Conversations with History - Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett - YouTube

Conversations with History - Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett - YouTube

Conversations with History - Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett

University of California Television (UCTV)

5,934 views  May 25, 2013  Foreign Policy and International Politics

(Visit: http://www.uctv.tv/) Conversations host Harry Kreisler welcomes Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett for a discussion of their new book, Going to Tehran. In the conversation, the Leveretts analyze the Islamic Republic of Iran's strategic goals and domestic politics. After analyzing the biases embedded in U.S. perceptions of Iran, they conclude with a proposal for changing U.S. relations with Iran by emulating Nixon's breakthrough with China Series: "Conversations with History" [5/2013] [Public Affairs] [Show ID: 25083]

===

In this video

Chapters

Transcript

Search in video

Intro

this program is presented by University of California television like what you learn visit our website or follow us on

Facebook and Twitter to keep up with the latest uctv

[Music]

programs [Music]

Welcome

welcome to a conversation with history I'm Harry Chrysler of The Institute of international studies our guests today

are Hillary man Leverett senior professional lecturer at American

University and Flint Leverett professor of international Affairs at Penn State

University they are the co-authors of a new book going to Teran why the United

States must come to terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome to my program thank you so

much now both of you worked in the government yes uh is that where you met

or yes and and and so uh you had various roles in in National Security focusing

on Iran I think I think that for you know Hillary and me both our careers in government really span the high

Flynt and Hillarys careers

Watermark of American Primacy in the Middle East they're not exactly coterminous but pretty close basically

we were in government from roughly the period of the first Gulf uh war in the early 1990s until um March of 2003 just

before the invasion of Iraq when we left our positions at the White House on the

National Security Council staff and that decade and change really is as I said the high Watermark of American Primacy

in the in the Middle East and Hillary and I think in RRP that we really had

ringside seats to watch as in our view the the United States really misused

that Primacy misused its Supremacy in ways that were grossly counterproductive

for its own interest and for America's standing in international Affairs this

was a period when the possibilities uh for America to uh

essentially go for a balance you know in the region uh or uh take the opportunity

to ass search uh uh to to take the opportunity to essentially dominate the

region I I think that's right that essentially coming out of the first Gulf War coming out of the Cold War the

United States did have this um unique choice that it could have in a sense

Consolidated its military Primacy in the region and use that to manage the

balance of power in a Smart Way um protect its core interests and and shape

a balance of power in which American interests would be protected but that would also mean

recognizing that there are other powers in the region that have some independent

interests of their own that have to be accommodated or respected in some way

and our argument is that really from the beginning you know even after the first

Gulf War when uh Bush 41 was still in office through Clinton of course through

the George W Bush Administration even up to Obama today that America has instead

basically tried to dominate the Middle East become a hegemon to remake the the

region by micromanaging political outcomes and by basically being

intolerant of uh any possibility for independent um actors powers to emerge

The Fall of the USSR

in now uh the period you're talking about it it was marked by the the the

fall of the Soviet Union and uh it was at that time toward the end of the Bush

Administration that Paul wiertz drafted uh the presidential guidance document

and and it essentially laid uh the agenda you're describing out because the

argument was that the US as the dominant power in that region and the world the

only superpower really uh had uh uh an

interest in preventing any Regional power from uh assuming that role yes and

I think that that I I think that is a fundamentally mistaken view um you know

hegemony is one of those things that it would be uh nice in theory if you could get it but in the real world um

especially in the real world of the Middle East after the Cold War even a state as powerful as the United States

couldn't really um establish itself as a hegemonic power on any kind of sustainable basis and it was actually

going to make itself weaker by trying so so your the your goal in writing the

book was to draw on your experience I would guess uh but but also to to sort

of see uh the broader implications of the problem and and kind of the biases

uh built in into the way the US views the region talk a little about that yes

Drawing on Hillarys experience

we wanted to draw very much on our experience we saw um one of there were so many unanswered questions you come we

come back to the first the first president Bush's administration at his inaugural in his first inaugural speech

in January 1989 he actually reaches out to the Islamic Republic of Iran because we still had hostages in Lebanon which

the Bush Administration thought were acting as an albatross over us in the Middle East and so then the first President Bush in his inaugural said

Goodwill would be get Goodwill essentially if Iran took steps we would reciprocate Iran eventually does

reciprocate helps us get our last hostages out of Lebanon sending messages through the through the UN yes and he's sending messages through the UN there's

a un Envoy who is dedicated to doing this and works between shuttles between the Bush Administration and then

president ronani in Iran gets our hostages out of Lebanon gets Iran's neutrality in the Gulf War and then

after the Gulf War ends the Soviet Union collapses the Iraqi military is defeated

and then the UN on goes back to then National Security adviser skull coft in the Bush Administration and says you

know the Iranians are now interested in what kind of reciprocity there they will be there will be and skull says I'm I'm

very sorry to have to say tell you this but there will be no reciprocity and there's the change the United States

didn't need to reciprocate as it did just in 1989 two years prior so we wanted we looked at all of these

questions why didn't the United States reciprocate what changed what made the United States focused on dominance we

drew on more of our experiences I was in my first job in the state department was during the Gulf War 1990 to 1991 I was

on the ground in several of our America in our embassies through the gulf including in Kuwait and I saw in Kuwait

Why has the US left Saddam Hussein

at the time kuwaitis liberate in liberated Kuwait angry and concerned and anxious why has the United States left

Saddam Hussein in Baghdad is it because they want to keep tens of thousands of troops here to restore the the ruling

family in Kuwait keep all of these ruling families as they are and dominate the region even Kuwai is even at that

time when here in the United States we all saw them as thrilled that they were liberated were very concerned about the

trajectory of American power in the region so we looked at these questions we looked at why you know why the United

States was doing this and we became very interested in this pursuit of hegemony in dominance then fast forward a few

more years and I'm again at the white I'm in the state department assigned to the US mission to the UN in New York and

I'm given this this kind of rare opportunity to actually talk to Iranian officials something almost never done by

American officials by US law and practice we are not allowed to talk to Iranian officials but there's an

exception you can talk to them in a multilateral frame framework over multilateral issues that have nothing to

do with us Iran relations and that's where I was I was in the six plus2 framework to talk about Afghanistan

before 911 so I talked to my Iranian counterpart and discovered lo and behold

very professional very educated very knowledgeable and our interests aligned we had very similar interests very

similar concerns about the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and with 9/11 that multilateral

dialogue then became a bilateral dialogue between the United States and Iran there's this idea that we actually

Irans role in Afghanistan

have had tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan from the beginning from

right after 911 that's not true we actually had just a few hundred CIA and special office special ops officers and

airow we actually worked with Iran to get access to Iran's allies on the ground the Northern Alliance 15 ,000 of

them to overthrow the Taliban and send Al-Qaeda On The Run we were able to really cooperate with Iranian officials

they acted in our kind of lexicon as quintessential rational actors so we

wanted to bring these stories out try to explain how the world looks from Iran's perspective not to have sympathy with

them but to De develop something that is almost unheard of here in terms of how we see the United the Middle East

strategic empathy okay so so uh let's roll back a minute and

The US is the worlds hegemon

uh uh because what your experience brings is a set of cases where uh you

are arguing that Iran uh reached out to the United States and we didn't reciprocate now uh but we we've got to

look at this in in the context of the region basically and essentially what we

have is there's no doubt that uh the US is the world's head heiman so the

question becomes how will it shape uh the Middle East and in the Middle East

what you have is two potential Rivals to be the regional he hegemon one is Israel

and one is Iran basically is that fair I I I would take issue only with the

Iran is a potential hegemon

description of Iran as a potential Hedon I know that it's conventional right but

it's part of the conventional wisdom here I would characterize the Iranian view as more they don't want anybody else to

become a hedgemon they are very focused on their own uh strategic and foreign

policy Independence this is one of the driving values and goals of the Iranian

Revolution um and they're very focused on that in their foreign policy and so they certainly don't want a hegemonic

Israel but they also don't want a hegemonic Saudi Arabia they don't and

they don't want an external power like the United States imposing its own

version of hegemony on the region and this is where why we think that Iran is

so critical in this choice between balance and hegemony for the United

States because to pursue hegemony in the Middle East means among other things

that the United States basically has to suppress a country like the Islamic Republic that is out to consolidate and

protect its own strategic Independence that won't be subordinated as part of a

US dominated Regional order the United States could come to terms with that but

it would mean we wouldn't be a hegemonic power we would be an important power we would be protecting and promoting our

own interests in the region but we wouldn't be a hegemonic power in the region but instead we chose to pursue

Conventional wisdom

hegemony and and part of the conventional wisdom that that is really incorrect it it assumes that Iran

because of its place its structure in the international political order will have the same Regional and foreign

policies as the Sha which is a HED was the Sha's policies were hedonic it disregards culture it disregards the

actors and influences on culture on foreign policy in Iran which makes the Islamic Republic very very different the

Islamic Republic looks at Regional international relations and Regional politics in terms of balance what they want in the region is not pro-iranian

lack surrounding them they want independent foreign policy actors surrounding them for balance it's a very

different foreign policy than the Sha okay so but but what you're

Hegemonic role

suggesting is if one assumes that America is going to play a hegemonic

role in the world just because uh of its military strength its economic strength

and there's no rival in the world then then uh there would seem to be a

structural conflict built in with that perception

of itself and the perception of the Iranians that you're describing is that

fair because you're asking in other words you're increasing the burden on the United States because it's not just

about changing its role in the Middle East and Rec recognizing Iranian interests but it's really

about thinking about its role in the world it it it it is but I think there is still even within that structure

Choice on both sides

there's choice on both sides you know the the Sha confronted with a certain

situation certain structure uh and an increasingly powerful America the Sha

makes the determination that he can actually increase Iran's chances of becoming a regional hedgemon by in

effect bandwagoning with the United States and that's an important element of his foreign policy but once you have

a revolution in Iran and you have an Islamic Republic in Iran that is committed to foreign policy Independence

and restoring what it saw as Iran's degraded sovereignty then you know you

have a very different um set of goals that come into play the goal is to

establish foreign policy Independence for Iran and over time to see more and more countries in the region become

independent in their foreign policies that's in fact structure doesn't determined that choice you know the Sha

made a certain Choice within a structure the Islamic Republic made a different Choice within that structure the United

States too has choices you know particularly coming out of the Cold War

it could say okay we have important interests in the Middle East we are going to in effect manage the balance of

power to protect those interest but that means we're prepared to come to terms

with important Regional players like the Islamic Republic of Iran particularly

after you've just put Iraq in a box in the after the first Gulf War the balance

of power argument for some kind of rap RMA with Iran is very powerful but

instead we under successive administrations deliberately um put that away and

instead say what we want to do is uh remake the region and there was a specific policy choice that had to be

Remaking the region

taken that was taken in the 1990s which very few understand coming out of the C coming

out of the out of the C War the defeat of the Iraqi military the United States essentially had two choices on its

policy table in the office of policy planning at the Secretary of State at the state department one was that it

could have tried to construct a regional Cooperative Regional security order somewhat like the occe in Europe that

would have recognized each state as a state with legitimate interest and power and tried to bring it into a Cooperative

security mechanism for the region which would have by definition meant a a gradual but real diminution and

withdrawal of US troops and let security be something managed by the regional players and it would a reduction in

Israel's freedom of unilateral military initiative right yes or or the flip side which would which would have been and

what we chose which would was to organize the political and Military order around a so-called peace process

and I say so-call because it wasn't really about a peace process it was about bringing Arab states in a very

weakened position into settlements with Israel on Israeli and American terms to have a political order where there's an

acceptance of Israel on its terms with its National Security strategy of dominating its neighbors that was the

choice taken in October 1991 in Madrid which we hail here as the great start of the peace process but in effect what it

was was was the real start of a highly militarized us-led political and security order in the region that issued

balance of power politics and issued this idea of regional security for the region this was the choice in in the

policy planning department of the state department under secretary Baker at the time but the the the the issue

Americas commitment to Israel

becomes uh America's commitment and support of Israel which many people

interpret as support for whatever Israel's current policy issue which

which are two different things so so one thing that has to be critical in this

analysis is uh Israel is there we

perceive it as a democracy uh a a uh a uh an example a

shining example on the hill of democratic values and it's also a uh a

hedgemon you know uh basically so so the the the the problem here

is as I see it is you're you're realists you're examining the the actual reality

but what when you come to putting a proposal on the table which you did it's very idealistic given the realities of

the existence of another heiman who uh has the political support in the country

The Israel lobby

well it's it's not idealistic in the sense it we think it's the only thing that would actually work to sustain uh a

measure of American influence in this critical part of the world over the long term that ultimately the pursuit of pony

is is self-defeating um I take your point about I mean we are often called realists and we certainly

don't have any problem with that I think that one um and and we are great

admirers of of John Mir shimer and Steve Walt and the work that they did um on the Israel uh Lobby um I least be able

to talk to them um on the record for for the book um but I think that one way in

which maybe we we um deviate a little bit from them on this issue is they see the American um relationship with Israel

and the way it affects American Middle East policy in terms of a kind of domestic political prism that because

the Israel Lobby is so effective at what it does this distorts um American policy

in various ways we certainly don't want to under um underestimate the

effectiveness of the Israel lobby but I think we have a slightly different take which is that part of why the lobby is

effective is because it is pushing on an Open Door a kind of ideological Open

Door that's been opened by an American sense that what we want to do in the Middle East is dominate it and the

Israelis have been very successful at making the case in Washington that having this militarily dominant Israel

that has nearly absolute freedom to use military force whenever uh for whatever

purpose it wants um that having an Israel like that is actually good for

the American strategic position in the region it helps to keep other potential

power centers in the region subordinated and that is strategically useful for the United States that really I think is the

key and in a sense it's not really Israel that um you know got us to take

this hegemonic position it was the Israelis who figured out that the United States is going in this direction and we

can in effect piggy back on on that and they've done so very very

um very very well uh you uh spend a lot of at least a third of your book talking

Irans vulnerabilities

about uh Iran's vulnerabilities and what its strategic goals are you've talked a little about

that but but their their geography dictates uh their vulnerability talk a

little about that when I first started talking to Iranian officials through this exception where you could talk to this multilateral format that Ronnie

Geography dictates vulnerability

ficial said to me why don't you think about what the Islamic Republic does and its foreign policy in a much less less

politicized way than you normally think about it visa Israel and concerns surrounding the Arab Israeli conflict

think about Iran in its neighborhood in Central Asia Pakistan Afghanistan Iraq

the threats that we have faced we as Iranians have faced without even thinking about Israel just to think about that and it is extraordinary when

you think back historically Iran has always been a focal point for great powers and Regional Powers because of

its resources its tremendously educated and sophisticated population its historic role its production its

manufacturing its Arts everything about Iran has made it attractive for

penetration from both great Powers the Russians the Soviets the Brits the Americans as well as Regional Powers the

Iraqis and others so to think about Iran's vulnerabilities it has 15

neighbors 15 neighbors now I had studied the Middle East seriously as an academic

and had never never really thought about that number to have 15 neighbors and all of them not just hostile to the idea of

an Islamic Republic but have actually taken military action against it that Iraq to Iran's East actually invaded the

country because it was an Islamic Republic and vulnerable with help from a lot of its other neighbors with help from from its particularly from the

United States and from its its Arab neighbors to to the South which today now host then thousands of US troops

with the most deadly American weapon systems all poised to disarm the Islamic Republic of weapons of mass destruction

it does not have so to think about these vulnerabilities as a state surrounded by F 15 hostile countries invaded having

their diplomats killed in Maza Sharif under the talibans Afghanistan really made us think about how the world looks

from Iran's perspective and again not to gain sympathy but real strategic empathy with the kind of foreign policy that

they have derived and that's why this idea of Iran as a hegemon actually makes no sense they cannot be a hegemon with

these kind of 15 different many of them hostile to the Islamic Republic what they can do is they can

hope for they can push for they can try to create help assist outcomes on the

ground beyond their borders that give those countries independent foreign policies and domestic systems grounded

in Islam and participatory politics so when I first started to negotiate with Iranians over Afghanistan I was shocked

we were focused on the air campaign the military campaign they were focused on the Constitution that Afghanistan had to

have a representative Constitution why it wasn't that they were necessarily great admirers of Jeffersonian democracy

why was because if there was a constitution in Afghanistan it was a real representative political order

based in Islam but representative that meant that Iran's historic allies the Shia there that are called the Hazara

the USCS the tajiks would come into a government and balance the historically vitriolically anti-shia Taliban POS

population and that would give a guarantee for Iran security unlike some military dictatorship imposed same thing

for Iraq just a year and a half two years later the thing they focused on in Iraq was not getting Shia militias in

there to kill Americans that's not what happened what they focused on was the political order to get a political order

there in a constitution that would make Iraq a representative political order based in Islam what that did was it

elected it brought to power their Shia and Kurdish allies that's what gives them the security there not Shia

militias running around with with with with with cish of c one of the problems I'm having with your argument is that

building on your experience where America uh the United States uh in its

search uh or in its consolidation of hedani in the region uh uh rejected

initiatives from Iran but but what what I'm hearing and what I'm sure people in

our audience are going to think is that you are examples of people who come to

identify with the people you're working with to a point where you're going

overboard in your analysis so for example in what you were just saying the

the it's reasonable to see Iran as wanting to protect Shia minorities you

know in in the regions we're talking about uh but on the other hand aren't

you overstating their desire for creating a democracy and a constitution

in Afghanistan to guarantee the Shia in other words what I'm saying is you're

you're overselling their blueprint and the arguments they probably made to you

as look at Afghanistan as an example because I think again Afghanistan is a less politicized atmosphere in terms of where the emotions come in in

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Iran tried in the early 1990s just to use their Hazara the Shia

Afghan Shia as their Ally it was a disaster the the Hazara the Shia in Afghanistan are significant but they're

only 10 to 15% of of the population they couldn't do that they needed to have an alliance with other groups within the

country that were not part of this Sunni poshon vitriolically anti-shia community

that was supported by Saudi araban that was supported by Saudi Arab and Pakistan so they needed to align with these other groups and the way to get to have this

stable to have this balanced is through not a perfect Jeffersonian democracy not at all but to have it enshrined in a

participatory political order where their allies could form a coalition and be with other groups to to balance

against basically their I think this is this is part of the the the dissonance that our message creates in that

ultimately the argument boils down to that Iranians calculate and we've come to think as an analytic matter that this

is a correct calculation they calculate that any

state in this part of the world that becomes at all more representative of

its people's attitudes grievances beliefs what have you any state in this

area that becomes more representative is going to become by definition a less

interested in strategic cooperation with the United States much less Israel and

that is a big plus for Iran and B

they're going to become more interested in foreign policy Independence for their

countries uh not subordinating their foreign policies and that too is going

to be a big strategic Plus for Iran um we're not trying to see it in idealistic

terms at all we're saying that Iran has a strategy to

um to alter the balance of power in the region in ways that it will become much

less threatening to Iran and this is a really important part of that strategy

and what we're trying to argue as an analytic matter is that this is a strategy which is actually achieved an

enormous amount you know if you look at the relative balance of power in the

region even just 10 years ago where the United States was where Iran was fast

forward where's the United States today where is Iran today in that balance I think it's really hard to say that in

relative terms that the United States is not significantly weaker today in terms of its ability to achieve its stated

goals and that the Islamic Republic is in a relatively much better position today than it was even just 10 years ago

this is about strategy and it's a strategy which is actually working do you make that argument in the book about

Jeffersonian Democracy

uh they're wanting democracy in these places uh uh if not Jeffersonian democracy that argument isn't in the

book though is it I I I think it is it is certainly you know in licit in a good

deal of what we say about Iranian strategy in places like Afghanistan in places like Iraq how the Islamic

Republic has reacted to the the Arab Spring you do not discuss in the book

Sunni Shia Split

The the Sunni Shia split basically I don't believe you do I mean in other

words this has to be a a major factor motivating their foreign policy in the

in the sense that they support Shia it's part of their soft power which you talk

about uh but they are known to support Hamas for example as part of uh their

their real they can do the math you know and yes you're right she is solidarity and we point this out in the book sheia

Shia Solidarity

solidarity is an important theme in their foreign policy but they can do the

math they know how many Shia Muslims in there there are in the Middle East in the world compared to the number of

Sunni Muslims and if they are playing a strictly sectarian strategy that is a losing proposition for them and they are

they are very very well aware of that and so in country after country in Afghanistan in um in in the Palestinian

Arena as you mentioned with Hamas they are basically supporting um you know

Islamic governance they are supporting people who want to combine participatory

politics and elections with principles of Islamic government whether they are doing that in a Shia

way or whether they are doing that in a Sunni way and in fact we talking about in the book that they're careful not to

do it in a strictly sectarian way so when they talk about Bahrain for example they're not talking about the rights of Shia they're talking about

participatory particip par participatory governance in a society now they don't say democracy for them democracy is

really a foreign concept that has been imposed for various various means and agendas that don't have anything to do

with in their view the desires of populations what they talk about is rep representative governance based in

islamism they're very very clear about that and foreign policy Independence and our point is not that we sympathize with

that but we understand that that is powerful not just in Iran but all over the Middle East and as a as a young

student in Egypt it was something that I clearly saw and myself had cognitive dissonance over for example in my

upbringing anoir Sadat was a hero was an absolute hero for what he did then I get

to Egypt as a student and he's not perceived as a hero there the reason wasn't because he had some for favorable

view for Jews the concern wasn't being nice or not nice to Jews the issue was that the United States was had supported

saddat and was supporting Mubarak over the is over the desires and interests of the population to serve a foreign

American agenda and that the settlement with Israel was really a settlement to lock in Egypt when it was weak and

prevent it from being a strong player in the region and I saw then that it wasn't that Egyptians were against democracy or

political participation or they didn't have opinions of course they did the the problem for them was that the United

States was supporting a dictator that was not allowing their views and policies to be heard now it's not that

Iran comes in as a night white knight in shining armor to say here you can have democracy no it's that Iran realizes

that if there are elections even in a place a Sunni dominant place like Egypt it's going to produce a political order

that is not pro-iranian but at least gives the Islamic Republic's foreign policy desires and interests a chance

and is not is not so focused on with with us I think and we do get a

Middle East

lot of kind of personal attacks but I think the problem that people have with

us they'll say it's a question of tone or this or that the real problem is what

we're saying is that particularly in the Middle East that is in which public

opinion is mattering more than ever before that the United States does not

have a narrative with which to compete for influence we've got carrier battle

groups coming out our ears but we do not have a narrative to compete for

influence the Middle East today is becoming less a balance of power in hard power terms and more a balance of

influence in which you need a narrative to compete we at this point the United

States does not have a narrative the Islamic Republic has one and it knows

how to use it to strategic effect you you're interested in uh changing

Changing Americas Perspective

America's perspective on the world uh especially in this region and uh one of

the problems I hear is you're trying to do that by making the case for Iranian

foreign policy the problem becomes that given uh Iran's situation which you're

descri describing they use as instruments of power uh things like uh

if not going for nuclear weapons at least keeping alive their nuclear programing exercising their rights under

the non right right that that's correct they they support groups which in the

American hegemonic perspective and I'm not defending it I'm just saying it are

label terrorists groups that win elections right right what but right but what what we're we we're we're talking

about the reality on the ground on the one hand and American perceptions you know on the other and we're creating

cognitive disase right you are but you're you're using as a case a case

that's very vulnerable to being dismissed whether

it's legitimate or not not on the basis of rationality but the emotions that can

be generated by the American narrative so America does have a narrative that narrative is

that Israel has to be protected at all costs whatever uh Israeli policy makers want

is confused generally with Israel's National interest which may differ uh

that any action taken by a potential adversary that makes perfect sense in

realist terms uh can in the American narrative be

dismissed because Iraq Iran is going for nuclear weapons or uh Iran is supporting

terrorists so there's a big problem here uh in bringing rationality to the

argument that's allely which is one of the Reas which is one of the reasons why our book is

called going to ton because it comes from Nixon and Kissinger going to before

we discuss that we'll talk about you I want to get into another point because

you we've I think laid out your case for the irrationality of

American hegemonic goals in the Middle East you you've laid out your case but another important case you're making is

that the uh we do not understand that's right uh the domestic politics uh of

Iran because we cannot see see their perspective on their goal in

establishing an Islamic Republic and the key Point here that is for America as

the the leading uh force in secularization modernization and globalization the

notion that there would be an important actor whose leadership combines religion

and state power in one so very briefly if we're going to get to to Tran give me

an your insight into why we misperceive the domestic situation and

the Iranian case for combining religion

and politics well and we have a history of doing this from the Bay of Pigs in Cuba to Iraq the reason why that's

important because we don't want to know we don't want to see what's really there because then we can deceive ourselves into thinking it's not as powerful an

enemy as it is and we can defeat it and I understand what America's problem is

what is the Iranian case for what they're doing the the Iranian case is

The Iranian Case

that um that the notion both just the concept of democracy the word itself is

foreign but more importantly the Western notion of democracy is is predicated

ultimately on a separation of religion and politics and the Iranian case is

that a this is foreign to our culture our beliefs B it's not just foreign it's

part of the way that Western uh colonialists Western uh external Powers

it's part of the way that they actually try to subordinate the Muslim World by trying to get modern Muslims to to buy

into this into this argument that in fact the only way that Iranians or

Muslims in other societies that have been heavily penetrated by Western Powers the only way in in which they can

restore uh a measure of genuine Independence and sovereignty and and really determine their own Futures is by

um a kind of governance that will it is grounded in Islamic principles but also

and the Islamic justification for this is in terms of sha or consultative government but that will also include

participatory politics and elections this is not secular democracy in the

western sense but it is a kind of governance that both responds to the

public um and also allows the public to have a government which is in some

fundamental ways looking out for their interests and not those of Outsiders that's the AR and you make the argument

The Recent Presidential Election

that in not understanding this we misread the recent presidential election

we we misread the uh the uh reform

conern conservative split in Iran which is reflected in the election of

different uh kinds of presidents uh and all of this

fuels uh the second leg of uh the failure of American policy because the

first leg is the the search for dominance in the region or the consolidation of dominance in the and

the second leg is well these people have to be irrational they have to be is

olated because they don't believe in the separation of church and state that's that's that's right and and this really

does you know we basically want to keep telling ourselves we've been telling ourselves for more than 30 years that

this system is illegitimate it's not wanted by most of the people in Iran and

that it is on the verge of collapse and we have been telling ourselves this over

and over again for more than 30 years it's never true but we keep telling ourselves this and so in night in 2009

the last Iranian presidential election we think somehow that musvi represents

all of these Iranians who want to get rid of the Islamic Republic and so when instead aidad is

reelected um the only explanation for it is is fraud that's the only possible

explanation for it even though methodologically sound public opinion polls say otherwise even though the

musvi campaign could never offer a shred of Hard Evidence of how fraud was actually perpetrated that's what we

prefer to believe so so let let's talk a little about the nuclear program because

The Nuclear Program

that's one of the big issues and on the one hand the the two Ayatollah uh H and

Kami basically have said that uh nuclear

weapons and are immoral basically so we have that on the table uh secondly uh n

the abil the the the ability to have a nuclear program and to uh be a great

state go together in the sense that having a nuclear program you you suggest

the argument is made in Iran that it it's a kind of industrial policy on the one hand uh on the other hand uh uh uh

given the evidence of what happened to Gaddafi and uh Hussein you know one

could make an argument that for their security they might want to be on the threshold of being able to make weapons

although they won't make that decision to to go forward so so the

issue again and then finally the notion is by not understanding uh that this is

an Islamic Republic and not seeing modernity the way we see it then they

have to be irrational so if they get the bomb you know they will immediately attack uh Israel of course uh they they

have to live with the the uh misinterpretation or the actual words of

the president of of Iran so so the problem is I guess what what I keep

hearing is this is a real it will require a real break through for the

United States to accept the the geopol politics of the region on the one hand

and what is a reasonable strategy and on the other hand understand what an Islamic Republic uh might look like

that's right it's that's exactly right that is the challenge and so the key to an agreement is not to try to prevent

them from nuclearization not to prevent their scientific and technological development the key to a breakthrough is

transparency is to have have overall breakthrough where you diffuse the military and political tension and

within that to get them to sign up to to basically country neutral rules like the additional protocol to the MPT that give

more and more transparency along the way because you're not going to stop this train that's left the station but you can build in more and more transparency

in an atmosphere of of mutual respect and trust and Reconciliation okay so so

dealing with these problems which which your book uh uh if one reads it in its

entirety uh makes a a an important case

uh for your view leads you to see the only solution to this set of problems is

to follow the example of Nixon and for the president to go to to to to ran as

uh Nixon went to Beijing so uh make that case well I think I think that that's

Strategic Readjustment

right I mean the only um I mean the real really powerful President we have for the kind of of um you know strategic um

Readjustment that we're calling for in the Middle East the real powerful president that we have is um the opening

to China in the early 1970s the People's Republic like the Islamic Republic I

mean obviously very very different systems in a lot of ways but these were both revolutionary States came out of

revolutions that were very focused on uh after periods of Western domination in

their countries on restoring sovereignty on restoring real Independence for those

countries and we in Asia when the Communists won for 20 years we couldn't stand that we

wouldn't have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic we tried to convince others not to do it we tried

economically to strangle it we didn't just we didn't pursue just regime change we recognize this whole other political

structure in Taiwan as the real government of China and the result was

disastrous for the American position in Asia you know we wouldn't have been in Vietnam but for this really stupid

approach or Korea before we really wouldn't have been in in Vietnam but for this really um I think

ideologically driven uh policy toward China that was ground in a sense that America had to have gmany in Asia we

couldn't accept an independent China and have the kind of regional order we

wanted and so we warped American forign policy to pursue that hegemonic um that

hegemonic illusion Nixon came to office realizing that this had to change and in

order to change he had to be prepared to accept the People's Republic as a

legitimate and enduring entity that represented real national interests and

come to terms with it on that basis and we think that was one of the most

brilliant moves in American diplomatic history it saved the American position

in Asia and restored aent that the United States was a great power which could proactively shape important

strategic outcomes in a positive way fast forward to the Middle East today our strategic position in this part of

the world is in freefall the only way we can we argue that we can bail it out is

by coming to terms with this Rising independent um revolutionary State the

Islamic Republic of Iran and like with China that is going to require us to

accept the Islamic Republic as an enduring entity representing legitimate national interests and come to terms

with it on that basis you you point out that that throughout all these administrations we've really uh been

supporting groups that seek the overthrow of the Iranian government so

so this failure to accept the legitimacy of the Iranian uh of the Islamic Republic of

Iran uh goes with uh a program of uh

subversion and support of organizations like the MK yeah I think that's right

Domestic Policy

and it starts largely after the collapse of the Soviet Union um and the defeat of the Iraqi military in the 1980s we you

know we had basically a proxy conflict in some ways in Lebanon with the Iranians but we weren't so much after

financing um and supporting groups that would really overthrow the Islamic Republic it's not until we think that we

can have hegemony that we can really dominate the region that in 1994 there's the first alloc allocation in Congress

of real money to support opposition groups in Iran and that has exponentially increased ever since and

that's been bipartisan absolutely bipartisan this is not a liberal uh conservative Democratic Republican issue

this is something that has not only bipartisan consensus among American foreign policy Elites and I think the

the broader American public but ideological consensus now now if if one were to Envision a a new

Nixon uh uh making the changes you're calling for I I I I

wonder what uh would change the political configuration domestically you

analyze US policy uh you point out the the the essentially Coalition of groups

that uh support a policy of continuing the path we're on supporters of Israel

uh liberal interventionists uh immigrat uh uh undoubtedly the the

military industrial complex there may be others so so what are you idealists with

regard to American domestic policy in the sense that that you think that a a

rational argument will change things or do we have to wait until the failure of

America's position leads to a a decline of American power or unfortunately to

war well in some ways we think that there already is a relative decline in American power which is one of the reasons why we think this argument is

very important to consider right now but the other thing we think is is critically important to focus on is the

element of presidential leadership this is not something that is going to come organically from our domestic constituencies clamoring for acceptance

of an Islamic Republic that is not going to happen similarly it didn't happen with the acceptance of the People's Republic of China there was a there was

a strong Taiwan Lobby here a strong anti-communist Lobby here there were our own version of exp Patriots on this

issue absolutely and within the within the foreign policy and Elite and media there were there were strong segments of

the American Body politic that were dead set against it in fact John Kennedy had the initial idea to have a approach M

with with China but Eisen how told him that he would support told Kennedy he would support him publicly as a

president on almost any issue unless Le he contemplated Repro with the People's Republic of China there were strong

constituencies here against reproach with China Nixon LED Nixon and Kissinger but Nixon in particular led the American

Body politic to see this in as in American interest and that's why we also call the book going to tan it is not

only trying to understand what works for Iran to shape increasingly shape the Middle East balance of power but why the

US president why there needs to be us leadership to go to ton to accept it like sedak goes to Egypt like Nixon goes

to China to accept the People's Republic the Islamic Republic of Iran requires presidential leadership it's not going

to come from coalitions of of domestic constituencies that are so grounded in the pursuit of a gmany and and if we

don't do it the alternative is going to be continued uh sharp decline of

American standing in this critical part of the world and we think eventually

another us initiated war in the region as Hillary put it to disarm another

Middle Eastern country Weapons of Mass destructure doesn't have and the blowback to the US position in this

Regional environment the blowback the US position if it does that will almost I think destroy the US position in the

Middle East that's the alternative you know one of the the problems here in addition to all this Coalition of forces

against this is the uh and and I guess this is why you're looking for presidential leadership because uh you

quote Nixon as saying you can't do anything half completely if you're going to do blamed yeah anyway so you have to

do it completely so basically what you're saying is if we look at what Nixon did it was in secret it was a top-

down approach yes and he just did it and he did it himself and then he's spring a Fed complete and he went there and and

very clearly said we recognize the legitimacy uh of the Communist uh state

of of uh of of China uh and I guess as a as a realist on

domestic politics in addition to being a realist on International Affairs I I

I am still looking for a handle to move in this Direction I mean if we look at

the case of Obama I mean he one was led to believe in the campaign you know that

that he might be uh a person who might do do this but

in fact he was captured by the bureaucracy and the and the existing

coalitions so so what where where do you

see the surprised President coming from it could still come from Obama he did he

had what I would say were strategic impulses not a fully thought out strategy or Vision or understanding of

how hard it would be and this would be hard it would require real political Capital but he still could do it he

could do it especially in a in a second term as it's configured with the Secretary of State Kerry who has said

that trying to to um to close Iran's nuclear program would be ridiculous he

can do it with the Secretary of Defense Hegel potentially even with a Vice President Biden in the first term I

don't think he was so much captured by the bureaucracy but he decided to try to co-opt it to bring it along to bring

about some other kind of agenda uh domestically that failed he I think realized that that failed and so he has

taken some political risk in terms of his second term appointments it would still require a lot of political Capital

I'm not very hopeful he's going to do it but it is certainly still possible and the problem that he faces if he doesn't

do it by the end of his presidency he may have to face the very Stark choice of admitting American irrelevancy in the

Middle East or going to war to protect it but aren't you overstating American

decline in that region I mean one can accept the unraveling of our initiatives

our being on the wrong side but but aren't we needed there to protect the

oil supplies of Europe and China and Asia uh not so much necessarily because

we're as dependent on oil as as we were we still obviously have a unique capacity is have carrier battle groups

Energy Security

out out the wazu we have a unique capacity to project um large amounts of conventional military power in the

region and that's a something we'll be able to do uniquely for for some time to

come the issue is though are we in fact using that power in ways that actually

um increase the security of oil flows to International markets you know I would

say the biggest threat to the security of those oil flows out of the Persian Gulf is not that Iran will take some

initiative it's that Israel Andor the United States will start a war with Iran

that's where the real threat to energy security comes from did the Iraq War

really somehow make Persian Gulf oil flows more secure I mean we go to China

every year I don't think people in China or people in other Rising countries that depend on Persian Gulf oil think that

the Iraq War made their energy supplies more more secure the us could still play

a very very constructive and important role in the Middle East it certainly has interest there but it needs a very very

different Strat one of the important manifestations that you see the decline of American power our regional States

and not specifically Iran but Saudi Arabia for example taking matters more and more into into their own hands

because they are so concerned about the precipitous decline of American power but they're also concerned about Shia

Iran but well this is the strategy that they're using they're concerned about the precipitous decline of American power has led them to push this the

sectarian card to fund Armen train vitriolically anti-ia and anti-American

groups in Libya in Syria and Afghanistan to hold on to their position position and make the issue not about people's

wanting more political participation in their own in their own States but about Sunni SE Sunni Shia sectarian divide

that's what the Saudis are pushing and they're doing so in large part because they feel they can't rely on the United

States to secure them okay so we're we're coming to the end of the program let let me summarize and then you make

any additional point you want you you are saying that America's uh

inability uh uh or choice not to understand Iran's strategic position and

what they really want is combined with a lack of understanding of uh what it

means to have an Islamic Republic uh uh uh which which sees religion and

politics linked and that is preventing the US from understanding the virtue of

a balance of power strategy in the region which would then see that Iran

and the US have many common interests which could lead to negotiations and not

war which could bring stability to the region is there something I'm missing the only thing I would alter is I would

go I would state it stronger it's not just that there are common interests that we could realize if we had a better

relationship with Iran I think it's more imperative than that I think at this point the United States can't achieve

any of its core objectives in the Middle East absent a better relation with the

Islamic Republic of ran yes it's not just a nice to have thing it's a need to

have thing well on that note and uh I think this was a very Lively discussion

so let me show your book one more time and uh thank you very much for being on

our program thank you so much thank you thank you and thank you very much for

watching uh this conversation with [Music]

history

==

==

=