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All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror eBook : Kinzer, Stephen: Amazon.com.au: Books

All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror eBook : Kinzer, Stephen: Amazon.com.au: Books


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All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror 2nd Edition, Kindle Edition
by Stephen Kinzer (Author) Format: Kindle Edition


4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars (1,562)


With a thrilling narrative that sheds much light on recent events, this national bestseller brings to life the 1953 CIA coup in Iran that ousted the country’s elected prime minister, ushered in a quarter-century of brutal rule under the Shah, and stimulated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Selected as one of the best books of the year by the Washington Post and The Economist, it now features a new preface by the author on the folly of attacking Iran.



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978-1620455302
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From the Back Cover
"A very gripping read . . . a cautionary tale for our current leaders."
--"The New York Times"

As zealots in Washington intensify their preparations for an American attack on Iran, the story of the CIA's 1953 coup--with its many cautionary lessons--is more urgently relevant than ever. All the Shah's Men brings to life the cloak-and-dagger operation that deposed the only democratic regime Iran ever had. The coup ushered in a quarter-century of repressive rule under the Shah, stimulated the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, and exposed the folly of using violence to try to reshape Iran. Selected as one of the best books of the year by the Washington Post and the Economist, it's essential reading if you want to place the American attack of Iraq in context--and prepare for what comes next.

"An entirely engrossing, often riveting, nearly Homeric tale. . . . For anyone with more than a passing interest in how the United States got into such a pickle in the Middle East, All the Shah's Men is as good as Grisham."
--"The Washington Post Book World"

"An exciting narrative. [Kinzer] questions whether Americans are well served by interventions for regime change abroad, and he reminds us of the long history of Iranian resistance to great power interventions, as well as the unanticipated consequences of intervention."
--"The Los Angeles Times"

"A swashbuckling yarn [and] helpful reminder of an oft-neglected piece of Middle Eastern history."
--"The New York Times Book Review"
About the Author
Stephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent who has worked in more than fifty countries. He has been New York Times bureau chief in Istanbul, Berlin, and Managua, Nicaragua. His books include "Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq" and "Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds."

Product details
ASIN ‏ : ‎ B00JJZTJIQ
Publisher ‏ : ‎ Trade Paper Press
Accessibility ‏ : ‎ Learn more
Publication date ‏ : ‎ 1 January 2008
Edition ‏ : ‎ 2nd

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From Australia

Eric A. Foster
5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Account
Reviewed in Australia on 9 July 2015
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I found this book to be a very well researched and written account of the deplorable events involving the Anglo Iranian Oil Company and the overthrow of Iran’s Mossadegh Government in 1953. The author provides a good insight to the development of Iranian attitudes and provides a clear historical background to the climactic event of the overthrow. The author also addresses all the key issues and provides thoughtful observations. I happily recommend this book to anyone seeking a thorough understanding as to why Iran hates the West. This is a story of the exploitation of an undeveloped country. It is also the story of mis-use of power and duplicity at the highest level of American and British Governments. Why would America and Britain expect to be trusted by anyone in the future?
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Ramin Marzbani
5.0 out of 5 stars Very interesting book.
Reviewed in Australia on 27 November 2019
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Modern history at its best.
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Richard V Tasso
5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars
Reviewed in Australia on 14 June 2015
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Brilliant yet disturbing. Another example of the English thinking they know what's best for everyone .
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From other countries

Ann Sheybani
5.0 out of 5 stars Why Understanding Iran Starts with Understanding What We Did There
Reviewed in the United States on 12 October 2025
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Every Iranian New Year, we'd drive through Abadan, and I'd watch the flames shooting from the tops of those massive stacks—the oil refinery burning off excess natural gas like some kind of industrial volcano. The infrastructure stretched for acres, a sprawling testament to British engineering and ambition, built back when Persia was just another piece on the colonial chessboard.

I didn't understand then what I was really looking at: the physical manifestation of why Iran doesn't trust us. Any of us.

Since living in Iran, I've been fascinated—maybe obsessed is more accurate—with the role foreign governments and companies have played in the Middle East, particularly in the petroleum industry. It's one thing to read about resource extraction and geopolitical maneuvering in a textbook. It's another thing entirely to live in a country where the national memory is scarred by it.

Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men is the book I wish I'd read before I ever set foot in Iran. Hell, it's the book I wish every American would read before we collectively decide to have opinions about the Middle East.

Here's what happens when you live in Iran: you sit around tables with educated, sophisticated people who will, with complete sincerity, spin conspiracy theories that sound absolutely bananas to Western ears. And I used to find it funny, this cultural tendency toward seeing plots within plots, secret hands pulling strings behind every curtain.

Then I read Ryan Holiday's Conspiracy, which chronicles how Peter Thiel quietly, methodically, and very successfully destroyed Gawker because they outed him as gay against his will. Turns out conspiracy theories aren't quite so ridiculous when you realize that powerful people actually do engineer elaborate, patient, multi-year schemes to achieve their ends. We Americans just aren't used to fearing such things, thanks to our relatively stable history.

Iranians, on the other hand, have every reason to believe in conspiracies. Because they've lived through them. Because their popular prime minister—Mohammad Mosadegh, wildly beloved by his people—was actually, genuinely, factually overthrown in a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1953.

That's not a theory. That's history.

And that's where All the Shah's Men comes in.

Kinzer's book does something remarkable: it explains not just what happened, but why it matters. It's not just a recounting of events (though it is that, and brilliantly so). It's a window into the Iranian national psyche, into why a country with such a long, proud history has so little patience for foreign meddling.

Iran isn't some backwards outpost that just appeared on the map. It's Persia, for God's sake—one of the world's great civilizations, with a history stretching back millennia. They've watched foreign powers trade in their resources for what amounts to glass beads. They've seen their own corrupt leaders sell them out again and again. They know what happens behind closed doors because it's happened to them.

When the British Petroleum's predecessor effectively owned Iran's oil and gave the country a pittance in return, Mosadegh tried to nationalize it. He wanted Iran's oil wealth to benefit Iranians. Radical concept, right? The British didn't much care for that idea, and they convinced the Americans that Mosadegh was a communist threat. So we—the United States of America, land of democracy and freedom—orchestrated a coup to remove a democratically elected leader and install the Shah, who would be far more amenable to Western interests.

That moment? That's the nadir of US-Iran relations. That's where the hostilities that eventually led to the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis actually began. Not with religious extremism appearing out of nowhere, but with us deciding that Iranian democracy was fine as long as it served our purposes.

All the Shah's Men is a fabulous read, not just because Kinzer teaches the history of Iran in a clear, concise way—though he does that masterfully—but because he shows you the folly of toying with a nation that has a strong identity and a long memory.

He explains what was at stake then and what remains at stake now: access to oil, regional influence, the strategic geography of the Middle East. He makes clear why nations vie for power there and why, despite all evidence to the contrary, we keep making the same mistakes.

Most importantly, he illuminates why invading or attempting to control Iran is probably the stupidest thing any foreign power could do. You can't bomb a proud people into submission, and you can't expect them to forget what you've done.

What struck me most about the book is how it reveals the chess game happening behind the scenes—the back-channeling, the quiet machinations, the deals struck in rooms the average citizen never sees. We like to think of foreign policy as this noble, principled endeavor. All the Shah's Men shows you the grubby reality: it's often about resources, leverage, and maintaining the upper hand, regardless of the human cost.
If you want to understand why the Middle East is the way it is, why Iran views the West with such suspicion, why our attempts at influence so often backfire spectacularly—read this book. If you want to understand how we got here and why our "here" involves so much mutual hostility and mistrust—read this book.

And if you just want to read a damn good piece of non-fiction that reads like a thriller but happens to be true—definitely read this book.

Because the thing about history is this: if you don't understand it, you're doomed to keep repeating it. And God knows we've repeated this particular pattern enough times already.
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Francisco Guillermo Jáuregui
5.0 out of 5 stars The whole book
Reviewed in Mexico on 11 February 2025
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Well written a master piece of History!
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Karina
5.0 out of 5 stars Un estudio completo!
Reviewed in Spain on 6 September 2017
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Un libro muy bien documentado que se lee más bien como una fabula. No se si se puede trazar la linea entre los hechos del `53 y 9/11 pero seguro que la participación de la CIA en la caída del gobierno de Mossadegh ha marcado las relaciones entre Irán y Estados Unidos e igual también en las relaciones internacionales en el mundo moderno.
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Parvaneh Razi
5.0 out of 5 stars Eye opening book
Reviewed in Canada on 25 November 2023
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As a Persian I was extremely sad and angry at politicians who changed the history of my country in a way that was beneficial for them. Reading the history that I didn't know much about was eye opening and bitter which means the writer did a good job! I offered this book to my sister to read and she had the same feeling of bitterness after reading the book.
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黒羽夏彦
5.0 out of 5 stars イランにおける反米感情の原点を描いた歴史ノンフィクション
Reviewed in Japan on 15 February 2010
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 1953年に起こったイランのモサデク政権転覆クーデターは、CIA主導の秘密工作のうち最も有名な事件の一つであり、現在に至るもその悪影響を引きずっている。本書はモサデクの人物像を中心に、19世紀以来のイラン現代史、とりわけクーデターに至る経緯を描き出した歴史ノンフィクションである。

 首相に就任したモサデクはイギリス資本の石油会社国有化を宣言、交渉が行き詰る中、英米側は彼の存在そのものが邪魔だと判断。CIAの工作員カーミット・ローズヴェルトの暗躍により、軍事クーデターでモサデクは逮捕された。アメリカはシャーの専制政治に肩入れした結果、イラン国民の反米感情を高めてイスラム革命を招き、さらには中東全体を不安定化させてしまったという歴史の連鎖が指摘される。
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Nancy Singh
5.0 out of 5 stars Intriguing book.
Reviewed in India on 16 December 2021
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What an excellent read. This book gives an excellent account of the events of week in 1953 when coup managed by British and American politicians ,removed the prime Minister of Iran which affected the world around and has carried on the repercussions till now. It tells us how Britishers with their imperialistic mind set exploited Iran for its oil . It gives an intriguing account of propaganda that worked against the loyal and democratic leader of Iran who wanted to benefit and uplift his countryman by its own natural resources ie oil . Book wonderfully explains how Britishers ruled by looting the world thus uplifting their own country. Iran being the legitimate owners of their oil were given shoddy treatment and pennies in return which created hatred against western powers in people . Also corruption among its own people and exploitation by Britishers changed the course of world history which is felt even in new world.
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Jacky P.
5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent pour le connaisseur et pour le moins connaisseur
Reviewed in France on 29 October 2016
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Ce livre donne une petite introduction à l'istoire récente d'Iran. C'est écrit dans une perspective iranophile assumée et justifiée explicitement dans une introduction qui donne une petite perspective historique et culturelle. Ensuite, le gros du livre est consacré à la description des actions des services secrets américains et anglais aboutissant au renversement du gouvernement démocratiquement élu de Mohamed Mossadegh, et à l'installation du régime autoritaire du shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Connaissant un peu l'histoire, j'ai surtout apprécié la description détaillée des actions de Kermit Roosevelt (agent américain). Mais mon épouse a vraiment apprécié l'ensemble, qui est une excellente introduction à ce chapitre d'histoire.
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Svetovid
5.0 out of 5 stars No going back to the same reality after reading this one
Reviewed in Germany on 5 January 2019
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You realize that the same system is still used nowadays to destroy many governments and impose lackeys which do not give a damn about the people. It is very easy to see that this scenario is simply copy-pasted for the last 50+ years.
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Peter C
5.0 out of 5 stars An extraordinary true story
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 20 December 2012
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This is a remarkable account of an almost unbelievable series of events in Iran principally in 1953, although the author does give us a potted history of Iran from the early days and a more detailed history of the first half of the 20th century which led up to the events of 1953. The conduct of Britain in Iran during the century prior to 1953, particularly in connection with the massive oil reserves and the creation of the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company, at the beginning of the 20th century to exploit the oil with massive profits to Britain and very little benefit to Iran, was quite appalling. Britain used the oil to fuel the forces during both world wars, and treated its Iranian employees like dirt while having wonderful facilities for its British staff. It was hardly surprising that the Iranians decided to nationalise the AIOC in 1950 and expel the British diplomats with their security staff. But then the Anglo-American plan in 1953 to get rid of the only prime minister who ever tried to start Iran on to a democratic path and to strengthen the position of the Shah was a disgusting attempt at interference in another country's affairs. The subsequent revolution in 1979 and the present situation may well not have happened if that had not occurred.

A well written account of a very interesting series of events which I was not previously aware of.
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Dr. Ramin Pouladian
5.0 out of 5 stars An absolute eye opener !
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on 10 October 2011
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This was an easy book to read and a difficult book to put down once you start. Having been born in Iran, I had always heard about the events surrounding Dr. Mossadegh and the British and American involvement in overthrowing the only democratic and a genuinely nationalist leader Iran had seen in it's recent history. But this book has given me a clear understanding of actual historical events and has put them into perspective. No wonder Iranians have a deep mistrust of the British and blame them for the country's misfortunes !!! This ia a real eye opener and a must for anyone who wants to learn about Iran, the Middle East, influence of Oil on British and US foreign policies and reasons for the animosities which exist around the world against the USA and UK.
5 people found this helpful
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Anders Flensborg
5.0 out of 5 stars Horror Story from real life !
Reviewed in Germany on 21 December 2013
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But the book is fascinating reading and offers good insight on a congenial people, and it truly offers a better understanding of our time
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Swati Chakrabarti
5.0 out of 5 stars i can very well understand the political as well as the social history of the world better
Reviewed in India on 20 April 2017
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Such a detailed investigative report... it doesnt only records Iran's but the worlds history in a way. Sitting in Asia, i can very well understand the political as well as the social history of the world better now
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ID
5.0 out of 5 stars Buena obra
Reviewed in Spain on 28 April 2020
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Excelente obra como complemento a otras sobre esa temática
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saeid
5.0 out of 5 stars I would recommend this collection
Reviewed in Canada on 7 April 2025
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Awesome Book About The Past And The History About What Went Down In The Middle East.
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Nash Boutros, Professor of Psychiatry
5.0 out of 5 stars A most amazing book
Reviewed in the United States on 14 August 2025
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All the Shah,a Men is by far the best book I have read in a number of years. It is a must reading for everyone even if not particularly concerned with history or politics. The book reads like a suspenseful intrigue spy novel making it hard to stop reading. As an Egyptian it made it clear why Britain and Fran e got so mad when Egypt,s Naser nationalized the Suez Canal only five years after Mosadeq nationalized the Iranian oil and how succeeding in removing him may ha e emboldened them to militarily attack Egypt. Even more importantly the Book increased my appreciation to President Truman vision and integrity but not so much for Eisenhower. Finally, the fact that Iran was on it's way to Democracy and instead of supporting it the effort was thwarted resulting in the current severe suffering of the Iranian people. I cannot recommend the book more for E vereone
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Streeds Reads
4.0 out of 5 stars Review: All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
Reviewed in the United States on 21 January 2017
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FTC NOTICE: Library Book

REVIEW: “All the Shah’s Men” serves as the second book I have read by Stephen Kinzer, and it was full of intrigue, micro-histories, and biographies that left me with the desire to research and read more about the Middle East as well as additional books by this author.

It is not unusual for history books to discuss timelines and people; but, what I appreciated most in this text was Kinzer’s differing approach to historical data. He was generous with details about a significant array of people that were involved with multiple coups. There were names of people in his book that I did not recall seeing in other compendiums pertaining to Middle East history and/or Iran. Kinzer shared what their individual philosophies were and how they affected their decisions and the resulting behaviors.

One challenge I experienced while reading this book, and that which prevented me from giving it five stars in lieu of four of them, was that there was too much going back and forth in history. A political leader’s history and interactions with others was/were very well described; but, at the end of that history, the reader was then re-introduced to a character at the beginning or middle of the previous history and all within the same chapter. Segmentation via a few extra and short chapters would have helped.

Despite the back-and-forth of histories, Stephen Kinzer has a great way of making a reader take a look at a situation and evaluate what could have been done differently. Unfortunately, he waited until over 200 pages into the book for any analysis or extrapolation to occur. This was coupled with a whole series of “if” and “if” and “if-then” and “if.” In doing so, Kinzer inadvertently de-valued what he was trying to accomplish, and the history could no longer be evaluated as a reality. Thankfully I had already read another book called " Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future " by Kinzer, so I knew what he was trying to accomplish, and I didn’t want him to think that this was lost on me. He wanted the reader to imagine how things could have been done differently; what would have happened if one or all of these things did not occur?

The author is also quite talented when it comes to creating imagery. He does this thoughtfully, purposely, and respectfully. Kinzer shares the details of his trip to Iran and his visit to Mossadegh’s final home. There are descriptions of colors, flowers, and buildings, and he places them in the context of what they experienced and looked like in history and how they had changed by the time of his visit. There is a certain romanticism about how he goes about interviewing people who were employees, villagers/neighbors, friends and family of Mossadegh. Stephen Kinzer makes it clear that with the Mossadegh name, there is a legacy, and there is a responsibility to keep the name pure.

Purity and the instability of relationships were prevalent themes in this book. The intelligence that the American government received was not consistently pure. There were people who wanted to make a name for themselves and leveraged “The Cold War” and its threat of spreading communism as a way to convince an American president that it was time to start supporting the British government in its efforts to take back Iran’s newly-nationalized oil company. Kinzer did a good job of “calling out” these people, namely The Dulles Brothers.

There were good people on all sides who had good intentions, and they were coupled with individuals or groups filled with mal-intent, which ultimately led to a surpise coup of Mohammed Reza Shah and the promotion to leadership and ultimate power of and for the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. There were well-described changes in alliances that ultimately put the United States in an unsavory position with countries in the Middle East…definitely an unfortunate stance and one that can hopefully be corrected.
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manou Farrokhzad
4.0 out of 5 stars Four Stars
Reviewed in Canada on 17 April 2015
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perfect
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Profile Image for Matt.
1,045 reviews30.9k followers
March 26, 2022
“Things looked bleak for the plotters. They had lost the advantage of surprise. Several of their key agents were out of action. Their anointed prime minister, General Zahedi, was in hiding. The Shah had fled. Foreign Minister Fatemi, free after several hours in rebel custody, was making fiery speeches denouncing the Shah for his collaboration with foreign agents…Operation Ajax had failed. Radio Tehran reported that the situation was ‘well under control,’ and so it seemed. Shock waves reverberated through CIA headquarters in Washington. Then suddenly, around midevening, [Kermit] Roosevelt cabled a most unexpected message. He had decided to stay in Tehran and improvise another stab at [Mohammed] Mossadegh. The CIA had sent him to overthrow the government of Iran, and he was determined not to leave until he had done it…”
- Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror

The relationship between Iran and the United States has been so bad, for so long, that it seems like it’s always been that way.

In 1979, after the exiled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was admitted into the United States for cancer treatment, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy and took 52 hostages, holding them for 444 days. In response, during the 1980s, the United States supported Iraq in a war that killed an estimated one-million Iranians, and which saw the use of chemical weapons. During the 1990s, the U.S. tightened sanctions against Iran, while after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush gratuitously added it to an “axis of evil,” though none of the members (including North Korea and Iraq) had any role in the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington D.C. A corner might have been turned – ever so slightly – with the Iran nuclear deal, struck in 2015. However, in 2018, the forty-fifth president withdrew America from the deal, escalating tensions. Matters inched towards war when the United States assassinated Quds Force commander Qasemi Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile attacks on American bases in Iraq.

With all that’s happened, it’s hard to believe that things could have gone differently. But that is Stephen Kinzer’s conclusion in All the Shah’s Men, his concise, efficiently presented tale about the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. According to Kinzer, this vigorous meddling with Iran’s sovereignty poisoned the well from which both countries are still drinking.

***

Both the chief virtue and chief flaw of All the Shah’s Men is its no-nonsense approach to its subject matter. At around 220 pages of text, Kinzer tells a big and complicated story in a fast-paced and pared down way. I never got lost, I effortlessly followed the progression of events, and I could probably give a decent summary at a cocktail party, before being asked to leave the cocktail party.

Nevertheless, the literary merits are a bit less obvious. At no single point did I feel excited to read this. I didn’t find a single bit of prose worth underlining, or a characterization that really leapt off the page. I am not saying this is poorly written or grammatically unsound or syntactically obtuse. Kinzer conveys his information with clarity and commendable structure. But my connection to the material was dutiful, not visceral, and while this is better than reading an internet summary, the gap between the two is not as large as you would like.

***

After a brief prologue detailing the first aborted attempt at a coup by the CIA, Kinzer backtracks all the way to antiquity, to Cyrus and Xerxes, for a sweeping look at Iranian history that starts before the common era and ends with the mid-twentieth century. Though this is obviously a mile-high view, I found it super-helpful, especially since I had practically zero prior knowledge about this event, or the larger circumstances in which it occurred. Kinzer has a clear passion for Iran and its culture, and that shines through in a book that is otherwise pretty workmanlike in its presentation. It also adds a bit of emotional heft to America’s betrayal of its own principles.

***

Kinzer also does a solid job laying out the immediate context in which the 1953 coup took place. Despite a subtitle strongly implying that the 21st century’s Age of Terror began in Tehran, he makes it clear that the “roots” are much deeper than that. (Published in 2003, it’s likely the misleading subtitle was an attempt to tie into the then-booming post-9/11 genre exploring the attack’s historical antecedents). In point of fact, the West’s intriguing in the Middle East began not with America, but with Europe, especially Great Britain, which needed oil for its battleships.

Much of this oil came from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British corporation – half-owned by the British Government – which had been founded in 1909. The AIOC single-mindedly exploited Iran’s natural resources for British profit, exerting absolute control over the reserves, refusing to allow audits, and subjecting Iranian workers to deplorable living conditions.

As it gradually lost its empire over the centuries, Great Britain never quite learned that you can only mercilessly expropriate for so long before there comes a reckoning. In Iran, that reckoning came in the form of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who led the effort to nationalize AIOC.

Fumbling about for a response, Great Britain turned to the United States, which was then rather respected in Iran. Raising the spooky specter of Communists, the Dulles brothers quickly convinced a self-distancing (and plausibly-denying) Dwight Eisenhower to allow the CIA to fund a coup to overthrow Mossadegh and allow Pahlavi to consolidate his hold on power.

The ad hoc, much improvised plan worked, though it was not simply the dark arts of the CIA, but self-interested Iranians as well, that allowed it to – for lack of a better word – succeed. The consequences, though, were pretty dire. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s repressive regime ultimately led to revolution, the declaration of an Islamic Republic, and frayed-wire relations that might still someday spark into war.

***

It probably goes too far to lay all blame on the Dulles brothers or Winston Churchill or Kermit Washington. Avoiding shortsightedness is hard, because seeing the future is impossible. Not every bad thing after 1953 happened simply because of the coup. Nothing is inevitable, and there are always possibilities for people to act differently, no matter the past.

Still, in executing the coup, the United States in general, and the CIA in particular, made the same mistake it repeated throughout the Cold War: the failure to believe in its own product.

In its words, America tried to convince the world that its values – of freedom, openness, and self-determination – were demonstrably better than the tyranny, oppression, and censorship animating the Soviet Union. In its actions, though, the United States showed no trust in its system, and resorted to undermining popular will and supporting oppressive leaders in the misguided belief that any means justified the ends. The Cold War could have been a contest of ideas. Instead it was a race to the bottom, with the rulebook thrown aside.

The bargain proved bad, and for twenty-five years of the Shah, America destroyed its relationship with Iran, weakened its moral standing in the Middle East and around the globe, and made the world that much more dangerous.
Profile Image for Mehrsa.
2,245 reviews3,586 followers
July 30, 2008
I just re-read this book in preparation for a book club. This book is the tragic story of a CIA operation that removed one of the only democratically elected leaders in the Middle-East. Mossadegh came into power and angered the British by nationalizing Iranian Oil and the British were determined to oust him from office. After Truman (who opposed a coup) left office and Eisenhower came to office, the Americans also signed on and actually conducted the coup. This story is so tragic (especially if you are Iranian) because although no one can say for certain what would have been, the fundamentalism that has taken over Iran and the entire middle east could have been averted with someone like Mossadegh in power. He was committed to the constitution and democracy. He was called the George Washington of Iran. His flaws were that he nationalized the oil and was not flexible in allowing the British any control of the company and he underestimated the cold war fears of the time. A lot of Anti-American hatred in Iran stems from this operation and the 1978 hostage crisis was a direct result of Iranian fears of a repeat of the 1953 CIA-led overthrow. I think the author could have done a lot more and the writing is certainly not flawless, but I give it five stars because I think everyone should read this book. Kinzer (the author) gives a truncated history of Iran and gets a lot of the psychology of the Iranian people right. I think he doesn't go far enough in saying that had Iran not fallen to Islamic fundamentalism in 1978, the entire Middle East would have been a different place today. The book, in my opinion, is not unjustifiably harsh on America. Eisenhower did not bear as much blame for this as churchill and the author places the blame mostly on two people in his cabinet who were very anxious about covert operations in many countries at the time and we certainly cannot underestimate the cold war fears that dominated the world psyche during the 1950s. But I just cannot help but feel depressed about this and just wonder what would have happened if the Iranian people were allowed to run their own country.
Profile Image for Nika.
242 reviews313 followers
November 22, 2022
The subject of this book is a coup aimed at overthrowing Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. The author delves into the details of the coup and explores its ramifications that continue to be felt to this day.

"They stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months."
The hostage-takers were enraged against Americans and their support for the deposed Shah who had been allowed into the United States. The US regarded this crime not only as barbaric but also inexplicable. But was it so inexplicable? Many Iranians feared that Americans would help the Shah return to power as they once did in 1953. What stood behind the fears of many Iranians that the US could help the Shah return to Tehran and to power?

In August 1953 the CIA with the help of some influential figures in Iran orchestrated a coup against Mossadegh. They encouraged and organized the mass protests against Mossadegh that resulted in chaos in the capital city of Tehran.
The great mob that surged through the streets of Tehran on August 18 was partly mercenary and partly a genuine expression of people’s loss of faith in Mossadegh.
Mossadegh was overthrown and, later, arrested. The Shah, who had been forced to flee Iran, returned and embarked on consolidating dictatorial power. That was the path that led to the Islamic revolution in 1979.
Mossadegh is remembered as a politician who nationalized Iranian oil and defied the British who had been exploiting Iranian national resources for decades. The British represented by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not ready to relinquish what they saw as their legal right. The Iranian government led by Mossadegh was determined to defend their national interests and not step back from the brink of confrontation.

Mossadegh cut an enigmatic figure. TIME magazine chose him as its Man of the Year for 1951.
As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate.

This well-researched non-fiction book at times reads like a novel. The author did a good job documenting the coup of 1953 and the events, public and clandestine, that preceded it. First, the British tried to dismiss Mossadegh but failed. The Iranian government expelled many of the British agents from the country. Then the British decided to pass the baton to the Americans. Churchill aimed to convince the White House to take action. President Truman was against intervention in Iranian internal affairs.
Only after Eisenhower took office, the Americans were persuaded that the action was needed. Discussing those events we cannot overlook the time period in which they happened. The beginning of the second half of the twentieth century saw the war in Korea which for the US was the proof of a "relentless communist advance." The fear of the expansion of communist power was the factor that to a large extent shaped American policies back then. They could not allow Iran to be drawn into the orbit of the Soviets. While those apprehensions may be partly justified, Kinzer notes that there is no proof that the Soviets were indeed scheming to defend Mossadegh.

Meanwhile, it is difficult to predict how the events could have unfolded without the American intervention. The British blockade of Iranian ports had been suffocating the Iranian economy heavily dependent on exports of oil. Mossadegh had influential opponents. However, the role the US played in those events dealt a blow to the hopes for democracy and liberal ideas and paved the way for fierce anti-Western sentiments in Iran.

It seems that at that time few could have known that this coup would have such an impact both within and beyond Iranian borders. Stephen Kinzer highlights the negative impact that came out of this coup. The author points to a series of rather unintended consequences of the 1953 coup. Some of the short-term and long-term effects are the oppressive rule of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution, the rise of radicalism and fundamentalism, and terror attacks across the world.

Also, Kinzer briefly outlines Iran's history before Mohammad Reza, the last Shah. His father Reza, the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty with the reputation of a strongman, came to power in a country that was torn between foreign powers, mainly the British and the Russians at the time. He worked upon the internal contradictions and hatred against the discredited Qajar dynasty and proclaimed himself Shah. Reza Shah insisted his country be referred to as Iran. Persia was considered the name used mainly by foreigners.
Profile Image for Amira Mahmoud.
618 reviews8,853 followers
February 9, 2017
لا جديد في هذا العالم إلا ما نجهله من التاريخ

لست من قراء التاريخ ربما لأن قراءة التاريخ تبدو ليّ سياسية إلى حد كبير حتى في ذلك الوقت الذي تقرأ به عن التاريخ الثقافي والفكري لأحد البلدان لا يمكن القراءة عنه بمعزل عن تاريخها السياسي لذا أجدني لا أفضل ذلك النوع من الكُتب لعدم تفضيلي بل ونفوري أحيانًا من السجالات السياسي، فليس هناك حقبة ما أو بلد ما تجذبني للقراءة في تاريخها، لكنني من وقت لآخر اختطف كتاب يتحدث عن فترة هامة ما بتركيز وتكثيف أشعر معه أنني حقًا عرفت كل شيء يخص تلك الحقبة وكأنني عايشتها مع معاصريها وقد كان من أهم الكُتب التي حالفني حظي معها هو كتاب الدين والدم إبادة شعب الأندلس الذي تحدث عن أزمة المورسكيين بعد أن تحولت الأندلس إلى أسبانيا، وها هو كتاب آخر عن حقبة شائكة أخرى يعيد إليّ شغف القراءة بعد انقطاع شهرين لأنهيه رغم كبر حجمه في أيام قليلة.

الكتاب يتحدث عن انقلاب إيران 1953 الذي نظمته كل من بريطانيا وأمريكا للإطاحة بحكومة محمد مصدق الرجل الديمقراطي ذو المبادئ الليبرالية الذي كان دفاعه عن الحرية وإيمانه بحق الثوار المعارضين له (والذين كان أكثر من نصفهم إن لم نقل جميعهم من أولئك الذين استأجرتهم المخابرات المركزية الأمريكية كي يساعدوها في عملية الانقلاب) أقول إن إيمانه بحقهم في أن يثوروا ورفضه تدخل قوات الشرطة لقمعهم حتى حين تحولت ثورتهم من السلمية إلى الوحشية والتخريب، والهجوم حتى عليه وعلى منزله الخاص هو ما كان أكبر الأسباب في نجاح الانقلاب وسقوط مصدق، فبأخطاؤه التي لم تكن سوى نية حسنة لا تُسمن ولا تغني من جوع وقت الأزمات مهد مصدق الطريق لسقوطه

ما الذي دفع محمد مصدق إلى ذلك المصير؟ لم تكن شعبيته ووطنيته ودفاعه عن مصالح شعبه هم فقط السبب، لكن خطؤه الأكبر وأنجازه الأكبر في آن واحد هو تأميمه الصناعة النفط الإيرانية التي كان يحتكرها الاستعمار البريطاني ويترك لإيران صاحبة الخير نفسها الفتات بل أن الأمر لم يقف عند ذلك الحد فقد كان البريطانيين يستغلون العمالة الإيرانية بأسوأ الطرق الممكنة دون حتى توفير ما يمكن لهؤلاء أن يعيشون به حياة شبه آدمية.
ستيفن كينزر في أحدى المواضع بالكتاب كان يتحدث أنه وفي مرحلة ما كان يمكن لمصدق قبول المفاوضات والوصول إلى حل وسط يخرج من خلاله كلا الطرفين رابحين لكن ومن وجهة نظر كينزر أيضًا فإن مصدق كان يعتبر أن ما يحدث هو قضية وطنية في الأساس غير المسموح بالتفاوض عليها ولم يكن ينظر لا للمكاسب التي يمكن تحقيقها ولا حتى للعواقب التي يمكن لها أن تحدث لكن أجدني ها هنا أختلف مع الكاتب الذي ذكر هو نفسه في كثير من المواضع كيف كانت بريطانيا تقوم بالمفاوضات بصلف وغرور وصلابة من ينتزع شيئًا حقه بالأساس وليس كأنها تقوم باغتصاب ما ليس لها، حتى أنها رفضت تعديل بنود عروضها والتنازل أكثر قليلاً فقد كانت كل ما تقوم بفعله حينها هو تعديل "صياغة" البنود لتبدو ألطف وكأن الشعب ورؤساؤه سُذج سيخضعون في كل الأحوال.
أحيانًا بعض القوى الإستعمارية تُسكرها قوتها حد العمى عما يمكن أن تشكله ثورة شعب مقهور ذي قضية من قوة تفوق قوتها أضعافًا مضاعفة!

إذا كان الخلاف إيراني/بريطاني فقط ما الذي دفع بالولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في خضم ذلك الصراع؟ بريطانيا وأمريكا ووفقًا لدور كل منهما كقوة عظمى في العالم يملكان الكثير من المصالح المشتركة بين بعضهم البعض على طريقة "هات وخد" لذا وبعد أن ظلت أمريكا طوال فترة حكم الرئيس ترومان تلعب دور الصديق لإيران والوسيط لبريطانيا وتحاول جاهدة رغم كل ما تنتظره البلدان منها أن تقف على الحياد، تغير موقف أمريكا مع انتقال السلطة من ترومان إلى أيزنهاور الذي كانت سياسته فيما يتعلق بهذا الملف هو الموافقة على التدخل لكن دعوني وشأني! فلم يكن يريد بعدها الإطلاع على أية تفاصيل فيما يخص عملية الانقلاب التي تسمى "أياكس" لذا وبعد هذه الموافقة اجتمعت العديد من القيادات البريطانية والأمريكية لتمويل ومتابعة عملية الانقلاب التي سيقوم بتنفيذها ثيودور روزفلت بالاستعانة بالأموال الطائلة التي بححوزته وبمساعدة عملاؤه الإيرانيين المجندين من الحكومة على رأسهم الشاه نفسه وخارجها وبشراء وحشد الغوغاء الذين قاموا بدور الثوار المعارضين لمصدق والمؤيدين لرجوع الشاه استطاع روزفلت تحقيق ما تمنى بعد محاولة أولى فاشلة وأخرى ناجحة فأن يقوم بالانقلاب على مصدق وتقديمه للمحاكمة ونفيه في أحدى القرى إلى أن توفاه الله وإعادة الشاه لعرشه لحكم دام بعدها خمسة وعشرين عام، خمسة وعشرين عام في خدمة الإنجليز!!

هناك علاقة طردية بين فساد الحاكم ومدة بقاؤه في الحكم، فكلما كان طاغية يملك من البطش ما يملك يستطيع حينها تكميم أفواه معارضيه وشعبه وكل من تسوّل له نفسه الثورة أو حتى أن يُظهر بعض الامتعاض على حكم مولاه، وكلما كان ذليل النفس مُنبطح أمام أسياده في الخارج كلما رضوا عنه وعن حكمه وتركوه على عرشه إلى أن يرث الله الأرض ومن عليها وإلى أن يقوم بتنفيذ كل أوامرهم ومصالحهم على حساب دولته ورعاياه لكنه حين يقف عثرة أمامهم سيصبح هو كبش الفداء الأول كي ينجون بأنفسهم!

الآن وبعد الثورة الإسلامية في إيران يبدو أن أمريكا تعض أصابعها من الندم على تدخلها الأول فقد تخلصت من خطر صغير لتأتي لنفسها –ودون أن تدري- بخطر أكبر بكثير

هذا كتاب صادم عن كيف للمؤامرات أن تكون، كيف تُحاك، وكيف يصبح وراءها عشرات المناصب الهامة وعشرات الأفكار الشيطانية، وملايين الملايين من الدولارات.
أنا كنت من أشد الساخرين من أولئك المؤمنين بنظرية المؤامرة، الذين يقومون بتعليق كل فشل/تعثر داخلى على شماعة الكيد الخارجي والذين يعتقدون أنهم محور الكون تترك القوى العظمي الخارجية مصالحها الخاصة لأجل الايقاع بدولة أو أمة أخرى هي ساقطة من الأساس دون الحاجة لتدخل.
لكنني الآن بتُ أعيّ أن نعم هناك ما يُسمى بنظرية المؤامرة بشكل يمثل أضعاف ما يمكن لعقلي الصغير هذا تخيله، هل هذا يعني أنني تركت جانب الساخرين من نظرية المؤامرة لأقف في الطرف الآخر وأقف موقف الدافع عنها؟ بالطبع لا فكلاهما تطرف؛ كل ما تغير في وجهة نظري هي أنها أصبحت أكثر إتزانًا، هناك مؤامرة من الخارج بالطبع لكنها لا تنفي المسئولية عن الداخل ولا تصلح كشماعة له لتعليق فشله فلم تكن لتنجح المؤامرة الخارجية لو لم يكن الداخل أجوف، هش، ضعيف الأساس.

كما أن أسلوب الكاتب رشيق، ممتع، شامل فاستطاع ربط ما حدث بالماضي بما يحدث الآن وتحليله بدقة واستخلاص نتائج بل وحلول مبهرة منه كما أنه غزير فلم يترك شخصية ما إلا وتحدث عنها بما يعطيك خلفية بسيطة عنها قبل أن يتحدث عن دورها في الانقلاب فلم تكن الشخصيات في حكايته تبزغ تلقائيًا من الفراغ بما يُشعرك بالارتباك والتيه.
حكايته؟ نعم فالكتاب أشبه بحكاية بوليسية من حكايات نبيل فاروق، أو فيلم أكشن/جاسوسية مع كثير من الخيال.
فمع كل ما تقرأ ستتعجب كيف كل هذا يحدث بكل تلك الدقة والخبث من خلف ظهورنا نُمارس مهنتنا الوحيدة ألا وهي؛ أن نكون نيام!

تمّت

Profile Image for Ali.
38 reviews25 followers
September 10, 2024
“Soon after the Shah was overthrown, President Jimmy Carter allowed him to enter the United States. That sent Iranian radicals into a frenzy of rage. With the blessing of their new leaders, they stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months. Westerners, and especially Americans, found this crime not only barbaric but inexplicable. That was because almost none of them had any idea of the responsibility the United States bore for imposing the royalist regime that Iranians came to hate so passionately. The hostage-takers remembered that when the Shah fled into exile in 1953, CIA agents working at the American embassy had returned him to his throne. Iranians feared that history was about to repeat itself.”
— All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of the Middle East Terror

This is the story of the oil-nationalization episode in Iran and the rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader who embodied his people’s hopes for taking control of their destiny. This book however, is mainly concerned with depicting how the United States and the British governments tried to influence the event through gunboat diplomacy.

Stephen Kinzer doesn’t tell anything new and the almost care-free way by which he draws conclusions about the legacy of the coup diminishes the value of the book. To be fair, this is not a historical work and Kinzer has mostly relied on the works of other historians like Elm and Gasiorowski for creating his narrative. The problematic part is his handling of the events surrounding the coup and its aftermath. His depiction of the coup is basically a banal rehashing of the account offered by Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA field-operative who reputedly masterminded the coup and brought it to success, almost single-handedly.

Kinzer cares about Iran and his trip to Tehran for visiting the house that Mosaddeq stayed and lived his final years (which he chronicles in the epilogue of this book), shows that he is passionate about Iran and its fate. His passion is palpable in the account that he offers.

(His critical stance towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the past decades shows that he sees the hand of the United States in almost any development throughout the world and this book is not an exception. While it might have a certain charm for some that Kinzer takes an almost activist-like stance against U.S policies, it does no good for objective historical writing. His recent remarks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blaming it on NATO expansion further reveals his penchant for isolating the effects of U.S. policies and criticizing them out of context.)

In this book, Kinzer heavily overplays the role of the CIA in the ousting of Mosaddeq and by relying on Kermit Roosevelt’s account, this book suffers a lot from ignoring lots of important personalities and their actions which were significant in shaping the final outcome. He hasn’t even tried to corroborate the version offered by Roosevelt by cross-checking it with other sources. He ignores the role of internal opposition to Mosaddeq to the point of absurdity and apparently doesn’t have any problem with that: it fits into his narrative that the United States was the major cause of the 1979 revolution and its disastrous consequences. In the final chapter, he warns: “...[D]rawing conclusions about causes and effects is always dangerous.” But he has evidently ignored his own warning in writing his narrative.

He only devotes two chapters to the actual unfolding of the coup, the rest he uses to build the background and provide context and a summary of events leading up to 1953.

In the first chapter he tells what happened on 15th August during the first coup attempt. The most glaring problem here is a lack of details. I thought maybe he would describe the CIA planning in more depth later on, but he doesn’t delve any deeper and jumps right into describing the second stage of the coup in the penultimate chapter.

Then he goes back in time and spends two chapters giving a summary of Iran’s ancient history up until the point that Reza Khan became Shah and established the Pahlavi dynasty. His summary of Iran’s antiquity is filled with mythological romanticization of the Achaemenid Empire and basically gives a slapdash account of how great they were and how they ruled that monstrously big empire without too much oppression and without brutalizing their subjects. I am not well-versed in Iran’s ancient history, but I refuse to believe such generalized statements based on fragmentary evidence and archaeological findings. He then retells the oft-repeated tale of how the barbarian Arabs invaded Iran and destroyed its civilization by introducing and enforcing their Islam on the population; again he clings to a one-sided narrative.

Why did Kinzer feel the need to include these sections, I don’t know but I think he should’ve avoided that which would’ve made his book more coherent and less rambling. I understand that he included these chapters to make the book more accessible but it’s not like he had many pages to dedicate to this background-building. Partly because of that, this book is misleading at numerous points. A case in point is his description of the reign of Reza Shah, reducing him to a few botched and generalized paragraphs:

If he had not alienated himself from almost every segment of Iranian society, and if he had kept a cadre of wise advisers around him instead of systematically exiling or murdering them, he might have been able to resist. Instead he found himself alone, his dreams shattered by his own narrow-mindedness, corruption, and boundless egotism.


Starting with chapter 4, the book improves a lot. He starts by telling the story of George Reynolds who managed to strike oil in Masjed-Suleiman for the first time in Iran and then he gives a good account of how the British Empire managed to gain oil-concessions from the Qajar dynasty and establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which owned the oil-fields of Iran and managed to remain a dominant force with the blessing of the British government. These sections are among the best in the book. Kinzer manages to give you a good outline of the British Imperial policies with regards to Iran and how their obstinacy to fairly share their profits with Iranians and the ugly way they treated the workers of Abadan refinery, begot widespread resentment in the population. These grievances ultimately led to the nationalization movement which brought Mosaddeq to the pinnacle of power for the express purpose of nationalizing the oil. I really enjoyed that Kinzer doesn’t try to justify British policies at all and he manages to show them for what they were: naked exploitation of Iran’s oil. The fact that Iran probably wouldn’t have managed to extract its oil without their help doesn’t excuse their never-ending greed and their oblivious attitude to the suffering of Iranians.

After Mosaddeq nationalized the oil and the oil company, things came to a head. The British government didn’t want a deal without retaining (de facto if not de jure) control of the oil company and even though their position softened a bit overtime, their persistence was more than matched by that of Mosaddeq’s. Kinzer doesn’t criticize Mosaddeq openly but from early-on, he devotes paragraphs on his peculiar character that made him a great orator and a firebrand opposition leader but not a great statesman: “...[A] visionary rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered shameful compromise.” This is actually a point of contention between historians: some believe that Mosaddeq made numerous mistakes in failing to make a compromise; others holding that the offers made by AIOC and the British government were not made in good faith and were not real attempts at a workable compromise. Kinzer doesn’t dwell on this and he settles for giving a broad summary of the proposals and then moves ahead.

There are not many faults that I can find in these middle chapters. There are some baseless claims that there are no end-notes to be found for but for the most part they are not earth-shattering. When Kinzer tries to describe the internal situation in Iran however, he is badly out of his depth. When he writes from the British and U.S. perspective, he does a commendable job; his sources are more diverse and he has a good command of the political line-up and policy making. His coverage of Mosaddeq’s speech in the Security Council and his meeting with Truman and Acheson are also remarkable.

Finally all efforts to find a compromise failed and the Eisenhower administration gradually relented to British pressure for ousting Mosaddeq. To some extent it can be said that the Eisenhower administration did so in the interest of safeguarding its alliance with Britain; not because of a real threat of communist takeover but because the United States needed British support in the international scene and knew that a failure to support them in this case will undoubtedly alienate the British government and will weaken their unified stance against the Soviet Union and China. Roger Goiran, the CIA chief in Tehran, vehemently opposed the coup and given the fact that he was responsible for dealing with the communist threat, it only strengthens the argument that the danger of a communist takeover was mostly a fabrication.

The situation became chaotic in 1953 and this is where Kinzer’s narrative goes off balance. The National Front started to split and numerous powerful groups (like the industrialists and the clergy) distanced themselves from Mosaddeq. This division, which had numerous causes, is mostly viewed as a result of foreign influence and the work of CIA and MI6 agents. By only relying on reports and correspondents of British and Americans, Kinzer fails to realize that this split most probably would’ve still happened as a result of the unstable political quagmire caused by the unresolved oil issues. He gives the impression that this shift in power dynamics was mostly the result of subversive activities which is far from the truth. Economic and diplomatic pressures from Britain and the United States had already taken their toll on the National Front, much more so than subversive activities.

Kashani’s split from the National Front — and his dissent against Mosaddeq — for example is solely attributed to the work of Rashidian Brothers and no ulterior motive is considered. The fact that Kashani was a power-hungry politician with some ties to Fada'iyan-e Islam terrorist cells (who had assassinated General Razmara in 1951), is not given that much weight. Kinzer doesn’t openly claim that the situation developed under the tight control of CIA and MI6, but by recounting the events through the prism of those agencies, he takes the power away from Iranian political actors. By doing so, he reduces the internal forces to mere pawns, trapped in a great game arranged by intelligence agencies, destined to play their designated roles. The element of chaos and confusion — inherent in any political upheaval — is almost nonexistent in his tale.

(Kashani was not the leader of Fada'iyan, a fundamentalist malcontent named Navvab Safavi was the man at the helm. Navvab saw himself big enough to condemn “apostates” to death and authorized assassinations in the hope of purging the land of corruption. The clerical establishment didn’t endorse him and even banned him and his fanatics from Qom.)

In the penultimate chapter, we finally get to the second stage of the coup. This section, like the first chapter, is again drawn from the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt. Like the first chapter, the absence of detail cripples this chapter and I’m not convinced that the coup succeeded because of Roosevelt and CIA agents.

In short it goes on like this:
After the failed attempt on August 15, 1953 to remove Mosaddeq from power, top-level CIA officials and even Beedle Smith (the undersecretary of state) had assumed that Operation Ajax had failed. They urged the evacuation of key personnel. How the first attempt was supposed to succeed and what the actual plan to remove Mosaddeq was, is not elaborated. But Kermit Roosevelt decided to give it another try in defiance of his superiors. Roosevelt however had already managed to get Mohammad Reza Shah to sign two farmans (decrees): one for dismissing Mosaddeq, the other for appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. (In reality, the Shah and his court prepared the farmans but in Roosevelt’s tale, it was the CIA-agents who wrote them and Roosevelt who got the Shah to sign them.) After the first attempt failed, Shah fled Iran first to Iraq and then to Rome and was unhinged and unaware of the situation in Iran. In the meantime, Roosevelt had hidden Zahedi away in a house and Zahedi was biding his time, waiting to see what would happen. Then Roosevelt decided to organize a pro-Mosaddeq demonstration by using his agents and his vast network, which included members of the clergy and merchants of the bazaar and hooligans. The pro-Mosaddeq crowds marched the streets the next day and set fire to buildings and generally caused mayhem. Mosaddeq didn't use his forces to suppress the protesters. Then Roosevelt convinced Loy Henderson (U.S ambassador in Iran) to visit Mosaddeq. Loy Henderson told Mosaddeq that American citizens were being harassed by the disorderly mob and their lives were in danger. Mosaddeq became worried and ordered his troops to finally put an end to the demonstrations. He also ordered his supporters to stay home in the coming days. Now Roosevelt held the winning card; he would just need to organize a pro-Shah demonstration! The day after, pro-Shah demonstrators emerged on the streets. The officers and their troops however, who had clamped down on previous days protests, didn’t interfere with the crowds this time. The troops actually started to march alongside the crowd and seized key installations across the city one by one, silencing pro-Mosaddeq forces as they went. This sudden about-face of officers, was the result of the work of generals and officers involved in the coup who held pro-Shah sympathies and decided to end the Mosaddeq’s reign once and for all. The combined pro-Shah forces finally descended on Mosaddeq’s house and after fierce fighting, forces loyal to Mosaddeq surrendered and Mosaddeq took flight, until he surrendered himself a few days later. Meanwhile, Zahedi came out of hiding and rode to the radio station and announced that he was now prime minister and Mosaddeq was no longer in power, by the force of loyal decree.

Kinzer’s tale doesn’t offer much more detail than this. And by ignoring crucial information like the involvement of key generals in rallying the troops and the importance of the clergy in organizing the protests, his account gets distorted and is attributed mostly to the work of CIA agents. I don’t know if we can say Mosaddeq's government would have fallen even without Ajax. But I think we can say that the CIA didn’t play that big a part. For that I recommend Darioush Bayandor’s account of the coup.

Finally we get to the legacy of the coup. As for the claim that by removing Mosaddeq from power, the Iranian people came to resent the United States for meddling in Iran’s affairs, Bayandor points out in his book that Iranians couldn’t have known about the Ajax operation until it was publicized around 1980 (and further in 2000 by the Wilbur Document). The clerics' violent anti-American rhetoric however, started much sooner than that. Bayandor aptly points out that Iranians had a predilection to see the hand of foreigners in almost all major developments in their country. So if Mosaddeq’s government had collapsed through other means, the people probably would’ve still seen it as the work of Britain and the United States. It is true that the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah was weakened because he built his power on the ashes of Mosaddeq's government. But it is far-fetched to say that the Mullahs' rhetoric would’ve been less anti-American if Ajax hadn't happened. Actually, the future leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini (who was close in his thinking to Kashani) didn’t approve of Mosaddeq and his secular nationalism. Since 1979, the Islamic Regime has never paid any real tribute to Mosaddeq and has denounced him in different ways. In their version of events, Kashani is the real liberator who led the struggle for oil-nationalization; the very personality who worked to remove Mosaddeq from power. In this light, Madeleine Albright’s apology in 2000 seems to have given more ammunition to the Islamic Regime for portraying the United States as the Great Satan. If anything, by removing Mosaddeq from power (assuming that Ajax was responsible for that), the United States government worked in tandem with the revolutionary clerics.
Profile Image for Dmitri.
249 reviews237 followers
September 24, 2024
"My countrymen lack the bare necessities of existence. Their standard of living is perhaps the lowest in the world. Our greatest natural asset is oil. It should properly be our national industry and the revenue from it should go to improve our conditions of life."

"If the exploitation of our oil industry continues in which the Iranian plays the part of a mere manual worker, and if foreign exploiters continue to appropriate practically all of the income, then our people will remain forever in a state of poverty and misery."

"Wherever the former (Anglo-Persian Oil) company may operate in the future, it will never again operate in Iran. Neither by trusteeship nor by contract will we turn over to foreigners the right to exploit our oil resources."

-Excerpts from Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's address to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, October 15-17, 1951

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This book is about the 1953 British and American ouster of the democratic government of Iran and reinstatement of a despotic monarchy. It is also the story of PM Mossadegh, elected in 1951 and deposed in 1953. He was educated in Europe, Iran's first law PhD, a fighter for secular democracy and against foreign domination since 1905. From 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., called by Winston Churchill 'a prize beyond our wildest dreams' had been owned by Britain.

Stephen Kinzer, a NYT journalist and specialist in US plots to overthrow foreign governments published this book in 2003. He begins with a whirlwind tour of Iranian history from Cyrus the Great in 550 BC to Alexander the Great in 334 BC and Parthians to Sasanians. Zoroastrianism taught leaders gained legitimacy by just rule. Following the Arab conquest of 633 AD Islam was divided into Sunni and Shia branches. Shia believed that the Sunni caliphate had been corrupted.

After the Mongol conquest of 1220 the Safavid dynasty in 1501 established Iran as the center of Shia Islam. At the turn of the 17th century Abbas Shah combined modernization with tyranny, creating artistic marvels in Isfahan. In the mid-18th century Nadir Shah looted Delhi and lands around. The dissolute Qajars ascended to power during the 19th century selling off natural resources. Movements toward reform were delayed by a British-Russian partition in 1907.

Reza Shah, a strongman from northern Iran, overthrew the Qajars in 1926 collaborating with Britain as the Bolsheviks renounced claims on Iran. An admirer of Ataturk, Reza built roads, rails and banks, banned foreign property sales and constrained religion by authoritarian fiat. A fan of Mussolini and Hitler he ran afoul of the west in WWII, abdicating in 1941. Postwar profits from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. soared as protests proliferated, leading to the rise of nationalists.

In 1950 communists advanced across Korea. The prior year the USSR tested a nuclear weapon and Mao won the civil war in China. Countries across eastern Europe had governments imposed by Moscow. Truman thought the developing world would adopt Marxism if the west didn't accept nationalism. Iran was at risk due to British refusal to compromise on oil leases. Churchill was PM again in 1951 and Eisenhower president in 1953. Britain needed oil to pay US war debts.

In 1951 Iran had nationalized oil fields exploited by Britain for over forty years. Ike took the opposite approach from Truman, who feared British intervention would drive Iran to Soviet aid. A CIA planned coup was put into motion within months of his inauguration, executed by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of Teddy. The goal was to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh and empower the son of Reza Shah. The plot was uncovered and military loyal to the Shah jailed.

Kermit was not daunted by the initial setback to the coup. He was backed by the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State and CIA Director, both cold war icons. Although foreign funded protests and propaganda painted Mossadegh as a Soviet pawn he remained a hero to Iranians for opposition to the British. US involvement wasn't widely known until after his overthrow in 1953. Mossadegh was under arrest to his death in 1967, a sad fate for a man who was a patriot and scholar.

Once Reza Shah Jr was reinstalled on the peacock throne his tenure lasted to the 1979 Islamic revolution. During the time he was a vassal of US and UK oil interests. A pampered and weak ruler he resorted to torture and imprisonment of his perceived enemies. Exiled and sick he was followed by angry mobs shouting "Death to the Shah!". He died in 1980. One of his former antagonists, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to lead the state and held fifty US hostages for over a year.

The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well.

Iran's struggle to modernize provokes questions. Should governments lease national resources? Should developed nations lease land from underdeveloped ones? Foreign investment could help develop domestic infrastructure. Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Co., agreed to 50% royalties in 1950 while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was paying 15%. When contracts were canceled the UK chose embargos and considered armed invasion, an avoidable crisis.

After the restoration of the Shah a deal was struck for fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue between Iran and a consortium of international companies. The UK retained 40% of the foreign half. The US bought a 40% share, the Dutch and France 10% each for $1B total. It was a very favorable arrangement for the west that lasted a quarter century until the revolution of 1979. The Shah presented Kermit a gold cigarette case and Eisenhower a ruby and sapphire encrusted peacock.
Profile Image for Woman Reading  (is away exploring).
470 reviews373 followers
October 23, 2022
4 ☆

During my entire life, I have regarded Iran and Iraq as part of the "troubled Middle East" with its occasional bursts of anger and violence directed at the United States. Even after 9/11, when the US launched military action in this region, I couldn't say that I could unravel the geopolitical complexities that characterize this corner of the world. I have now read a few nonfictions set in Iran in the 20th century, and none of them, including the latest, had been written in a purely objective tone. But at least, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror offered an explanation for the anti-Western sentiment.
It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs the World Trade Center in New York.

Iran had been ruled by a monarch, the Shah (or "king"), for centuries. In the mid-1800s, the Qajar Dynasty under Nasir al-Din Shah began to sell concessions (ie. access) to Iran's natural resources to support a lavish lifestyle instead of benefitting his people. There were no terms of parity as Iran essentially became a cog in Great Britain's industrial empire. Perpetuating his father's practices, Muzzafir al-Din Shah had sold in 1901 the most pivotal concession in his country's history -- access to Iran's natural gas and petroleum for 60 years.

Political instability arrived with the 20th century as the populace began agitating for a constitution, the nascent seeds of democracy. Three distinct segments within Iran wrestled for power: the Qajar ruling clan, the Constitutional reformers, and the Islamic clerics. Simultaneously, Britain and the Russian Empire tussled to maintain their economic interests in Iran and in 1907, they accordingly signed a treaty, notably without any input from Iran. As Russia became engulfed by its own civil war and revolution, Britain took decisive steps which resulted in its effective sovereignty over Iran. In the 1920s, Reza, an uneducated but ambitious military leader, toppled the Qajar dynasty and ruled until 1941. His successor was his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Neither dislodged British business interests nor its military presence.

Although it took nearly a decade to find oil, the company's patience had been generously rewarded. The British executives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company possessed extractive colonial attitudes. They also had the solid backing of the British government, which had owned a 51 percent share in the company since 1913. By the mid-1900s, the abused Iranian workers could tolerate no more the management's profit-maximizing ethos. Mohammad Reza Shah was not effective on behalf of the Iranian oil workers.
The riots that shook Abadan led many Iranians to rally to the workers' cause, partly out of instinctive sympathy but also because of the grossly unequal terms under which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company operated. In 1947, for example, the company reported an after-tax profit of £40 million-the equivalent of $112 million dollars-and gave Iran just £7 million. To make matters worse, it never complied with its commitment under the 1933 agreement with Reza Shah to give laborers better pay and more chance for advancement, nor had it built the schools, hospitals, roads, or telephone system it promised. Manucher Farmanfarmaian, who in 1949 became director of Iran's petroleum institute, was appalled by what he found at Abadan.

Mohammad Mossadegh had been rising in popularity since he resumed his political career in the late 1940s. By 1951, he was on the brink of becoming the next Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadegh agreed to do so only if parliament accepted his proposal to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On May 1, 1951, Anglo-Iranian's concession was revoked and it was replaced by the newly established National Iranian Oil Company.

After a century of involvement in Iran, Britain did not remain idle in the face of this loss. So when Mossadegh's administration expelled the British diplomats, they turned to their American allies for assistance. Author Stephen Kinzer firmly pointed his finger at specific employees of the British and American governments. President Harry Truman opposed any military intervention on behalf of British economic interests. But in 1952, Truman was replaced by Dwight Eisenhower, who heeded the anti-Communist strategies of his Secretary of State John Dulles [the one for whom the Washington DC Airport is named] and brother Allen Dulles [who became the head of the CIA]. With the approval of POTUS Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a coup d'état (codenamed "Operation Ajax") had been successfully orchestrated against Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953.
"My only crime," Mossadegh told his judges, "is that I nationalized the Iranian oil industry and removed from this land the network of colonialism and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on earth."

Kinzer argued that the consequences of Operation Ajax have reverberated throughout the ensuing decades in the fraught international relationships. I found Chapter 12, in which he wrapped up his thesis, interesting even though I wasn't completely convinced. The author had cited academic research which concluded that many of the geopolitical tensions of the 21st century are the rotten fruit borne of the 1953 coup. I have no doubt that the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran was directly connected with Operation Ajax but I remain skeptical of the longer term repercussions. Given Ayatollah Khomeini's fervency, who is to say that he wouldn't have gained power without the US-led toppling of Mohammad Mossadegh?

Overall, I found All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror to be quite intriguing. I now have a better grasp of both Iran's modern history and, sadly, interference by the US government. The fact that it took me months to finish it is not a reflection on the writing but of my ability to become distracted by real life.
Profile Image for Jon Nakapalau.
6,434 reviews996 followers
February 6, 2024
The overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh is one of the little known events that lead to Mohammad Reza Shah coming to power in Iran. This book looks at the tragic aftermath - and the continuing strife - that was a direct result of this act. It is very clear that because Mohammad Mossadegh wanted more oil profits for his country the US/UK decided he had to be replaced. A sad commentary on the limits of commitment given to elected officials who advocate for their people over global corporate interests.
Profile Image for C..
770 reviews119 followers
March 24, 2017
Eye-opening, sad and infuriating read. Tells how the U.S. destroyed the birth of democracy in the middle east, which began in Iran, and now falsely accuses Iran as a sponsor of Mid-East terrorism, when in truth, it's the Saudis!
Always remember majority of Islamist terrorists are 'Sunni' Muslims, while Iran are Shia Muslims!
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