility I'm saying it because
5:11
exactly one year before after finishing almost more than three years
5:18
as a commander of the navy Rabin called me and asked me to replace the
Navy vs. Shin Bet: black-and-white thinking and grey zones
5:25
director of the Shin Bet. And I refused.
5:32
And I was lucky enough that he didn't ask why. Personally, I know exactly why, because, you know, when you are in the Navy
5:42
or in the military, the reality is very, very clear. You know, it's simple,
5:48
simplistic. all the colors are white and black good guys,
5:54
bad guys good guys, bad guys and all what we have to do is to kill the bad guys and to defend the good guys and in the Shin Bet which is internal
6:04
security all the colors are gray, you know, you have to try to see
6:11
a potential enemy among your citizens which for me was
6:19
against all white I used to believe in. And, you know, you have to follow
6:25
them, you have to sometimes to listen to them, and you have to... Anyhow, so I said no. But after he was assassinated,
6:36
I couldn't refuse because I think that it was a moment in which I understood that I'm living in a place that I didn't really know before, the
6:47
Israeli society and the idea that a Jewish
6:54
Israeli citizen would assassinate our prime minister
7:02
on the question on who we are
7:07
and what have we come to be here as a people.
7:16
this was a debate and you know we say okay Yigal Amir he was an
7:23
assassin, he was a terrorist but we have to understand that hundreds of thousands supported him and even today it was after the Oslo Accord right?
7:34
yeah it was the reason because Rabin chose to try to negotiate
7:41
and to achieve agreement between us and to put an end to this war.
7:48
And there are too many people that used to believe that this is
7:55
a holy place and, you know, it was given to us by God and we do not
8:02
have the right to betray God and the country and etc.
8:08
So, yes, I felt that I I don't have the right to say no, so I did it for four and a half years.
8:20
I'm still trying to explain who am I, and I'll finish by saying that the
8:25
way I understand myself and the way I understand the Israeli society,
8:32
the people who are living around us, the Middle East and the world, I think
8:37
that it is a result of almost four and a half years as the director of the Israeli Shin Bet.
8:43
Much more than the way I understood myself during my childhood.
Why Ayalon thinks politics is built wrong
8:50
So, yes, okay, today I... You retired? Yes, I retired several times, by the way, from the Navy, from
8:59
the Shin Bet, and from some business, you know, organizations that I led.
9:08
You went to politics? Yeah, I tried politics. I was a lousy politician.
9:15
Because when you are elected and you cannot change the reality according to
9:22
what you believe in, so there is no reason to stay there. So it took me about four years to understand. I just didn't listen to my
9:32
wife. She told me from the very beginning, you don't fit.
9:37
Why did you say that? Well, she was right. And today I can tell you that every politician will have to decide every day whether
9:49
he is taking his decisions in order to improve the future of his country,
9:55
its health system, education, science, security, whatever. Or he's taking the same decision in order to be elected.
10:04
To convince his base. And those who survive are the people who are giving
10:11
up on their dreams and too many times forget why they enter into politics.
10:18
And we blame them, but it is not. We shouldn't. We created a system, political system, in which they are not elected.
10:30
elected every four or five years. They are elected every day because the revolution in media, communication, networks, with the globalization
10:41
change the world. And the power, the political power is not in their
10:49
hands because they have to be elected. In a way, every day they They ask
10:55
you and me, where do you want us to lead? Where do you want me to lead you?
11:01
Poles. Shouldn't it be the other way around? It was. It was. During the 19th century, you know, Clausewitz, et cetera, et cetera.
11:12
We don't understand the change, these two revolutions.
11:18
or media, the way we understand the reality, the way we get and we digest
11:24
and we store and we mine the information,
11:31
created a major change on everything, on our economy,
11:38
our security, the way we fight, by the way. You will ask later about the war. Everything is different. So we shouldn't blame.
11:48
to not to blame ourselves but to take responsibility we should shift from a
11:53
language of blame blaming everybody we blame Palestinians we blame our Prime Minister we blame our our Parliament members no it's to a language of
12:03
responsibility language of responsibility start with a totally different
12:09
question what can I do about it what did I do about it
12:16
and then to try to understand the other side etc etc introspection so
Responsibility instead of blame
12:23
yes I think that we lack we as a community in many places but I'm
12:31
speaking as an Israeli we do not want and refuse
12:39
to see us from outside, which means to see and to try
12:46
to understand our enemies or the people who do not agree with us.
12:53
And again, this is a language of blame. We blame Palestinians. We blame the international community. We blame everybody who do not agree
13:04
to what we are doing. And we do not give ourselves any answer
13:11
because we do not ask what can we do or what did we do in order for him to
13:18
see us the way he sees. Before we dive in, tell us real quickly, where are
13:24
we? Yeah, we are sitting now in my, not my, but it belongs to my family,
13:32
Olive Grove. This tree behind us,
13:37
one of the professors told me that he's between around 600 years old.
13:45
And it's very, very important because, you know, I know that I didn't plant
13:52
this tree. I was not here when it was planted.
13:57
It was during the Mamluk and later Ottoman Empire.
14:05
And in a way, it gives you some perspective of who we are and what is our
14:11
role. and a friend of mine told me
14:19
he deals with olive trees and he said once we have to remember all of us
14:25
are here in order to make sure that these trees that we did not plant will
14:32
survive and will live after us this tree is still giving fruits and we
14:39
produce olive oil from a tree which is more or less 600 years old.
14:45
So we are here in the south of the Kalman Mountain. These are the hills of
14:51
the mountain, which is up to the north. And, yeah, it's a village, agricultural village.
15:02
And, yeah, this is a place. You didn't grow up here? No, I didn't. Jordan Valley
15:10
and
Kibbutz, family and duty after 1967
15:16
I left the kibbutz it was a kibbutz because
15:23
you know the kibbutz decided you know in the kibbutz the kibbutz decide for
15:29
you what you will do because this is a voice of the majority it's a total
15:35
you know a type of democracy, I don't know, equal rights.
15:41
Everybody has equal rights. And we decided, I decided then that
15:47
I see myself as you know, going on serving,
15:54
it was after the Six Day War. I decided, and the whole security of our
16:01
small country was, we felt on our shoulders. it was a war of attrition and many people from the unit died and many were
16:13
wounded and uh and i said okay i'm not going to ask anybody i uh i'm just
16:19
going to leave the kibbutz so i left the kibbutz and then i uh i fell in
16:24
love with my wife today about 55 years ago and um
16:31
and truth And we left to her kibbutz. But later, after finishing my first degree in the university, still in the
16:41
Navy, we decided that we want our children to sleep with us,
16:48
which in the kibbutz it was not what we did.
16:53
Because I was in the Navy and I came back only during the night. And I
16:59
couldn't see my son the whole week. Where did the kids stay in the kibbutz?
17:04
In the kindergarten. All of them, yes. Overnight? Yeah, of course.
17:09
Every night, every day. I used to meet my parents one or two hours a day.
17:17
We didn't need it. If you ask me, I had a great, great childhood.
17:23
Really, this is the way I understand my childhood. only as a father I try to understand I think that I needed it as a father
17:34
not as a child this is the way I understand it I don't blame it if I am not
17:39
okay it is not because of the kibbutz it is because something happened on the way I have no idea anyhow so and I was just you know
17:51
nominated the commander of the naval commando here not far from here so we were looking for a very cheap place it was cheap then it was before the
18:00
withdrawal from Sinai when the prices went up at the end of 70s?
18:05
yes it was 79 so this was probably the only
18:13
place that we could buy today you have to be a million in order to buy it but we were lucky it was not a business wisdom or something
18:26
and that's it so I came and all my children are living here and
18:33
one of them is not far from here small kibbutz 15 minutes from here and my
18:42
I have 5 granddaughters and 4 grandsons all of them somewhere
18:49
around so you were a soldier for decades a sailor i don't know
18:56
it's uh yeah okay yeah you were in the marine yeah i was in the marine in
19:01
the navius why were you a good sailor why were you promoted so much uh why
19:08
did i why did they promote you oh okay well you have to ask them you know
19:14
okay it's uh you never you never figured it out well i i tried or if you ask me i was good enough in order to be promoted but it's uh i'm not here to,
19:23
you know, to praise myself.
19:29
You were a good leader? I have no idea. I want to believe that I did
19:36
something good and I did it the right way.
19:43
But again, I'm not here to answer this very, very important question.
19:49
I was decorated twice again because I participated in a in a very very
19:56
complicated operations one is a Green Island We don't have the time to
20:02
explain, but okay, it was... we lost out of about
Naval Commando, war experience and lost friends
20:09
35 people who raided this island. It was a fortified
20:15
castle, something like this,
20:22
that the British built in the north part of the Red Sea.
20:27
entrance to the Suez Canal from the south. And the idea was to defend the
20:33
south entrance. And it was there was
20:40
about 120 Egyptians, among them about
20:47
80 commando warriors and the rest operators of the
20:53
machine guns anti -aircraft etc etc and we have to uh
21:00
to conquer this island the only way to uh to reach the island
21:07
was by diving so we it was during the night we had to dive and then to to
21:14
climb on the etc etc i was wounded we lost six uh six of our
21:21
warriors out of about uh 30 or 35 people
21:31
um anyhow it was uh one of the again too many operations that i took part
21:39
And, but the question was why I joined the Navy.
21:44
It was stupid. You know, I remember that I was asked a question when I volunteered.
21:52
And I said, what do you mean? I was born, you know, on the lake of the sea.
21:57
And they were laughing. What do you mean sea? This is the lake of Galilee. And I said, well, for me, it was a major, huge sea. So only when I joined
22:07
the Navy, I understood that, you know, it's okay. They used to say in Italian, they used to say, oh, there's my narrowed aqua dulce, which is, I don't know,
22:16
sailors of sweet water. Anyhow, so it took me a while to understand.
22:24
but yes I love the sea and the storms and the
22:30
challenge that the sea create for every sailor
22:38
and the command of a missile boat or a missile boat
22:45
squadron and to dive and again so it's I love
22:51
the life in the sea and
22:59
after several years after the Six Day War it was not
“The longest war in modern history”
23:06
an adventure anymore but it was a kind of responsibility a duty
23:13
again because in a way I think that since the Six Day War
23:21
we all of us in the naval commando in the navy and in israel we have been
23:27
fighting almost every day it's a one it's a long probably the longest war
23:34
of the of the modern history If you ask me,
23:41
we are fighting our war for over 140 years
23:48
since the concept of Zionism was created
23:55
in the end of the 19th century. We used to say, okay, the first Zionist
24:01
immigrant, 1981, 82, some people will tell you,
24:08
okay, even earlier. And since the first day, we have enemies who do not accept our right to declare ourselves as
24:21
a nation. They used to say Judaism is a religion, is not a state, is not a
24:27
nation, and we do not have the right to declare ourselves as a state.
24:34
And they fought states and organizations, and we have been fighting since
24:41
then until we created the state of Israel and later in order to defend the
24:47
state of Israel. And we have been fighting so many years, and what happened
24:54
to us is horrible because if you ask me, and this is the way I understand our war, we won the war. and we refuse to recognize our victory.
25:06
You mean the creation of the state? No, we believe in the creation of the
25:13
state. When I say we won the war, we won the war because finally,
Why Ayalon says Israel won the war in 2002
25:20
why or what for? We fought.
25:25
We fought in order to create and later to defend the state of Israel as a
25:30
Jewish democracy. and we won this war in 2002
25:37
in Beirut. This was a declaration of our victory.
25:42
You know, I'm not sure that the audience understands, you know, when I say the three nodes of Khartoum. Okay, the three nodes of Khartoum after the
25:52
six -day war in which Israel defeated the Syrian, the Egyptian,
25:58
and the Jordanian armies in six days. It was, they suffered a humiliated
26:05
defeat. And they, all the Arab League members, they go to Khartoum.
26:13
And the three no's of Khartoum, no to recognition, no to negotiation, and
26:19
no to peace with Israel. Israel is not a legitimate entity.
26:25
And we went on fighting. but in 2002 the world is changing
26:33
it's too complicated but they unite all the Arab League
26:40
members in Beirut and it is after
26:47
the beginning of Oslo and it was after you know invade of Iraq
26:54
first Iraq war, second Iraq war, etc and they understand that the reality
26:59
is different. And they changed the three no's to three yes.
27:07
Yes to recognition, yes to negotiation, and yes to peace with Israel on the
27:13
condition that Israel will accept all the Security Council resolutions and
27:20
the UN resolutions, which we did. but we refuse to see it no government in Israel no government in Israel
27:32
discussed the Arab peace initiative that was agreed in 2002 and we are
27:39
going on fighting and if you ask me the war that we are fighting today is
27:47
not a just war our war was just until
27:54
2002. Once they recognize the reason why we fought for
28:03
the war that we are fighting today is not a just war.
28:10
And I'm not sure that all Israelis will agree with me but frankly speaking,
28:15
we are fighting in order to expand our eastern border and to deny the
28:20
option for the Palestinians to declare themselves as a nation and to have
28:27
their own state side by side on the other side of the border.
28:34
And we know the Palestinians, but we do not see the Palestinians as a
28:41
people who deserve a state of their own. Sounds like the Arabs who didn't
28:47
want to see a Jewish state. Exactly. But we don't see it.
Zionism, settlements and security
28:52
We refuse to see it. Why? Well, I'm not a philosopher.
28:57
I'm not a historian. But the way I understand it, it's too difficult for us.
29:14
Look, I never ask my parents.
29:20
What was the concept of Zionism? Well, I was a child. I couldn't care less. I didn't have questions.
29:29
Everything was clear. We have to build this state. The Jewish people is in a great danger.
29:38
They understood it before the Holocaust. All their parents stayed in Europe and were assassins there.
29:51
I am a generation without grandparents. I didn't see any old person until
29:57
my parents became old. And I'm saying it because I believe that if I would ask, the answer
30:08
will be we have to build a state for the Jewish people which is in great
30:14
danger. And the state will be wherever in the state of Israel because this
30:20
was the place in which the people of Israel were born.
30:26
the promised land and it will be wherever we can build a settlement walk
30:33
the land and defend ourselves so the two pillars were settlements and
30:38
security after the six day war nothing was changed
30:44
you know we still have to fight because nobody recognized us etc etc I
30:52
stayed in the security in the Navy. The idea was to go back after four years. But I realized that I don't have the right to leave the naval
31:03
commando because there is war. And you cannot, you don't have the moral
31:09
right to go and to work for yourself or to live a great life.
31:15
And I'm saying it because
31:22
for us it was a dream. We didn't see Palestinians.
31:29
They were living here. But I as a child, I didn't see them.
31:37
Because it was a dream. We are going to create something new.
31:43
And it's something very, very difficult to explain. Okay, they are here, but we don't see them. we don't count them and I'm saying it
31:55
because in retrospect it was a dream and you ask me why it is so difficult
32:02
because the awakening process the reality is not as
32:09
your dream suddenly you see that Palestinians are here suddenly you
32:15
understand that this land is yours but it is not only ours.
32:21
They are living here for hundreds of years. You know, I have a very, very good Palestinian friend. I met him when we ran a very
32:32
strange, you know, initiative trying to explain after I left the Shin Bet
32:37
and I left the politics, I decided to, oh, before the politics, sorry, after I left the Shin Bet, to run an initiative to explain to the Israelis,
32:48
that we can achieve agreement because Palestinians are human beings and
32:54
they want a better life. And I remember when I met Professor Nusseibeh,
33:01
he was the president of the largest Palestinian university,
33:08
which is Al-Quds University in Jerusalem. I'm going to meet him on Saturday. Ah, great. We're going to talk. Very good. Send him my regards. You know, it's okay. he
33:17
mentioned me in his book and I mentioned him in my book anyhow you don't have to read these two books anyhow and um
33:26
and you realize that um ah okay
The Holocaust, biblical places and the difficulty of partition
33:33
the first question that he asked me uh no I I asked him okay sorry yeah I
33:39
asked him uh he asked me first uh where you came from so I said okay my
33:45
parents came from Europe etc. I said no no you're a family tree come on what is a family tree my family tree was erased during the holocaust I don't have
33:56
family tree I don't have Kravir but we are going to create a great future we have past a great past the bible and the
34:07
history but this is not my I don't have family tree But I asked him,
34:14
where would you use family tree? And he said, my family tree start in Jerusalem during the seventh century, during the time of Muhammad. And, you know, the
34:23
Christians, with all the respect, they are fighting each other almost as much as we do on who own the Holy Church in Jerusalem.
34:33
and they need a non -Christian to keep the tree
34:40
of the Holy Church the Nuseiba family is a family that keeps for hundreds
34:46
of years the key of the Holy Church ask him about it
34:53
and you know I'm saying it because can I tell him listen, this is mine, not
35:00
yours so the idea that you have to divide this piece of land, you know my mother after the six day war I told her that she came to study in Jerusalem
35:10
and every weekend it was you know during the late 30s they used to walk
35:19
to Beit Lechem Kev Rachel one of the
35:26
Jewish mothers is buried there And then they used to walk,
35:32
which is a long walk, by the way, to the Wailing Wall.
35:40
And from time to time, they used to drive to Hebron, which is Abraham's
35:46
boat, etc., etc. So she told me, okay, I want you to rent a car and to take
35:52
me to Bethlehem, etc., etc. These are the places that we learn during our
35:59
childhood. Jerusalem, Beit Lechem, Hebron, Jericho.
36:05
These are places. This is our history. So the awakening process is very,
36:12
very difficult. And this is my explanation.
36:18
This is one. The second, I think that as a society,
36:29
we do not trust anybody it is not mentioned in our security doctrine
36:36
but if you ask me, we do not trust this is what we learned from our history
36:42
we never had, we never, you know, we fought in this area, historians will
36:49
tell you between six to seven hundred wars in the history of this area,
Israeli mistrust and the belief in military power
36:56
this region, Israel, Palestine, whatever you call it. Many of them were
37:02
wars that we, when we were here, we fought.
37:08
In none of our wars, we were not a member of a coalition.
37:15
That's it. And, you know, I remember that during the Sinai War,
37:21
my father said, well, in a moment of truth, nobody will be there for
37:28
us. This is what we learned from our history. If you ask people, why you do
37:34
not have confidence in anybody? Why you are afraid?
37:41
Some people will start the history from the ruins of the second temple, and
37:46
then they will stop for a moment during the Spanish in physician, and then they will go for pogroms and everybody will stop in the Holocaust.
37:56
And what we learned is in a moment of truth,
38:06
when we are fighting for our existence, nobody will be there for us.
38:13
The idea that only God, etc. Everybody, religious people will tell you God
38:18
saved us. you know what is the Pesach? Okay?
38:24
If I say to the audience, know what is Pesach, Seder? No, nobody understands. Okay, every year we remind ourselves you know
38:39
the time that we were slaves in Egypt and the road
38:47
from slavery to freedom. took us 40 years in the desert.
38:52
This is the Holy Bible. This is the story of the Holy Bible.
39:02
And the story is based on the idea that only God is there for us.
39:09
Now, my parents, you know, they left religion and, you know, they changed. But finally, in Israel today, this is a story that we are telling our
39:18
children. that only we, a secular person will tell you,
39:24
we did it alone, and the religious person will tell you, God there was for
39:30
us, and et cetera, et cetera. What about the Americans and Germans? They are very close allies of Israel. You guys don't trust them either? You are
39:40
too rational. It's a rational question. Yes, sometimes we are paying a huge price because we do not trust.
39:52
If you ask me about the recent war or if you ask me about, you know, what
Gaza, Lebanon and the refusal to end wars
39:58
we see today in Gaza. And in Lebanon, this is exactly the price that we are
40:03
paying. We do not believe in political agreements. We do not understand the simple concept that every war must end.
40:14
It's a historical truth. Not quite. Not quite. I gave you the example of our war. We are still fighting the
40:25
longest war of the modern history. This is a war that started somewhere in the, I don't know, 1980,
40:36
and still lasts many operations, many military campaigns, many battles.
40:43
But this is only one war for the creation and the defense and
40:50
the survival of the Israeli state. This is the way we see it. And is it also about making Israel bigger, you
41:01
know, extending the borders to Lebanon? This is the way I understand,
41:06
because, you know, it's the result of the way we understand
41:13
the reality, the Middle East.
41:19
Is that not a danger of, like, overexpansion?
41:24
When you keep fighting and, you know. This is exactly what is happening. When I said, if we shall not change our policy,
41:35
first of all, you have to understand that when you say Israel, it's a false
41:42
term. There are more than one Israel. There is the Israeli government,
41:48
and there is the Israeli people. Most Israeli people do not support
41:55
this government. you see it in all the polls and most
42:02
of the Israeli people do not support the policy of this government but
42:08
still deep down, especially after the 7th of October we did not mention the
42:14
7th of October because it's very very it's an event that shaped not
42:21
only the Middle East and was in a way the beginning
42:28
or the reason to the war of the last three years it changed
42:36
the way we see ourselves and the way we see our enemies
42:42
and the way we understand the neighbors and the way we used to understand
42:49
our friends and it was a massacre we used to think
42:56
I used to think that I understand the way of thinking of the
43:03
Muslim Brotherhood I tried to do everything in order to learn everything about it when I was a director of the Israeli Shembet but the level of
43:15
of cruelty and the massacre and raping women
43:22
and slaughtering children. This is not the Muslim Brotherhood.
43:29
This is ISIS. Probably even worse.
43:35
1 ,200 people. Majority of them, civilians.
43:42
Dancing and trying to celebrate their life.
43:48
800 people. Only minority. as soldiers that arrived
43:55
to the area. This was a major, major collapse of our security doctrine, but
44:01
this is another question. I'm saying it because in order to explain or in
44:08
order to try to understand our behavior today, on one hand, we do not support our government. On the other hand, most Israelis, I totally
44:20
disagree, but most Israelis believe that there are no innocent people among Palestinians and we have the right to kill all of them I mean international
44:31
experts Israeli NGOs most other countries call what has happened since
Is Gaza a genocide? Ayalon’s answer
44:39
October 7th in Gaza a genocide by now no it's not a genocide is
44:45
a legal term genocide means that intention to
44:53
erase this race, to erase Palestinians from Earth, this is not a genocide.
45:02
I'm not going to defend it. I'm ashamed of what we did in Gaza. It's a war crime, but it's not a genocide.
45:12
So if terms, if the language is important, yes, the language is important. But we can agree it is the worst kind of military operation
45:24
I've seen. No, come on. I'm too young. I'm too young.
45:29
Okay, you are too young. You know how many civilians, not military targets,
45:37
the Allies, how many Germans they killed in Dresden?
45:45
I meant Israeli. Israeli wars. Israeli war, yes.
45:50
To get perspective, you have to understand the concept of war.
45:56
Which people that did not spend a day in the battlefield will never
46:03
understand. A battlefield is a place in which you have the right to kill.
46:11
We were born, all of us, we are born with the concept You will
46:18
not kill. You do not have the right to kill. And then you join the army.
46:25
And people tell me you have to kill all the enemies.
46:30
And now the enemy is not a state. And they are not soldiers.
46:36
They look like civilians. He is a pharmacist during the day and he's a
46:42
terrorist during the night. So you meet him in the middle of the day, in the battlefield.
46:47
will you shoot him or not no one will give you an answer no one
46:54
so the question is what can we do and in this case
47:01
the war after the 7th of October was a just war it was a just war because
47:09
it was after a massacre that no one can imagine
47:16
And the idea of this massacre was to kill civilians and children and women
47:22
and to rape them. So it was a just war for the first 12 months.
47:29
It was a just war not only because it was a response to a barbaric
47:37
attack. It was a just war because you have to understand we fought an enemy
47:42
that his military doctrine, and we saw it in his website,
47:49
is to bring the Israeli soldiers, the IDF, into the middle of the cities to
47:55
make sure that they will kill as many Palestinians, civilians as possible.
48:02
and then the world will support the Palestinian cause. So they used intentionally, this was the doctrine, the people as a human
48:13
shield. This was the doctrine. Now, when you send your people to war,
48:19
there is no way to avoid the killing of thousands of, it was the most
48:26
dense battlefield ever fought. I don't know specific cases.
48:32
during the Second World War in Stalingrad or wherever.
48:37
But this was a war. Now, you have to understand, Hamas built the largest
48:43
shelter on Earth. Hundreds. The tunnels? The tunnels. There is no entry to any civilian
48:53
Palestinian. Only Hamas activists. They could save thousands of
48:59
Palestinians by just letting them go in. They didn't. So, just a moment.
49:17
Okay. We were at the tunnels. Sorry? We stepped at the tunnels.
49:23
Yes. So, okay, this was the result. Yeah.
49:28
But after 24 months. No, you said after 12 months, the just war.
49:35
Okay, after 12 months in 2024. Yes. The end of 2024, when the military
49:41
commanders came to the government and said, there is nothing that we can
49:46
achieve more by the use of military power. And this is a time to try to
49:53
start to negotiate. Well, good. But the government refused.
49:58
Why? Was it in Netanyahu's and other ministers' interest
Netanyahu, power and “Hamas as an asset”
50:06
to keep the war going? Exactly.
50:11
Our government today is a government that the moment that they will
50:18
achieve a political agreement, they will not be elected.
50:23
They need the war in order to provide power. this is not a democracy anymore if you really want to understand you have
50:34
to go back and to read George Orwell Animal Farm?
50:40
not Animal Farm there is a much better
50:46
1984 oh yes read it twice right okay this is relevant in order to make sure
50:53
you will understand the power of the external enemy for a
51:00
totalitarian regime to hold in power.
51:06
This is what we see in Israel today. It's the only way to explain the
51:12
policy of our government today. You know, when ministers used to tell us for years that Hamas is an asset, they said, we are financing Hamas
51:23
to make sure that Hamas will survive in power. Because Hamas is an asset.
51:28
Because as long as Hamas is the Palestinian government in Gaza,
51:35
and they are fighting or they are trying to
51:41
decrease the political power of the Palestinian authority, so they are
51:47
fighting each other. This is divide and control. So we don't have to negotiate.
51:52
We can say to ourselves and we can say to the world, there is no one to negotiate with. This was the idea. And this was the idea that
52:04
brought us to the 7th of October. So as long, if we shall not change our policy and we are
52:15
still a democracy, we do not execute we do not shoot our leaders, but we
52:21
have elections in three, four months. I mean, it looks like Bibi's
52:26
coalition could actually be re -elected. No, the coalition will not be re
52:32
-elected, but there is a political scenario in which, again, we cannot go to explain all
52:44
our problems as a society.
52:49
Netanyahu government cannot be elected but there is a possibility that no
52:56
other elected party will be able to create a coalition because of the
53:03
refusal to join the Arabs who are 20 we have 20 % of Israeli
53:10
Arabs as Israeli citizens and especially after the 7th of October they
53:16
became a potential enemy because they are Arabs. Most of them are Muslims.
53:21
So it's a crazy political situation and Netanyahu will not be elected but
53:28
if... You're sure? Well, I'm not sure in anything.
53:34
I talked to some Israeli political experts in the last couple of days and they're afraid that he could actually pull it off again.
53:44
because like the opposition is first of all it's good that we're afraid
53:50
because it will make sure that they will go to vote last time in all
53:57
the elections the percentage of our
54:05
people were much lower the percentage the
54:11
people who went to vote. So at least we hope that today all the people
54:18
who do not want to see this government will go to vote. And in politics,
54:24
nothing or, you know, only God knows what will be the results.
54:31
But the way, you know, a rational analysis of
54:38
all the polls is Netanyahu will not be able to
54:45
create a coalition. But it is a very, very realistic scenario that no
54:53
one else will be able, so he will go on as a prime minister in a temporary,
54:59
and he can go on by one year, two years, every three, four months, etc.,
55:04
etc. So, yes, it will be a major problem.
55:10
But again, what I'm saying is that it is our duty to do everything in order
55:16
to replace our government. This is democracy. And if we will not be able to do it, so probably we do not deserve it. I learned today like 75 % of
Palestinian citizens of Israel and lost trust in democracy
55:27
Palestinian Israelis don't go to vote. No. How can they be motivated to go?
55:35
Do you have an idea? No, it's... Well, I don't know these figures.
55:41
They... I think that they... It was at the last election.
55:46
Okay, no, no, it's... I'm not sure, but anyhow, I think that less than 50%, but not 25%, anyhow. Well, in a way,
55:57
they gave up on democracy. They say, okay, if you don't want us in any
56:03
coalition, so why should we go to vote? Because if we are not sitting in
56:09
the coalition system in which the Israeli political system is built on
56:14
which you cannot really create any impact you cannot influence if you are
56:22
not a member of the coalition. So yes, many of them are saying yeah, we
56:27
don't have... They gave up on the democracy, on the system which is
56:32
disaster. And I have many Palestinian friends,
56:38
Israeli Palestinians, and we are trying to do everything.
56:43
But again, until now, we were not successful.
56:50
And this is not the only battle that we lost.
56:58
so yes it's a great challenge for any democracy by the way
57:05
we have to remind ourselves we are dealing with the Israeli democracy who
57:11
is collapsing inside we are fighting each other
57:17
but all the liberal democracies worldwide are facing a great challenge
57:24
I'm sure that you see it in Germany, in France in Europe. Israel, yes, Israel is a specific case because in addition to the
57:36
changes, the revolutions, the media, etc., and the demographic change as a
57:43
result of globalization that creates these conflicts, domestic conflicts
57:49
everywhere, the ongoing war in Israel. Madison, when he presented the American constitution to the American
57:59
people. He said, a democracy will not survive an ongoing war.
58:05
And he was right. And what we see today is a miracle.
58:12
The question is not why Israel is collapsing as a democracy.
58:17
The question should be why it took us so long to survive as a
58:24
democracy for good or for bad for more than
58:31
75 years or more than 140 years as a democratic society not a democratic
58:38
state is a miracle if people believe in miracles but anyhow I
58:45
do we have a few topics One question regarding Israeli
58:52
democracy. I have the feeling that at least some of the leading politicians
58:58
in Israel don't care if there's an Israeli democracy.
59:04
That they maybe don't mind turning Israel into an autocracy, some kind of
59:10
theocracy. When I look at Ben Gavir, some kind of dictatorship.
59:19
You know, democracy... Right, well, it's a coalition system is a very, very
59:26
strange and not a perfect system. We have a coalition system. No, but it's... You have, first of all, you have a constitution.
59:37
Yes. And we don't. And today, you know,
59:42
the parliament is controlled by the government.
59:48
You cannot pass any law without the support of the coalition.
59:54
And the support of the coalition, you know, since the prime minister has the right to fire. Every minister. So in a way, prime minister has a power
1:00:05
over the parliament. Parliament is not an autonomous entity anymore in
1:00:12
Israel. And the legal system is the only, you know, gatekeeper.
1:00:20
and they are doing everything in order to destroy the legal system and in a
1:00:26
way they are doing it day by day and you see it every day you see it you
1:00:32
know and the question is
1:00:39
what should be done again we have the right we have the responsibility we
1:00:45
have the duty to go to the streets In certain cases,
1:00:53
we have the duty to refuse to any order because in some
1:01:00
cases, the law is not a legitimate law.
1:01:05
If the government is doing it against its own people, because this is the
1:01:11
whole concept of democracy. And civil disobedience was created, I don't
1:01:16
know, during the 18th century. I don't know. Well, 19th century.
1:01:23
Yes. Against the slavery in America. Yes. Israel is not a perfect democracy. And if we shall not change our policy in
1:01:34
the West Bank, in Judea and Samaria, is apartheid. Israel is not an apartheid state yet but in the West Bank
1:01:46
it's a reality of apartheid when there is two different law systems
1:01:53
against Palestinians so nobody can tell you that it is still a
1:02:00
democracy and personally I don't think that Israel today is a
1:02:07
liberal democracy as a state and it depends
1:02:15
on us which means that the government
1:02:22
became part of the problem the parliament became part of the problem
1:02:29
the legal system will not save us from ourselves and
1:02:36
yeah it is for us and if you ask me on what we
1:02:43
expect from the international community. I was going to end with that question. Okay, so let's end with this question. I have a question regarding the
1:02:54
justices since you mentioned it. You're the successor at Shin Bet,
1:03:02
not your immediately successor, but the head of the Shin Bet now. Director, yes. David Zini. Yes, Zini, yes. He hates the Israeli justice system,
1:03:14
I read. There were some remarks. I don't want to discuss, you know, I was
1:03:20
against his nomination. I applied to the court, Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided against us. Like many consider him like a Jewish extremist.
1:03:32
I don't want to discuss specific personalities. This is a result of a policy. He was elected by the Prime Minister.
1:03:41
And the way I understand the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister, you know, he choose only people that he believe will follow his orders.
1:03:51
Not because his professional activity or because, anyhow,
1:03:57
this is the only reason to choose the
1:04:04
gatekeepers for the Prime Minister. whether it will be his ministers
1:04:10
whether it will be if he will if he will have influence
1:04:17
on the judges in the Supreme Court and specifically you know the director
1:04:24
of the Israelish and Beth is a gatekeeper so he was not elected because you
1:04:29
know his great professional career to
1:04:37
Bibi. Yes, this is the way I understand him, but I don't want to discuss it
1:04:42
anymore. Anyhow... You don't have to, I'm just telling my audience, because they haven't heard of his name, that there's a lot of protest against you know, Zini.
1:04:53
I read a quote, like somebody said it's like making Al Capone the chief of police in Chicago. Okay, I... Look, I think that
1:05:06
it's It's a different kind of head of Shin Bet than when you were head of
1:05:13
Shin Bet. In order to follow the law of Shin Bet, you have to understand
1:05:19
that the director of the Israeli Shin Bet is living every day with a tension. On one hand, he has to report to the prime minister.
1:05:31
The prime minister is the minister responsible for the Shin Bet.
1:05:38
On the other hand, his responsibility and his duty is to preserve the
1:05:46
Israeli democracy, the system. So when the director of the Shin Bet finds
1:05:52
himself in a situation, and this is a situation with our prime minister,
1:05:59
that he demands from him something that it
1:06:06
is against the whole concept of a liberal democracy.
1:06:13
What shall he do? So a person who do not understand
1:06:20
that he is living in a conflicting, you know,
1:06:26
values and his responsibility for the democratic system and the
1:06:33
democracy of the state of Israel is beyond his,
1:06:39
you know, obedience to the prime minister,
1:06:45
I don't think that he can be, that he can follow the
1:06:52
law of the Shin Bet. I used to understand your former job as the head of
1:06:57
Shin Bet is first and foremost loyal to the Israeli democracy. Exactly. And not loyal to the Israeli Prime Minister. This is the law. There is a law of the
1:07:07
Shin Bet. It is written in the law that he has to report to the government
1:07:13
and to the Prime Minister, but his duty is to preserve the Israeli
1:07:18
democracy, the system. So we used to say it in a very simplistic
1:07:25
way. The kingdom comes before the king.
1:07:31
This is the way to explain it to the people who do not understand the complexity of, you know, it's a legal system, government, etc., etc.
1:07:41
We are here in order to preserve the kingdom and not to obey to the king.
1:07:50
Have you ever thought about what it would be like to be a Palestinian, to
1:07:55
be on the other side, to be the oppressed, to be under occupation?
1:08:02
Yes, I'm thinking about it every day. By the way, the first time when people ask me what did you learn in the Shinbe?
1:08:11
I can speak about it for, I don't know, two years but there are two very
1:08:19
simple lessons and don't laugh. The first lesson was that my enemies are human beings.
1:08:30
I think I remember I came to I discussed this with my wife and she said are
1:08:36
you crazy of course there are human beings I said you don't understand you know when you are a military commander your people expect
1:08:47
from you to kill the enemies so the enemies whether you like it or not are
1:08:54
becoming military targets I'm not proud of it I killed many people in many
1:09:02
ways I knew nothing about them personally I didn't know their names I
1:09:09
didn't know their families their wives, their children with whom they pray in the mosque you didn't need it a military commander all I ask is how how to kill
1:09:20
using knife or Kalashnikov or machine gun or a missile that you shoot to,
1:09:28
I don't know, 100 kilometers. But you know that people will die.
1:09:33
You don't care because they are the enemy. The question is how?
1:09:38
Technology, strategy, tactics. When you come to the Shin Bet,
1:09:45
the question is totally different. You have to ask yourself why.
1:09:51
Why they are doing it. You have to understand every person in order to
1:09:56
understand him you have to know everything about him otherwise you You cannot interrogate him. You don't know what to ask him. You cannot try to achieve information from
1:10:07
him. You cannot try to recruit him as an agent.
1:10:14
You have to know everything. First of all, his names. Muslims, they have four names. Tell you something about their family, where they came from.
1:10:24
His children, to which school he sent his children. To schools of Hamas?
1:10:30
or to schools of the Palestinian Authority. Totally different. Palestinian Authority are looking for a compromise.
1:10:41
Two states. Hamas is a real enemy. He wants to eliminate.
1:10:48
He does not agree to our existence. So when a person decides to which
1:10:54
school, it means he tells you something about his ideology.
1:11:00
So he is becoming a human being. You are not afraid of him. This is the first lesson. Second lesson, which is not far from the first.
1:11:13
We Israelis, we shall have security only if and
1:11:21
when Palestinians will have hope. Hope is everything.
1:11:26
So people ask me, are you crazy? He said, no, let me translate it to a military terms. We speak military language. You cannot deter a person or
1:11:38
a group of people if they are not afraid.
1:11:45
Because if he's not afraid, he will commit suicide.
1:11:51
Nothing to lose. Nothing to lose. If he has nothing to lose, you cannot take from him anything. you cannot threaten him so people tell me okay no
1:12:02
you don't understand Islam is something I said no no no go back to the Bible you read the Bible no you know the story of Samson and Delilah
1:12:14
you don't okay they know by the way there is a great song
1:12:21
anyhow so he was a Jewish hero
1:12:28
He killed Plishtim. Anyhow, the people who in our history.
1:12:36
But he fell in love in a Palestinian woman.
1:12:41
And she betrayed him. And he was arrested and, you know, and they tortured
1:12:48
him. And he decided to kill as many enemies.
1:12:56
And he killed thousands of enemies when he was a very very powerful person
1:13:01
so he destroyed the whole I don't know building
1:13:08
they brought him in order to to laugh on him because the prisoners anyhow
1:13:15
this is a story so the first the first suicide attack in the written human
1:13:22
history is in the Bible. By the way, you should read the Bible.
1:13:29
I plan on it one day. Okay, very good. So, by the way, when I became the
1:13:35
director of Shin Bet, I had to, not only to read, to learn something about the Koran and to learn something about the New Testament,
1:13:48
Christians. Because, finally, What I learned in the Shin Bet is
1:13:56
that ideology is something that we need in order to understand,
1:14:02
you know, the reality. But extreme ideology creates
1:14:09
violence. and this is why the Shin Bet has to study every ideology
1:14:15
before it is becoming violent which
1:14:22
is terror so yes I told them okay
1:14:29
not Muslims invented the suicide attack it's a human behavior a
1:14:36
person who has nothing to lose he will do everything he will commit, he will kill everybody in order to achieve something sometimes it is bread for a child
1:14:46
and sometimes it is freedom he just wants to feel free so these are
1:14:53
the two lessons so if you ask me, yes I ask myself every time how does the
1:15:00
Palestinian feel and by the way, I believe that in too many wars I'm trying
1:15:07
to understand our war. And I'm trying to understand why America entered
1:15:13
into this war. And my answer is very simple.
1:15:18
Not America, nor we understood our enemies.
1:15:25
And the idea that, you know, Iranian regime will surrender
1:15:32
is crazy idea. Anybody who understands the enemy, everybody who knows
1:15:39
something about the history of the Shia and the Karbala battle in the 7th
1:15:47
century, 680, will tell you that they will not surrender.
1:15:54
Because if you don't, you know, Sun Tzu, you don't know him? Chinese. Right. You don't know the Bible and you know Sun Tzu.
1:16:04
Okay. I was born in East Germany. Very good. There was like anti -religion.
1:16:11
I will read it someday. Both Bibles. So Sun Tzu about 4
1:16:18
,000 years he said
1:16:25
if you don't know the enemy You will never be able to win the war.
1:16:31
And we don't know, we don't understand our enemies. By the way, he said something which is very relevant the way I understand our government.
1:16:43
He said a cruel leader will burn his country in order to rule the ashes.
1:16:51
So in a way, this explains, you know, sometimes in history, Neron, you
1:16:57
know, in Roman if you are too many years in power
1:17:04
if like Louis XIV L 'Etat
1:17:12
Semua yes sometimes you believe that you are
1:17:19
the state you are the kingdom and this can explain the
1:17:26
behavior of authoritarian regimes.
1:17:33
Just to understand you correctly, I asked if you ever thought about being Palestinian and fighting the occupation. If you had nothing to lose, you would fight?
1:17:44
I said it again and again, and I'll say it again, although many people
1:17:51
believe that I'm a traitor, if I were a Palestinian,
1:17:57
fight against the Israeli occupation. I will never accept the Hamas ideas,
1:18:07
but against the occupation in order to achieve my freedom. And I will add that every statement, Israeli statement,
1:18:19
and every military commander who will give you a different answer.
1:18:27
He is either stupid or he just does not know his
1:18:34
enemy and he will never win this war. That's it.
1:18:40
The only way to win this war is to understand that we won this war.
1:18:46
I am repeating myself. We won this war because our enemies surrendered in
1:18:53
Beirut in 2002 and if we shall not accept it we shall bring ourselves
1:19:00
to the end of the Zionist dream Israel will not be a democracy because if
1:19:06
our border will be on the Jordan we are not majority and we feel not
1:19:12
majority we do not have the power and we do not have the right to dictate the calendar, the language, our way of life, the way we celebrate our
1:19:23
holidays. And that's it. This is the end of the Zionist dream.
1:19:32
Final question? Yes, international. How can the international community, and of course, we're from Germany, German governments support all the wars,
1:19:45
that, you know, Israel is conducting. How can Europeans,
1:19:52
Germans, Americans help Israel accept that you guys won the war?
1:20:01
First of all, to learn the history. I want to believe that all the German
1:20:08
elected leaders know by heart the Arab Peace Initiative.
1:20:14
I want to believe if... well, I expect people...
1:20:20
I'm not sure about this. Okay, anyhow. So, I'm sending a message.
1:20:26
Tell them. I will show them this interview. tells them that I believe that we won the war and the Arab Peace Initiative that was accepted by all the
1:20:35
Arab League members and later by 56 Muslim states,
1:20:41
all the Muslim world accepted the Arab Peace Initiative is the baseline in
1:20:47
order to ignite negotiations between Israel and Palestinians. And the only way for us to accept it is don't
1:20:59
boycott us but don't support us unconditionally
1:21:08
and I believe in great gesture why I believe in great gesture I'm a
1:21:15
generation of Yom Kippur War for us you know until now during the last two
1:21:20
years we lost about 2 ,000 people and in Yom Kippur
1:21:27
during three years in Yom Kippur we lost 2 ,700 people in less
1:21:35
than three weeks so you can imagine the trauma for us my generation
1:21:43
and three four years later we signed peace with Egypt for us Egypt was the
1:21:49
devil and I believe that It was before
1:21:55
the Arab Peace Initiative. It was in 1967.
1:22:01
And Sadat, he decided that what he has to do,
1:22:08
he has to come to Jerusalem and to speak to the Israeli people.
1:22:13
And he came to the Knesset, but he spoke in the television to the Israeli people. And he didn't threaten us. he told us I want to be your friend
1:22:26
I want to sign peace with you but I will do it only on the condition of
1:22:34
Israeli -Palestinian relations before he came
1:22:42
I think that 90 % of us Israelis saw him as a devil as an enemy
1:22:48
one or two weeks after it was amazing shift in the
1:22:56
way we saw our enemies now I want to translate this event
1:23:03
it was a dramatic event yeah he had a partner our Prime Minister Begin
1:23:11
and both of them they signed peace with American interference
1:23:20
today, you know, after the 7th of October, which was a horrific event,
1:23:28
what happened, the Palestinian issue came back to the table.
1:23:36
If you will ask all the international leaders,
1:23:42
I don't know, 180, they will tell you that only a reality of two
1:23:49
states will create stability and prosperity in the Middle East
1:23:55
and it will create a major impact on the region and all the world because
1:24:01
today it is obvious that we, it's not a small conflict between Israel and Palestinians anymore it's a major regional conflict
1:24:13
that create a major impact on the global system,
1:24:19
the economy, energy, political stability in many states.
1:24:24
So can we imagine a reality in which,
1:24:31
I don't know, 190 too many, but the major
1:24:38
leaders, I don't know, the 25 major leaders, will come to Jerusalem
1:24:47
and will tell us, listen, we want you.
1:24:53
We want your security. We want stability. We want for you peace and
1:24:59
prosperity. And we shall support you. We will be here for you. They will do it not because they love us, because
1:25:09
today they understand more than ever that they need it in America and
1:25:14
Europe for your economy and your political stability. And the terror will
1:25:20
reach Europe everywhere. So they will do it, but they will promise us
1:25:27
a dream. They will promise a dream. But they will say on the
1:25:34
condition of you will negotiate with the Palestinians on the basis
1:25:41
of the Arab Peace Initiative. And you will have to divide this piece of
1:25:47
land. But you mentioned trust earlier. There's no trust in any... No, but there was no trust before he came. This is exactly the case. As the trust
1:25:57
was built, we need bravery.
1:26:04
We need bravery for them to come. You know, I spoke to everybody.
1:26:12
And, you know, I met Arab leaders in the
1:26:19
Emirates and in many places in Europe. And I told them, why you are not
1:26:26
doing it? And he said, we will not come to a place in which the prime
1:26:32
minister will not accept it. So, OK, yes, I agree. you have to wait for the
1:26:37
elections. It is for us. They will not save us from ourselves. But yes, we need the international community to show the way and to create
1:26:47
confidence. As I said, I believe in miracles. It can happen. Only a person who believes in miracles can survive in the
1:26:57
Middle East. Maybe I should move here. Yeah, you should. This was fun. This was very important. much.
1:27:06
Let's do this again sometime. Come on. No, like sometimes we come back
1:27:13
regularly. Okay, very good. Every few years. Okay. And I'm sure there will
1:27:18
be much more to discuss. Yeah, it's yeah, okay. I accept not because it's,
1:27:24
you know, your audience will be saturated, but in the Middle East we used
1:27:31
to say that, you know, it's the most interesting place because everything
1:27:38
is happening here. And I'm sure that if you will come in six months,
1:27:45
it will be a different reality. And I believe that it will be a better
1:27:51
reality. And the dream that I'm dreaming today, the peace, I will not see
1:27:57
peace in my lifetime. But it's okay. I'm 82 years old. It's okay.
1:28:03
These trees, we spoke about these trees. I did not plant these trees, but
1:28:08
we have to plant the ideas. So our children, our grandchildren, the people,
1:28:14
you know, you said that the audience is a young audience. So, yes, I think that they should not, they shouldn't give up on the future of the Middle East
1:28:26
and on the future of Israel. Thank you so much. You're welcome. Bye -bye.

Bedouin - Wikipedia 베드윈 ベドウィン

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