Yaakov Amidror
Yaakov Amidror | |
|---|---|
 Yaakov Amidror in 2009 | |
| Native name | יעקב עמידרור |
| Born | 15 May 1948 Yad Eliyahu, Israel |
| Allegiance | Israel |
| Branch | Israel Defense Forces |
| Rank | Major general |
| Unit | Paratroopers Brigade |
| Conflicts | |
| Other work | Former National Security Advisor |
Yaakov Amidror (Hebrew: יעקב עמידרור; born 15 May 1948) is a former major general and National Security Advisor of Israel and was also the head of the Research Department of Israeli military intelligence. Today, he is the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies, a conservative security think tank.
Biography
Background
Amidror was born in Yad Eliyahu, Israel, on the day after the Israeli Declaration of Independence. His father, Leo, had enlisted in the British Army during World War II, and spent five years in German captivity after being taken prisoner in Greece. His mother, Tzila, was an Irgun member, active in the organization's finance department, who had been arrested by the British in 1941, and incarcerated at the Bethlehem Women's Prison.[1][2]
Military career
Amidror was drafted into the Israeli Defense Forces in 1966. He volunteered as a paratrooper in the Paratroopers Brigade. He served as a soldier and a squad leader, and fought in the Gaza Strip during the Six-Day War.[3] He became an infantry officer after completing Officer Candidate School and returned to the Paratroopers Brigade as a platoon leader. Afterwards he transferred to the Military Intelligence Directorate and served in various positions such as a regional brigade Intelligence officer during the War of Attrition, the 162nd Division Intelligence officer during the Yom Kippur War, the Northern Command Intelligence officer, and as the head of the Research Department. Amidror was considered a candidate to lead the Military Intelligence Directorate, but he was passed over after he controversially referred to non-religious Israelis as "Hebrew-speaking gentiles". Instead, he became president of Israel's National Defense College before retiring from his military career in 2002.[1][4]
Political career
Amidror was selected to draw up the list of candidates for the Religious Zionist The Jewish Home party in the lead-up to the elections for the 18th Knesset. Amidror became enmeshed in internecine fighting within the party, and with competing right-wing factions. He clashed particularly with MK Uri Ariel, calling him a "liar" and a "cheater".[5][6]
He was appointed to lead Israel's National Security Council in May 2011[7] and held the position until November 2013.
As Israel's national security advisor, he participated in high-level talks with U.S. officials about the Iranian nuclear program and led efforts to restore relations with Turkey after the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid incident.[8][9]
Amidror is considered a hawk on security matters. He wrote an op-ed in The New York Times opposing the Geneva interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program.[10] However, he has also warned privately that Israel's settlement policy was isolating it from the international community.[11]
In 2014, Amidror joined the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. In 2017, he became the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.
In 2016, Amidror chaired an official panel charged with providing recommendations to improve the functioning of Israel's National Security Council and cabinet ministers during wartime.[12]
In June 2020, Amidror cautioned against Netanyahu's plan to annex portions of the West Bank.[13]
References
- Avi Benayahu (26 November 2013). "The Man Who's Not Afraid to Go Against the Flow". The Post (in Hebrew). Archived from the original on 2 December 2013. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- "שער חמישי - נשים במעצר".
- Yaakov Amidror, The Risks of Foreign Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2014.
- Attila Somfalvi (9 March 2011). "Amidror new national security advisor". Ynetnews. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Mordechai Gilat; Uzi Dayan (14 January 2009). "Burn the House". Israel Today (in Hebrew). Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Nadav Shragai (25 December 2008). "At Habayit Hayehudi, ideology is one thing - and politics is quite another". Haaretz. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Barak Ravid (9 March 2011). "Netanyahu appoints new national security adviser, Ya'akov Amidror Israel News". Haaretz. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Aaron Kalman (23 June 2013). "Netanyahu's top security adviser set to quit after bust-up". The Times of Israel. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Michal Shmulovich (6 May 2013). "Turkey and Israel close in on reconciliation deal". The Times of Israel. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Yaakov Amidror (27 November 2013). "A Most Dangerous Deal". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- "Yaakov Amidror is said to be concerned over Israel's growing isolation". United Press International. 7 February 2013. Retrieved 23 December 2013.
- Tuchfeld, Mati (20 December 2016). "New advisory body to offer cabinet routine security briefings – Israel Hayom". Israel Hayom. Retrieved 28 May 2018.
- "Retired IDF general raises concerns over West Bank annexation". The Jerusalem Post. 8 June 2020. ISSN 0792-822X. Retrieved 2020-06-08.
External links
- (in Hebrew) Columns written by Yaakov Amidror at Ynet
- Yaakov Amidror (2008). Winning Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience. Strategic Perspectives. Vol. 2. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. ISBN 9789652180629.
- Yaakov Amidror (2011). "International Law and Military Operations in Practice". In Mark El-Ami (ed.). Hamas, the Gaza War and Accountability, Under International Law: Updated Proceedings of an International Conference on June 18, 2009. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. pp. 47–48. ISBN 9789652180902.
| International | |
|---|---|
| National | |
| Other | |
- Israeli generals
- 1948 births
- Living people
- University of Haifa alumni
- Tel Aviv University alumni
- Members of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America
"The Gaza ground offensive will be like no other"
Yaakov Amidror credit: Jerusalem Insitute of Strategy and Security18 Oct, 2023 16:57Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, former head of Israel's National Security Council, discusses the complexities of the operation and what will happen after Hamas is beaten.
"Ahead of the ground offensive, whenever it will be, it is important that the public will understand two things that go hand in hand but somewhat contradict each other," Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror (res.), former head of Israel's National Security Council (2011-13) and senior fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security tells "Globes."
"On the one hand, it is very important to understand that it is not possible to eliminate the military capability of the Hamas organization without a ground assault (into Gaza). It is impossible to do this with intelligence and countermeasures, or by continuing the siege or only by air force operations alone. We must bring in the ground forces.
"But in the same sentence it should be said that the ground entry is not simple at all. It will be a very difficult, very complex, very complicated operation. It is true that we are very strong, but fighting in a built-up area that has been prepared for defense is considered very difficult in the military world, especially for the attacking side.
"The side defending itself in the fighting has a great advantage, but we have no choice. We must bring in the ground forces in order to destroy the military capability of Hamas. There is no rush, we have time and we must do it sensibly. We must not enter hastily, because it is necessary to have thorough and rigorous plans. But we must do it. The public in Israel needs to understand both sides of this equation, one that it is necessary, and secondly that it will not be easy and we will have quite a few losses."
Amidror adds, "It will not be like previous incursions in previous operations in the Gaza Strip, it will be a much, much broader entry. I can say, without knowing the operational plan that the aims of the fighting this time - the destruction of Hamas' military capacity - is very far from what it was in the past, both in terms of the scale of the forces and also and the depth of entry."
What will be in the Gaza Strip afterwards? There are several options.
Asked what will be in the Gaza Strip after the victory over Hamas, Amidror says, "There are several options here, and it depends a lot on what happens in the fighting itself, after which we will have to make a decision. At one extreme, there is an option to stay there with a military government. At the other extreme, we could finish what we need to do in the Strip militarily, and then just leave, and the Strip will remain a problem for the world and for anyone who wants to deal with this problem - that is not our business.
"We have only one interest in the Gaza Strip, and that is not the well-being of the residents, but to fight any force that tries to establish a military capability in Gaza. We must continue to hurt anyone who tries to do that even after this war is over.
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"Between option A and B, there are all kinds of intermediate possibilities that need to be considered. Which international authority might come in? Maybe the Palestinian Authority? Everything, as mentioned, will be determined according to the results of the fighting, according to what is seen on the ground, according to international public opinion, according to the talks that we will conduct in the Middle East and much more. There is no need to make the decision now."
Should the fact that there are 199 hostages influence the offensive, and how will it in practice influence it.
As long as we do not know the location of the hostages and captives, it should not affect our operational plan. We should do what is necessary and possible to identify their location, or at least the location of some of them, and then the operational judgment should be left to the political and military level on how to act to try to get them back. Because once you know where they are, that's another consideration."
Is it clear that there was a mistaken concept here, and if so, what did it stem from?
"We had a series of failures on the eve of this attack by Hamas. First of all, we had an intelligence failure - there was no warning. We had a failure in the concept of the essence of Hamas, and how far it is an organization that has interests other than terrorism, and we had a mistake in the defensive concept that was not adapted to the scenario that took place.
"We need to check all these things straight after the war. To waste time and energy on issues that do not lead us to an absolute victory in the war right now is a mistake. But straight after we win, after the war is over, we will have to look back. Not to look for people so that heads can roll, but to understand how did we made the mistake, in order to be better in the future."
"Iran is behind the strength of Hamas"
Is there in your opinion a grain of truth in the reasoning that Iran pushed Hamas to hit us just now to prevent us drawing closer to Saudi Arabia?
"I think there is more than a grain of truth in this, and that for the Iranians a Middle East where there is an American, Saudi and Israeli alliance is something they are very much afraid of, and they do not want the Middle East to look like this, but I know of no proof that Iran was behind the attack, in the sense of the timing and the scale of the attack.
"But it should be remembered that even if there is no such proof, the one who has invested a lot of money in Hamas and given it a lot of weapons, and trained Hamas people and taught Hamas how to produce some of its own capabilities, is Iran. So even if Iran was not behind the attack in terms of timing and location, Iran still stands behind the strength of Hamas. Both in economic and military terms."
In wars you don't worry about the enemy's population"
During the fighting should Israel take into account the humanitarian angle?
"We must, as part of international law, subjugate all other interests to our main interest - to destroy the military capacity of Hamas. With all due respect to the world, the British did not ask themselves any humanitarian questions when they bombed Germany in WWII. Today they are giving weapons to the Ukrainians and they are not asking any humanitarian questions about the Russian cities that are being hit by the ammunition that the West gives them. When there is an enemy state on the other side, and Gaza is an enemy state as far as we are concerned, we behave as in war, and in war we do not worry about the needs of the enemy population. Don't abuse it, and try not to hurt it, but in the end the aim should be clear.
"You have to understand that Hamas operates behind the civilian population, and does everything to harm our citizens, so this is a very clear situation. You also have to remember that at the end of the day, the Palestinians chose Hamas in democratic elections. Therefore, it is impossible to make claims against Israel when it acts in accordance with its needs in the war. By the way, in all the previous operations we took seriously the claims of humanitarian needs of the residents of Gaza, and in the end you see where it got us."
What is the role of the Palestinian Authority in this whole story? Abu Mazen issued a condemnation of the atrocities in the south after a week and then deleted it, but what is their interest here?
"Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority have no role in this situation. As we said, there are those who think he will have a role at the end of the war. In the meantime, Abu Mazen is happy that the two sides are killing each other, because he hates both. He hates us and of course he hates Hamas."
Why is the US supporting us so much this time? Is it Biden's Zionism?
"This unprecedented support can be interpreted as something personal to Biden. But there is something more here, to make it clear to the world that the US-Israel-Saudi alliance is stronger and can be trusted more than the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas-Islamic Jihad alliance. It is already something that concerns the status in the world not only of Israel, but also of the US."
Published by Globes, Israel business news - en.globes.co.il - on October 18, 2023.
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https://www.thejc.com/opinion/inside-israels-final-campaign-against-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-vfn9dkgd
By Yaakov AmidrorOpinion
Inside Israel’s final campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran
The war is being fought in exceptionally close cooperation between the IDF and US forces. For the first time in the history of the Jewish state, a genuine military coalition has emergedMarch 4, 2026 12:16
Plumes of smoke rise following explosions in Tehran on March 1, 2026 (Image: Getty)
5 min read
For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic has been preparing a war to destroy the State of Israel. The regime in Iran has invested hundreds of billions of dollars, primarily in three major efforts to realise that ambition: the nuclear programme, the ballistic missile programme, and the construction of a “ring of fire” encircling Israel. The present war is intended to eliminate all of these threats, in the hope that the regime will be so weakened that the Iranian people will take to the streets and succeed in toppling the oppressive and corrupt government.
In June 2025, a swift and successful operation against Iran enabled Israel, with precise but narrowly focused American assistance, to halt the nuclear programme and delay missile production. Even earlier, following Hamas’s October 7 attack, Israel fought a prolonged war on two fronts, during which it dealt a severe blow to Hezbollah and neutralised Hamas as a force capable of threatening Israel. As a result of Israel’s success against Hezbollah, Sunni rebels were able to capture Damascus, thereby completely shattering Iran’s “ring of fire”.
It became clear, however, that despite the IDF’s achievements, the tasks remained unfinished in every theatre.
In the Gaza Strip, the American President announced a 20-point plan, centred on the voluntary disarmament of Hamas. Israel is acting in accordance with those 20 points and facilitating the plan’s progress. The United States will now have to demonstrate that its part of the arrangement – the full disarmament of Hamas – is indeed implemented. Those involved understand that if the US-established mechanism fails to disarm the terrorist organisation, the IDF will do so by force. This would not be a short war. Yet by its conclusion, which would take roughly a year, Hamas would no longer be able to rule over Gaza’s residents, would cease to be a military power and a significant portion of its remaining personnel would be eliminated.
In Lebanon, following a ceasefire initiated by the United States, the Lebanese government was expected to disarm Hezbollah. The process began sluggishly in southern Lebanon, but almost nothing was done in central and northern areas. The IDF acted in line with what had been agreed with Washington as part of the ceasefire, countering Hezbollah’s attempts to rebuild its capabilities.
Nevertheless, the damage inflicted on the organisation was only partial. Hezbollah’s decision this week to join the assault against Israel on the second day of the war demonstrates how limited the achievements of the Lebanese Army have been, despite its declaration that disarmament had begun. Hezbollah’s opening of hostilities is likely to bring a dramatic shift: the IDF is prepared to deliver a severe blow, potentially including a full-scale ground operation. The objective is to dismantle Hezbollah as a military organisation, thereby enabling the Lebanese government to complete its disarmament.
With regard to Iran, a more complex reality emerged. Despite Israel’s successes in June 2025, the regime swiftly resumed ballistic missile production, with substantial assistance from China, and made efforts to restore the nuclear programme. As a result, Israel concluded that another campaign against Iran would be unavoidable. Lessons from the June operation were thoroughly analysed in order to determine what should be done, where resources should be invested, and where genuine improvement was required.
No one planned it in advance, but the situation created by protests erupting across Iran triggered by severe economic hardship and acute water shortages – to the extent that there was even talk of evacuating parts of Tehran’s civilian population – presented a new opportunity. Moreover, the US President’s call on Iranian demonstrators to take to the streets because “help is on the way” created a US commitment to act against Iran.
The US, genuinely seeking a comprehensive agreement that would dismantle the nuclear project without the use of force, entered negotiations and allowed the Iranians room to compromise. They did not. Their evasive responses designed to buy time and their calculated formulations – intended to avoid blame for the crisis – led Washington to conclude that there was no partner for dialogue and that force was necessary. Israel’s Prime Minister persuaded the President that the missile programme was also a grave threat to the wider world. Thus, eliminating the nuclear programme and destroying the missile production infrastructure became the two central objectives of the present war.
To prepare for the possible use of force, the US assembled a vast and sophisticated air armada across the region – in neighbouring states, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf. This served as leverage in negotiations: a demonstration of the alternative should no agreement be reached. At the same time, it constituted the very force that would be deployed in the absence of a deal. The military capabilities the US gathered led to a new strategic assessment. As a result – and in light of the regime’s brutal suppression of protests – an additional mission was added: creating the conditions for the Iranian people to overthrow the regime.
Israel recognised this as a historic opportunity unlikely to return, given both the regime’s fragility and the current American President’s willingness to embark on a major and potentially prolonged war, despite uncertainties surrounding the mission of “creating the conditions for revolution”. The uncertainty does not stem from any doubt about the legitimacy of the objective – quite the contrary. Rather, it arises from the fact that, however justified, it remains unclear whether such an outcome can be achieved through air power alone, however extensive. Close cooperation between the US and Israel increases the likelihood of success, as their combined air force capabilities are formidable.
The war is being fought in exceptionally close cooperation between the IDF and CENTCOM, the US command responsible for the region. Following the President’s decision that this was the correct course of action, the two militaries achieved unprecedented coordination, creating a formidable war machine composed of two very different armed forces. Each side contributes its comparative advantage; each relies fully on the other. For the first time in Israel’s history, a genuine military coalition has emerged. The personal closeness and mutual respect between the US President and Israel’s Prime Minister have undoubtedly strengthened the alliance, but at its core lie shared strategic outlooks and closely aligned interests.
Many demand to know what will happen “the day after”. The leaders focus instead on the military campaign ahead, aware that the degree of military success will profoundly shape post-war realities. They are correct to emphasise the next stages of the war rather than speculate about the world that will follow. Outcomes will determine the options.
One example of how the war will shape the future more than any prior planning is the potential transformation in the Gulf as a result of Iran’s decision to attack its neighbours. Different reactions could lead to markedly different scenarios during and after the war, and there was no practical way to factor such developments into advance planning.
Now that Iran has widened the theatre to include all Gulf states, the US–Israeli alliance will need to respond and leverage the situation to advance its three objectives. That could not have been pre-designed. Flexibility is essential, along with timely responses to new developments, while resolutely pursuing the operational plan formulated by Washington and Jerusalem before the campaign began. In that resolve and determination lies the capacity to succeed — and ultimately to shape a less violent Middle East that promotes prosperity and better lives for all. That is the “day after” worth striving for.
Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror (Ret.), who served in the IDF for 36 years, is a former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and Head of the National Security Council. He is currently a fellow at JINSA in Washington DC and at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
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