Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future Hardcover – 8 June 2010
by Stephen Kinzer (Author)
4.4 4.4 out of 5 stars (61)
What can the United States do to help realize its dream of a peaceful, democratic Middle East? Stephen Kinzer offers a surprising answer in this paradigm-shifting book. Two countries in the region, he argues, are America's logical partners in the twenty-first century: Turkey and Iran. Besides proposing this new 'power triangle', Kinzer also recommends that the United States reshape relations with its two traditional Middle East allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. This book provides a penetrating, timely critique of America's approach to the world's most volatile region, and offers a startling alternative. Kinzer is a master storyteller with an eye for grand characters and illuminating historical detail. In this book, he introduces us to larger-than-life figures, like a Nebraska schoolteacher who became a martyr to democracy in Iran, a Turkish radical who transformed his country and Islam forever, and a colourful parade of princes, politicians, women of the world, spies, oppressors, liberators, and dreamers. Kinzer's provocative new view of the Middle East is the rare look that will richly entertain while moving a vital policy debate beyond the stale alternatives of the last fifty years.
Publisher : Henry Holt & Company Inc
Publication date : 8 June 2010
Language : English
Print length : 272 pages
ISBN-10 : 0805091270
ISBN-13 : 978-0805091274
Item weight : 544 g
Dimensions : 16.18 x 2.6 x 24.28 cm
Customer Reviews:
4.4 4.4 out of 5 stars (61)
TopAbout this itemSimilarFrom the AuthorQuestionsReviewsReset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future
Stephen Kinzer
Stephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents. His articles and books have led the Washington Post to place him “among the best in popular foreign policy storytelling.”
Kinzer spent more than 20 years working for the New York Times, most of it as a foreign correspondent. His foreign postings placed him at the center of historic events and, at times, in the line of fire. While covering world events, he has been shot at, jailed, beaten by police, tear-gassed and bombed from the air.
Today Kinzer is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. He writes a world affairs column for The Boston Globe.
Kinzer’s new book, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain and the Birth of American Empire, builds on his career watching the effects of American interventions around the world.
From 1983 to 1989, Kinzer was the Times bureau chief in Nicaragua. In that post he covered war and upheaval in Central America. He also wrote two books about the region. One of them, co-authored with Stephen Schlesinger, is Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala.” The other one, Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, is a social and political portrait that The New Yorker called “impressive for the refinement of its writing and also the breadth of its subject matter.” In 1988 Columbia University awarded Kinzer its Maria Moors Cabot prize for outstanding coverage of Latin America.
From 1990 to 1996 Kinzer was posted in Germany. From his post as chief of the New York Times bureau in Berlin, he covered the emergence of post-Communist Europe, including wars in the former Yugoslavia.
In 1996 Kinzer was named chief of the newly opened New York Times bureau in Istanbul, Turkey. He spent four years there, traveling widely in Turkey and in the new nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus. After completing this assignment, Kinzer published Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds.
He has also worked in Africa, and written A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It. Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa called this book “a fascinating account of a near-miracle unfolding before our very eyes.”
Kinzer’s last book was The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. The novelist John le Carré called it “a secret history, enriched and calmly retold; a shocking account of the misuse of American corporate, political and media power; a shaming reflection on the moral manners of post imperial Europe; and an essential allegory for our own times.”
Kinzer’s previous book was Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future “Stephen Kinzer is a journalist of a certain cheeky fearlessness and exquisite timing,” the Huffington Post said in its review. “This book is a bold exercise in reimagining the United States’ big links in the Middle East.”
In 2006 Kinzer published Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. It recounts the 14 times the United States has overthrown foreign governments. Kinzer seeks to explain why these interventions were carried out and what their long-term effects have been. He is also the author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror.” It tells how the CIA overthrew Iran’s nationalist government in 1953.
In 2009, Dominican University in River Forest, Illinois, awarded Kinzer an honorary doctorate. The citation said that “those of us who have had the pleasure of hearing his lectures or talking to him informally will probably never see the world in the same way again.”
The University of Scranton awarded Kinzer an honorary doctorate in 2010. “Where there has been turmoil in the world and history has shifted, Stephen Kinzer has been there,” the citation said. “Neither bullets, bombs nor beating could dull his sharp determination to bring injustice and strife to light.”
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4.4 out of 5 stars
黒羽夏彦
5.0 out of 5 stars アメリカ・トルコ・イランのトライアングル同盟は果たして可能か？Reviewed in Japan on 8 October 2010
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
本書で示される論点は大きく分けて次の二点にまとめられる。第一に、トルコとイランの現代史を振り返りながら両国ともに民主化・近代化へと向けた内発的な動きがあったことを示し、その点で欧米とある程度まで価値観の共有される素地があることに注目を促す。モサデク政権転覆工作等で反米感情を高めてしまった経緯はそれこそ「リセット」したい歴史だろう。一方、中東には冷戦期の戦略的目的からアメリカが強力な同盟関係を築いたやっかいな国が二つある。すなわち、イスラエルとサウジ・アラビアの存在はアメリカの対中東関係をこじらせる一因となっている。この不安定な中東世界において仲介役が果たせる国として、近代的な価値観とイスラムとの両方の要素を合わせ持つトルコの存在に注目し、さらにはトルコ・イラン・アメリカのトライアングル関係の構築を提唱するのが第二の論点である。
トルコとイランは本来欧米と価値観を共有できたはずなのに、歴史的な経緯の中でうまくいかず、アメリカ外交政策の判断ミスによってさらにそのねじれが増幅されてしまった、その仕切りなおしを図りたいという考え方が本書の基本的なトーンである。こうした議論は民主化・近代化を指標とする点で西欧文明至上主義の一変種に過ぎないのではないかという批判もあり得るかもしれないが、むしろギクシャクしがちな欧米とイスラム世界との間に開かれた関係を築く接点をどこに求めたらいいのかという問題意識に目を向けたい。
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MR RAYMOND FW PHELAN
5.0 out of 5 stars Recommended seller.Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 24 May 2018
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
No problems whatsoever. Recommended seller.
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Vigolo
5.0 out of 5 stars Great Book to Catch up with Current EventsReviewed in the United States on 19 February 2011
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
I recommend this book hihgly to anyone who doesn't know what the fuss with Iran is about and why Turkey is considered a unique system in its geography and why America is so heavily invested in Israel and where all the anti-American dissent is coming from in the Middle East. If you are like me and confused, yet not convinced by mainstream media and want to add 2 and 2 together to see HOW things got here, this is the book for you. It offers a clear, crisp history of all three countries and their relationships with each other. These are major players in the Middle East, which has been an open wound for a while now, affecting every country in different ways and the book shows you why it is important for them to band up together against much more serious threats. A lot of people called the solutions 'naive' but I don't feel that way at all - history shows us that things can swing this or that way very fast for nations and that people have a very short term memory. The country that enjoyed immense friendship with Iran not too long ago seems oblivious to it now and considers it an archenemy. Why can't things reset and revert again? It sounds very possible to me with the right people in the right places and the world is certainly changing fast enough to make it hopeful. Also, the last chapter might as well have been written just last week - it eerily predicts the wave of democracy and anti-government movement that is happening right now in the Middle East, which proves that it is not making far-fetched, mythical assumptions and has a lot to offer to the curious mind. it isn't too long and overwhelming either, a good, fun read with a lot to learn from.
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Barbara Collins
4.0 out of 5 stars Turkey & IranReviewed in the United States on 10 August 2010
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
With Turkey playing an increasingly important role in the area and the US and Israel threatening to obliterate Iran, this book is a must read. More than just a he said/she said, it delves into the history and politics of both countries. Most of us know little about either country,and this is a real eye-opener and a plea for more reasonable and mature minds to keep us from making an even greater mistake in the Middle-East than has already been made.
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Shirin Afrasiabi
5.0 out of 5 stars One of the most informative books, I have ever read.Reviewed in the United States on 3 January 2011
Format: HardcoverVerified Purchase
I had read All of the Shah's Men and was fascinated by the facts that were disclosed in it. His books are well researched and well documented.This book is no different. The content is mind blowing and as you read this you wonder why it's facts are not all over the news?! Why does the media do such a good job at ignoring these facts? But I am greaful that at least they are put together in such a fantasticly well put together book.
He beautifully portrays the roles of Israel and Saudi Arabia in American history from the beginning to now. While drawing a parallel between Turkey and Iran and their histories during the last century. He ultimately suggests that Israel and Saudi Arabia have served their purposes in fighting the cold war and are NOW detrimental to the US image and ideals. Israel is doing the US's dirty work and Saudi Arabia is funding them. The world knows it and dispises us all for it!
He suggests that the Turks and the Iranian people have faught and survived severe, unimagianble political rapings by the foreign/western world and have continued to idealize democracy and freedom, while maintaining their religious fervor. It talks about multiple attempts by such revolutionary leaders as Ata Turk and Reza Shah to put the clergy in their place and allow democracy to run its course. He then parallels that with the US history and how it overcame the invaders and fought for democracy while maintainning its religious beliefs.
Idealistic but very tempting to believe as a possibility. I hope those in power will read this and maybe consider it as a plausible point of view. Non politicians should revel in these facts and thank him,with reading every line, for bringing these facts to our attention.
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<요약>
스티븐 킨저의 『Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future』(2010)은 미국의 중동 정책이 “냉전의 습관”과 고정된 동맹 구도에 갇혀 반복적 실패를 낳았다는 문제의식에서 출발한다. 그는 미국이 이스라엘·사우디아라비아에 과도하게 의존해 온 기존 ‘안보 건축’을 재점검하고, 장기적으로는 <이란–터키–미국>이 이루는 새로운 전략적 삼각관계(그가 말하는 ‘새로운 파워 트라이앵글’)를 모색해야 한다고 주장한다.
책의 큰 흐름은 두 나라(이란·터키)의 근현대 정치사를 병렬로 훑으며 “무슬림 다수 국가가 근대화·국가건설·정치적 대표성을 둘러싸고 어떤 굴곡을 거쳤는가”를 보여주는 데서 시작한다. 킨저는 두 사회 모두에 ‘민주적 열망’과 ‘권위주의적 반동’이 교차해 왔다는 점을 강조하며, 그 과정에서 군부·왕정·종교권력·외세 개입이 각각 어떤 방식으로 체제를 흔들거나 고착시켰는지 서사적으로 풀어낸다. 이 파트는 독자에게 이란과 터키를 “단일한 종교문화권”으로 뭉뚱그리지 않고, 서로 다른 역사적 경로와 정치적 상상력을 지닌 사회로 보게 만드는 효과를 노린다.
중반 이후 그는 9·11 이후의 지역 질서 변화 속에서 터키와 이란이 각각 ‘지역 강국’으로서 미국의 목표(이라크·아프가니스탄 안정, 핵 문제 관리, 팔레스타인 문제의 긴장 완화 등)에 실질적 영향을 미칠 수밖에 없다고 말한다. 특히 터키에 대해서는, 주변국과의 갈등을 줄이려는 외교 기조와 중재자 역할을 통해 지역 분쟁 완화에 기여할 여지가 있으며, 미국은 터키의 이런 ‘조정자/중재자’ 역량을 파트너십으로 활용해야 한다고 본다.
이란에 대해서는 현재의 지도부가 미국에 비우호적이라 해도, 이란 사회 내부의 정치적 역동성과 대외적 이해관계를 고려하면 “이란의 협조 없이 미국이 중동에서 핵심 목표를 달성하기 어렵다”는 식으로 현실주의적 결론을 제시한다. 동시에 미국이 1953년 쿠데타 등 과거 개입의 후과를 직시해야 ‘관계 재설정’의 최소 조건이 마련된다고 본다.
책의 후반에는 미국–이스라엘, 미국–사우디 관계에 대한 비판적 검토가 비교적 큰 비중으로 들어간다. 킨저는 이 두 축이 미국의 중동 정책을 경직시키고, 역내 반발과 장기적 비용을 키웠다고 본다. 다만 일부 서평은 이 부분이 본래의 핵심(이란·터키와의 재설정)에서 벗어난 “우회”처럼 느껴질 수 있고, 근거 제시가 더 필요하다고 지적한다.
마지막 장에서 킨저는 요컨대 “미국이 과거의 가정·동맹·정책 감옥에서 벗어나면, 팔레스타인부터 이라크·아프간에 이르는 여러 위기를 완화할 수 있다”는 방향성을 제시한다. 완성된 ‘정책 설계도’라기보다, 기존 상식을 흔드는 재프레이밍(관계의 우선순위 재배치)으로 읽히는 대목이다.
<평론>
이 책의 강점은 <정책 처방을 역사 서사로 설득>한다는 점이다. 이란·터키를 ‘문제 지역’의 객체로만 보지 않고, 각각의 내부 정치와 대외전략이 어떻게 형성됐는지 긴 호흡으로 보여주며, 독자가 “왜 이 나라들이 지금도 중요한가”를 역사적으로 이해하게 만든다. 입문서로서의 가독성도 높다는 평가가 나오는 이유다.
하지만 약점도 분명하다. 첫째, ‘현재’에 대한 정책 논의가 상대적으로 늦게 나오고(역사 서술이 길어), 독자에 따라서는 제목이 약속한 “미국의 미래”가 충분히 전개되기 전에 힘이 빠질 수 있다. 둘째, 이스라엘·사우디 장이 문제제기 자체는 이해되지만, 책의 중심축(이란·터키)과의 연결이 더 정교했어야 한다는 비판이 설득력 있다. “짧은 요약이면 될 부분이 길어졌다”거나 “주장 대비 근거가 더 필요하다”는 지적이 그 예다.
셋째, 킨저의 구상은 “터키와 이란이 중동의 비교적 합리적 파트너가 될 수 있다”는 전제에 기대는데, 이는 2010년대 이후의 격변(권위주의 심화, 지역전쟁의 연쇄, 제재·핵 갈등의 장기화 등) 속에서 더 엄격한 조건 검토가 필요해 보인다. 즉, 이 책이 던지는 핵심 질문—<미국은 누구와 어떤 질서 구상을 공유할 것인가>—는 여전히 유효하지만, 답안(‘삼각관계’)은 시대 변화에 따라 수정·보완되어야 한다.
그럼에도 『Reset』은 “동맹은 도덕이 아니라 구조이며, 구조는 비용을 낳는다”는 점을 독자에게 강하게 각인시킨다. 미국이 무엇을 ‘안보’로 정의하느냐, 그 정의가 어떤 국내 정치·로비·관성의 제약을 받느냐, 그리고 그 결과가 역내 사회들에 어떤 반작용을 낳느냐를 묻는 방식은 지금도 생산적이다. 결론적으로 이 책은 <정답 제시>라기보다 <사고의 재배열>에 강한 책이며, 특히 중동을 “고정된 적·아군 구도”로 이해해 온 독자에게 유용한 문제제기다.
<English ~1,000-word Summary + Critical Review>
<Summary>
Stephen Kinzer’s Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future (2010) is a call to rethink the U.S. strategic map of the Middle East. Kinzer argues that Washington has remained trapped in Cold War–era assumptions and in a rigid alliance structure—most notably heavy reliance on Israel and Saudi Arabia—and that this has contributed to repeated policy failures and “serial disasters.” He proposes a provocative reframing: if the United States wants a more stable regional order, it should explore a new strategic “power triangle” with Turkey and Iran as central partners.
The book’s method is deliberately historical. For a substantial portion of the narrative, Kinzer traces the parallel modern political histories of Turkey and Iran: state-building and modernization efforts, cycles of authoritarian consolidation and democratic aspiration, and the ways domestic actors (military elites, monarchs, religious institutions, reformers) interacted with external pressures. This long historical runway is meant to show that neither country can be understood as a static or purely ideological “other.” Instead, each has a complex internal political evolution that shapes how it behaves as a regional power.
As the narrative approaches the post–9/11 era, Kinzer’s policy argument becomes clearer. Turkey, he suggests, has the institutional experience and diplomatic positioning to play a constructive role in regional mediation and conflict de-escalation. He highlights Turkey’s self-presentation as a mediator—attempting to bridge among adversaries and factions—and argues that the U.S. should treat Turkey’s diplomatic capacity not as a nuisance when it diverges from Washington, but as an asset in managing regional tensions.
On Iran, Kinzer takes a realism-inflected stance: even if Iranian leadership is hostile to the United States, Iran’s regional weight means that many American objectives—ranging from conflict management to broader security concerns—are difficult to achieve without some form of Iranian cooperation. He also places emphasis on historical memory, particularly the long shadow of U.S. involvement in Iran’s political trajectory (including the 1953 coup), arguing that any genuine “reset” requires acknowledging the consequences of past intervention.
A distinctive feature of the book is that Kinzer does not confine himself to Iran and Turkey. In the latter half, he devotes significant attention to U.S. relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia, portraying these ties as central constraints that shape—and often distort—American choices. His broad contention is that Washington’s established bargains with these allies have become dysfunctional, and that a sustainable regional strategy may require reshaping these relationships as well.
In the concluding portion, Kinzer returns to the central question: how to “reset” American policy in what he calls the world’s most volatile region. He presents his argument less as a detailed blueprint and more as a strategic realignment of priorities—break out of the “prison” of old assumptions, recognize Turkey and Iran as regional superpowers, and pursue a new security architecture that reduces the incentives for perpetual crisis.
<Critical Review>
Kinzer’s strongest contribution is his insistence that strategy cannot be separated from history. By building the policy case on a deep narrative of political development, he pushes readers to see Iran and Turkey as societies with internal pluralism, contested modernities, and shifting coalitions—not merely as fixed “regimes” to be managed. Reviewers often note the book’s readability and storytelling power, which makes it an accessible gateway for readers unfamiliar with 20th-century Iranian and Turkish history.
That same strength is also a weakness. A prominent critique is structural: the book spends so long in historical exposition that its promised forward-looking analysis arrives late and feels comparatively compressed. One review argues that the present-day policy discussion is delayed until more than halfway through, and that the detour into U.S.–Israel and U.S.–Saudi relations is longer than necessary given the book’s stated focus.
A second issue is evidentiary balance in the “detour” chapters. At least one academic-style review suggests that some assertions about U.S.–Israel dynamics need stronger support, and that the placement of these chapters can feel “out of place” relative to the Iran–Turkey core. Even sympathetic readers may feel that the book’s argumentative density varies: the Iran–Turkey historical narrative is richly textured, while portions of the Israel–Saudi critique can read more like a polemical intervention than a fully substantiated policy analysis.
Third, Kinzer’s proposal depends on a demanding premise: that Turkey and Iran can serve as reliable anchors for a U.S.-backed regional order. Even if one accepts his diagnosis of American overdependence on certain alliances, turning Iran and Turkey into the central pillars of U.S. strategy requires careful attention to domestic political trajectories, regional rivalries, and the possibility that Ankara and Tehran may pursue interests that only partially overlap with Washington’s. One reviewer notes that Turkey’s “mediator” role is real, but also that Turkey’s strategic ambiguity could generate outcomes that challenge U.S. primacy rather than reinforce it.
Still, Reset remains valuable as a conceptual provocation. It forces readers to separate <habitual alignment> from <strategic necessity> and to ask who benefits—and who pays—the costs of entrenched policy routines. Even if the exact “triangle” Kinzer imagines is difficult to operationalize as a stable long-term framework, his underlying question persists: what would it mean to build a Middle East policy around regional power realities rather than inherited ideological and domestic-political constraints? In that sense, the book is best read not as a final answer, but as a disciplined attempt to reorganize how the problem is posed.
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